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0.	  Outline	  	  Film	  is	  an	  omnipresent	  medium	  in	  today’s	  world,	  playing	  a	  crucial	  role	   in	  a	  massive	  amuse-­‐ment	   industry,	   in	   advertisement	   as	  well	   as	   in	   information	   distribution,	   education,	   sciences	  and	  the	  arts.	  What	  and	  how	  we	  perceive	  the	  world	  when	  we	  perceive	  it	  via	  film	  thus	  seems	  an	  important	  question	   to	  answer.	  Still,	   the	  principles	  of	   film	  perception	  are	  barely	  understood.	  This	   thesis	  presents	  some	  of	   the	  newest	  steps	   in	  an	   interdisciplinary	  approach	   to	  exploring	  human	   creation	   and	   perception	   of	   film.	   Specifically,	   it	   reports	   about	   two	   high	   density	   EEG	  studies	  investigating	  the	  role	  of	  camera	  movement	  and	  montage	  in	  live-­‐action	  edited	  moving	  images	   while	   being	   informed	   by	   modern	   theoretical	   approaches	   to	   cognition	   as	   will	   be	  outlined	   in	   the	   following.	   Live-­‐action	   edited	   moving	   images	   comprise	   any	   kind	   of	   film	   or	  video,	  consisting	  of	   shots	  recorded	  by	  means	  of	  a	  camera	   filming	   live	  events	   (in	  contrast	   to	  animations),	  with	   these	   shots	  being	   then	  edited	   together	   to	   form	  a	  perceptually	   continuous	  stream	   of	   images.1	  This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   contemporary	   concepts	   of	   how	   the	  mind	  works,	  known	   as	   4EA	   (embedded,	   embodied,	   enactive,	   extended	   and	   affective)	   approaches	   to	   cog-­‐nition,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  develop	  a	  notion	  of	  the	  human	  perception	  of	  life-­‐action	  edited	  movies	  which	   can	   crucially	   illuminate	   the	   principles	   of	   movie	   making	   and	   movie	   experience.	  Especially,	   as	   this	   thesis	  will	   outline,	   they	   can	   help	   to	   gain	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   role	   of	  camera	  movement	  and	  montage	  in	  procuring	  deep	  involvement	  of	  the	  spectators	  in	  the	  film’s	  fictional	  world.	  This	  thesis	  will	  show	  how	  such	  theoretical	  conceptualisations	  can	  be	  used	  to	  derive	   precise	   hypotheses	   testable	   in	   an	   experimental	   setup	   of	   cognitive	   neuroscience,	  enabling	  us	  to	  enhance	  our	  knowledge	  about	  how	  movies	  can	  move	  us	  the	  way	  they	  do.	  The	  following	  paragraphs	  will	  shortly	  outline	  the	  main	  aspects	  of	  this	  project.	  	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition	  camera	  movement	  and	  montages	  can	  be	  described	  as	  rendering	  a	  film	  experience	  into	  an	  interaction	  between	  a	  fictional	  world	  and	  an	  embodied	   inhabitant	   of	   this	   world,	   the	   spectator.	   Specifically,	   they	   suggest	   that	   camera	  movements	   and	   montages	   create	   visual	   experiences	   that	   recruit	   and	   sustain	   the	   complete	  embodied	  skills	  of	   the	  perceiver,	   that	   is,	  his	  habits	  and	  experiences	   from	  his	  daily	   life	  as	  an	  embodied	  being	  actively	  exploring	   the	   real	  world.	   In	   consequence,	   the	   illusion	  of	  a	   fictional	  environment	   gets	   created,	   in	   interaction	   with	   which	   humans	   can	   deeply	   immerse	   in	   the	  movie,	  an	  experience	  known	  to	  all	  of	  us.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  proposed	  that	  moving	  images	  closely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  From	  here	  on	  the	  terms	  “film”	  or	  “movie”	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  specific	  subclass	  of	  moving	  images,	  unless	  stated	  otherwise.	  2	  “Massive	   Open	   Online	   Courses”	   used	   by	   millions	   of	   learners	   of	   all	   nationalities,	   ages	   and	   educational	   backgrounds	   are	  nowadays	   revolutionising	   the	   educational	   field.	   See	   http://ideas.ted.com/2014/01/29/moocs-­‐by-­‐the-­‐numbers-­‐where-­‐are-­‐
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resembling	   vision	   in	   real	   life	   take	   over	   a	   substantiating	   role	   in	   this	   relationship,	  while	   also	  allowing	  the	  occurrence	  of	  violations,	  such	  as	  innovative	  perspectives	  and	  moves	  or	  temporal	  or	  spatial	  jumps,	  for	  which	  movies	  are	  equally	  famous.	  Lastly,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  derivable	  that	  the	  embodied	  perceptual	  activity	  of	  a	  spectator,	  guided	  by	  the	  movies,	  over	  time,	  can	  even	  learn	  new	   habits	   in	   perceiving	   the	   world.	   Such	   process	   might	   turn	   effects	   that	   were	   previously	  experienced	  as	  strong	  violations	  into	  only	  slight	  deviations	  or	  even	  known	  perceptual	  circum-­‐stances.	  	  To	  follow,	  test	  and	  exploit	  such	  a	  concept	  of	  film	  perception,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  necessary	  to	  better	  understand,	  what	  it	  means	  to	  perceive	  familiarity	  or	  violation	  of	  a	  perceptual	  habit	  in	  a	  film.	  The	  following	  thesis	  will	  show	  how	  the	  above	  sketched	  notion	  of	  film	  perception	  and	  recent	  theoretical	   and	   empirical	   work	   on	   related	   topics	   can	   be	   used	   to	   formulate	   three	   precise	  hypotheses,	  able	   to	  guide	   two	  neuroscientific	  experiments	   that	  can	  precisely	   illuminate	   this	  point.	  In	  the	  experiments,	  we	  assessed	  the	  spectators’	  brain	  activity	  and	  subjective	  experience	  during	  a	  movie	  by	  a	  high	  density	  EEG	  recording	  and	  a	   related	  rating	   task,	  while	   comparing	  responses	   to	  moving	   images	   that,	   due	   to	   the	   application	   of	   camera	  movement	   or	  montage,	  either	  more	  or	   less	   closely	   resemble	   vision	   as	   experienced	   in	   real	   life.	  The	  hypotheses	   that	  guided	   the	   analysis	   (as	   will	   be	   developed	   in	   the	   thesis)	   concerned	   1)	   the	   detection	   of	   a	  violation	  of	  visual	  habits,	  2)	  the	  postperceptual	  processing	  of	  a	  violation	  of	  visual	  habits,	  and	  3)	   the	   effect	   of	   familiarity	   with	   and	   violations	   of	   perceptual	   habits	   on	   activation	   of	   motor	  cortex	  areas	  during	  action	  observation	  (mirror	  mechanism).	  The	  first	  study	  focused	  mainly	  on	  the	  last	  point,	  while	  looking	  for	  differences	  in	  motor	  cortex	  activations	  of	  spectators	  watching	  short	  action	  movie	  clips	  produced	  by	  applying	  different	  types	  of	  camera	  movements	  or	  uses	  (steadicam,	   dollycam	   and	   zoom).	   The	   second	   study	   tested	   all	   three	   hypotheses	   by	   inves-­‐tigating	  differences	  in	  ERP	  and	  frequency	  data	  of	  spectators	  watching	  short	  action	  movie	  clips	  produced	   by	   applying	   different	   types	   of	  montages	   (continuity	   editing	   versus	   reverse	   shot).	  The	   results	   are	  discussed	  within	   the	   chosen	   framework	  while	  underlining	   the	  new	   findings	  made	  and	  the	  ideas	  developed	  for	  future	  research	  due	  to	  the	  specific	  perspective	  taken.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  is	  structured	  as	  follows:	  The	   introduction	   answers	   the	  most	   fundamental	   question	   justifying	   this	  work,	   that	   is,	  why	  film	  should	  be	  a	  topic	  of	  neuroscientific	  research	  to	  begin	  with.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  pointing	  out	  the	  strong	  presence	  of	  film	  and	  the	  important	  role	  it	  plays	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  sectors	  in	  our	  daily	  life.	  It	  then	  illustrates	  the	  explicit	  differences	  between	  a	  world	  presented	  by	  a	  movie	  and	  the	  world	  that	  surrounds	  us	  in	  real	  life,	  while	  stressing	  our	  common	  neglect	  of	  these	  differences,	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crucially	  enabling	  the	  strong	  impact	  of	  films	  on	  us.	  This	  finally	  allows	  this	  chapter	  to	  present	  filmmakers	  as	  ‘specialists	  of	  human	  cognition’	  and	  their	  products	  as	  an	  object	  worth	  studying	  also	  from	  a	  neuroscientific	  perspective.	  	  The	   second	   chapter	   introduces	  4EA	  approaches	   to	   cognition	  by	  pointedly	   contrasting	   them	  with	  competing	  perspectives	  within	  a	  theory	  of	  mind	  and	  illustrating	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  different	  stances	   on	   experimental	  works	   on	   cognition.	   It	   then	   reports	   about	   the	   particularly	   difficult	  standing	   of	   4EA	   approaches	   in	   the	   history	   of	   media	   and	   art	   research,	   while	   at	   the	   end	  highlighting	  promising	  outcomes	  of	  most	  recent	  experimental	  works	  that	  use	  this	  framework.	  In	   the	   following	   part,	   it	   presents	   the	   specificity	   of	   film	   in	   comparison	   to	   other	   media	   and	  describes	   how	   this	   special	   character	   can	   be	   conceptualized	   using	   4EA	   approaches	   to	   cog-­‐nition.	  Lastly,	  it	  formulates	  the	  hypotheses	  regarding	  brain	  activations	  during	  film	  perception	  that	   can	   be	   derived	   from	   such	   a	   reconceptualization,	   and	   that	   served	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   the	  neuroscientific	  experiments	  reported	  on	  in	  Chapter	  III.	  	  The	  third	  chapter	  describes	  the	  two	  experimental	  studies	  on	  film	  conducted	  during	  my	  PhD,	  comprising	  detailed	  presentation	  of	  design,	  analyses,	  findings	  and	  interpretations.	  	  Lastly,	   the	   fourth	   chapter	   summarizes	   the	   results	  made	   in	   both	   studies,	  while	   conclusively	  underlining	  their	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  why	  movies	  move	  us	  the	  way	  they	  do.	  An	  outlook	  to	  further	  experiments	  and	  future	  projects	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  the	  thesis.	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I.	  Introduction:	  Film	  as	  a	  topic	  for	  psychological	  and	  neuroscientific	  research	  	  Taking	  into	  account	  how	  much	  there	  is	  still	  left	  to	  do	  in	  neuroscientific	  research	  about	  human	  perception	  and	  cognition	  in	  real	  life	  settings,	  some	  might	  argue	  that	  exploring	  mechanisms	  of	  film	  perception	  might	   be	   a	   project	   of	  minor	   importance.	   This	   view	  however	   dismisses	   that	  film	  perception	  is	  everything	  but	  a	  side	  phenomenon	  of	  today’s	  life.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  film	  is	  omnipresent	   in	   today’s	  world.	  Recent	   surveys	   reported	   that	   average	  people	   for	   as	  much	   as	  about	  1/5	  of	   their	   lifetime	  are	   confronted	  with	  edited	  moving	   image	  material,	   a	  big	  part	  of	  which	   consists	   of	   live-­‐action	   edited	   movies	   in	   the	   above	   defined	   sense	   (U.S.	   Bureau	   of	  Statistics,	  2014;	  see	  also	  Casetti,	  2015).	  This	  is	  easy	  to	  believe	  considering	  that	  these	  kind	  of	  films	   are	   one	   of	   the	   main	   products	   of	   a	   massive	   amusement	   industry	   with	   an	   enormous	  impact	  on	  economics,	  amounting	  in	  the	  United	  States	  alone	  to	  7-­‐8	  billion	  cinema	  admissions	  and	  about	  25	  billion	  US$	  income	  due	  to	  video/DVD	  sales	  every	  year.	  Films	  also	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  all	  contexts	  focusing	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  information,	  ranging	  from	  public	  media	  to	  the	  steadily	  growing	  sector	  of	  MOOCs2.	  In	  behavioral,	  cognitive	  and	  neurological	  scienes,	  films	  often	   find	   application	   as	   stimuli	   that	   allow	   the	   controlled	   assessment	   of	   behavioral	   and	  physiological	  responses	  to	  real	  world	  stimuli.	  Furthermore,	  films	  represent	  a	  specific	  medium	  of	  artistic	  production,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  impressive	  capacities	  of	  mankind,	  fascinating	  scholars	  of	  various	  disciplines.	  Lastly,	  in	  all	  of	  these	  contexts,	  films	  may	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  be	  used	  and	  are	  used	  for	  purposes	  of	  decision	  and	  opinion	  making,	  which	  alone	  makes	  them	  a	  topic	  worth	  studying	  from	  different	  angles.	  	  One	  might	  hypothesize	  that	  the	  popularity	  of	  live-­‐action	  movie	  usage,	  illustrated	  above,	  is	  due	  to	  its	  close	  similarity	  to	  normal	  perception.	  Thanks	  to	  today’s	  recording	  techniques,	  film	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  present	  the	  world	  visually	  and	  auditorily	  in	  real	  time,	  thus,	   in	  comparison	  to	  other	  media,	  to	  best	  simulate	  the	  sensual	  richness,	  directness	  and	  vividness	  of	  the	  real	  world.	  This	  view	  however	  pays	  too	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  world	  presented	  in	  film	  and	   the	  experiences	  we	  entertain	   in	   real	   life.	  Even	   if	   leaving	  out	  animation	  and	  special	  effects	  made	  possible	  by	   today’s	  digital	   capacities,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	  point	  out	  how	   the	   two	  most	  traditional	  narrative	  devices	  of	  film,	  that	  is	  the	  use	  of	  camera	  movements	  and	  montage,	  create	  a	   representation	   of	   the	  world	   extremely	   divergent	   from	   the	  way	   our	   normal	   daily	   life	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “Massive	   Open	   Online	   Courses”	   used	   by	   millions	   of	   learners	   of	   all	   nationalities,	   ages	   and	   educational	   backgrounds	   are	  nowadays	   revolutionising	   the	   educational	   field.	   See	   http://ideas.ted.com/2014/01/29/moocs-­‐by-­‐the-­‐numbers-­‐where-­‐are-­‐we-­‐now.	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bodily	  being	  allows	  it	  us	  to	  see	  and	  experience.	  Shots	  from	  high	  above	  the	  ceilings	  or	  from	  low	  above	  the	  ground,	  wide	  angles	  and	  extreme	  close-­‐ups,	  zoom	  ins	  and	  zoom	  outs,	  looks	  over	  the	  shoulder	  of	  the	  murderer	  or	  even	  from	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  victim	  –	  the	  camera	  literally	  multiplies	  our	   capacities	   of	   being	   and	   moving.	   Moreover,	   montages	   editing	   shots	   sometimes	   only	  seconds	  in	  length	  but	  connecting	  scenes	  far	  apart	  in	  time	  and	  space,	  allow	  us	  to	  switch	  from	  yesterday	  to	  today	  or	  the	  far	  future,	  leaping	  from	  earth	  to	  the	  moon	  or	  jumping	  from	  buying	  a	  gun	  to	  burying	  a	  person	   in	  a	  split	   second.	  Furthermore,	   they	  even	  enable	   the	  quasi-­‐sensory	  experiences	  of	  parallel,	  circular	  or	  reverse	  action,	  phenomena	  so	  contrary	  to	  our	  capacities	  as	  real	   living	   creatures	   that	   it	   is	   indeed	   hard	   to	   imagine	   how	   we	   could	   have	   imagined	   them	  without	  media	  and	  arts.	  	  Remarkably,	  at	  least	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  tradition	  of	  narrative	  cinema	  and	  movies,	  little	  of	  these	  manipulations	  in	  film	  catch	  our	  direct	  attention	  or	  challenge	  us	  intellectually	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  throws	  us	  out	  of	  our	  deep	  involvement	  with	  the	  movie’s	  plot.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  previous	  research	  has	  shown,	  that	  the	  capacity	  to	  easily	  follow	  movies	  is	  neither	  culture	  or	  education	  nor	   specifically	   age	   dependent3,	   with	   neither	   small	   kids	   nor	   media	   inexperienced	   adult	  spectators	   of	   non-­‐western	   origin	   showing	   a	   problem	   in	   understanding	   the	   narratives	  presented	   by	   edited	   moving	   images	   of	   the	   type	   described	   above	   (Schwan	   &	   Ildirar,	   2010;	  Comuntzis,	   1987,	   19914).	   Moreover,	   further	   research	   showed,	   that	   the	   almost	   transparent	  nature	  of	  the	  devices	  reported	  about	  (that	  is	  camera	  use	  and	  montage)	  is	  able	  even	  to	  resist	  us	  when	   we	   are	   explicitly	   focusing	   on	   their	   application.	   To	   give	   an	   example,	   Zacks,	   Speer	   &	  Reynolds	   (2009)	   showed,	   that	   even	   if	   participants	   were	   explicitly	   asked	   to	   press	   a	   button	  every	  time	  they	  spotted	  a	  cut	  in	  a	  movie,	  some	  of	  the	  cuts	  were	  missed.5	  	  The	  apparent	  per-­‐ception-­‐deluding	  power	  of	  movies	  demonstrated	  by	  these	  findings	  did	  from	  the	  very	  start	  of	  film	   production	   stimulate	   researchers	   to	   think	   of	   filmmakers	   as	   implicit	   specialists	   of	   per-­‐ception,	   and	   of	   their	   products	   as	   objects	   obviously	   worth	   being	   studied	   by	   all	   sciences	  determined	  to	  illuminate	  the	  principles	  and	  capacities	  of	  human	  cognition.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Excluded	   are	  of	   course	   infants	   or	   age-­‐related	  demented	  people,	  who	   are	  not	   able	   to	   follow	  even	   real	   life	   events	   in	  basic	  terms	  usual	  for	  a	  normal	  functioning	  adult.	  4	  However,	  for	  an	  interesting	  study	  that	  indicates	  some	  culture-­‐specific	  differences,	  see	  Worth	  &	  Adair,	  1972,	  also	  critically	  discussed	  in	  Smith,	  2005.	  5	  For	  further	  details	  about	  this	  study	  see	  chapter	  III.2.1	  of	  this	  thesis.	  6	  Indeed,	  already	  in	  1916	  the	  psychologist	  Hugo	  Münsterberg	  dedicated	  a	  whole	  book	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  film	  perception,	  that	  is	  especially	  to	  the	  mental	  performances	  he	  assumed	  to	  underlie	  this	  special	  kind	  of	  experience.	  Even	  if	  film	  experience	  as	  it	  will	  be	  described	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  ultimately	  captured	  by	  his	  assumptions,	  his	  observations	  in	  total	  are	  of	  highly	  illuminating	  character	  and	  the	  book	  strongly	  recommended.	  See	  Münsterberg	  (1916):	  The	  Photoplay.	  Antonio	  Damasio	  stated,	  that	  those	  filmmakers	  who	  made	  film	  what	  it	  is	  and	  can	  do	  today	  must	  have	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  human	  brain	  (Damasio,	  2008).	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  Interestingly,	  though	  this	  view	  has	  also	  been	  promoted	  by	  scholars	  of	  the	  neuroscientific	  field	  (see	   for	   example	  Dudai,	   2012),	   neuroscientific	   studies	   explicitly	   dedicated	   to	   this	   issue	   are	  still	  of	  limited	  number.	  A	  crucial	  reason	  for	  this	  might	  be	  the	  immense	  richness	  of	  movies	  not	  fitting	   to	   the	   general	   principle	   of	   experimental	   research,	  which	  must	   use	   controlled	   stimuli	  only.	  To	  get	  interpretable	  results	  it	  is	  considered	  highly	  necessary	  to	  create	  stimuli	  and	  tasks	  allowing	  that	  all	  participants	  actually	  engage	  in	  the	  same	  cognitive	  processes.	  Thinking	  about	  the	   complex	   interactions	   of	   film	   plot,	   film	   style	   and	   the	   individual	   background	   of	   the	   per-­‐ceiver,	  especially	  over	  the	  rather	  long	  duration	  of	  a	  movie,	  indeed	  raises	  the	  question	  if	  there	  can	  be	  anything	  shared	  at	  all	  between	  spectators	   -­‐	  concerning	  the	  processing	  as	  well	  as	   the	  related	  subjective	  experience	  of	  the	  film.	  Likely,	   the	  most	   famous	  study	  dedicated	  to	  the	  ex-­‐ploration	  of	   this	   question	  was	   conducted	  by	  Hasson	   et	   al.	   (Hasson,	   Furman,	   Clark,	  Dudai	  &	  Davachi,	  2008;	  but	  see	  also	  for	  a	  publication	  in	  a	  journal	  of	  film	  sciences:	  Hasson,	  Landesman,	  Knappmeyer,	  Vallines,	  Rubin,	  &	  Heeger,	  2008).	  Using	  fMRI	  recording	  of	  participants	  watching	  actual	  commercial	  movies,	  the	  authors	  demonstrated	  that	  for	  some	  movies	  and	  during	  certain	  time	  windows	  BOLD	  responses	  and	  gaze	  behavior	  of	  participants	  showed	  a	  significant	  corre-­‐lation.	  This	  finding	  was	  interpreted	  as	  indicating	  that	  movies	  are	  able	  to	  “exert	  considerable	  control	  over	  brain	  activity	  and	  eye	  movements”	  (Hasson	  et	  al.,	  2008b,	  p.1).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  authors	   also	   stressed	   that	   the	   level	   of	   correlation	   between	   participants’	   responses	   signi-­‐ficantly	  varied	  as	  a	  function	  of	  movie	  content,	  editing	  and	  directing	  style.	  Interestingly,	  after	  this,	  only	  very	  few	  other	  studies	  used	  neuroscientific	  methods	  to	  explore	  these	  observations	  on	  a	   smaller	   scale,	   showing	  only	   short	   sequences	  of	   film	  and	   focusing	  on	  one	  problem	  at	   a	  time,	  for	  instance	  the	  effects	  of	  specific	  filmic	  devices	  such	  as	  montage	  and	  camera	  movement	  on	   spectators’	   brain	   responses	   (see	   for	   an	   exception	   Magliano	   &	   Zacks	   (2011)	   further	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  III	  of	  this	  thesis).	  	  	  The	  studies	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  were	  designed	  to	  start	  filling	  this	  gap,	  while	  being	  guided	  by	  what	  is	  called	  the	  “4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition”.	  The	  following	  chapter	  will	  introduce	  this	  notion	   by	   contrasting	   it	   against	   competing	   perspectives,	   as	   well	   as	   by	   illustrating	   how	   in	  previous	  decades	  it	  has	  influenced	  experimental	  research	  about	  cognition	  in	  general	  and	  art	  perception	  specifically.	  Finally	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  how	  4EA	  approaches	  considerably	  affect	  our	  understanding	   of	   film	   perception	   and	   how	   this	   can	   be	   exploited	   by	   cognitive	   neuroscience	  exploring	  film	  perception.	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II.	  Theoretical	  Background:	  Why	  introduce	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  film?	  II.1	  Enacted,	  embodied,	  embedded,	  extended	  and	  affective	  cognition	  as	  a	  new	  concept	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  and	  in	  empirical	  research	  about	  cognition	  	  Cognitive	   Sciences	   historically	   developed	   in	   demarcation	   to	   behaviorism	   as	   the	   dominant	  paradigm	  in	  life	  sciences	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  As	  explained	  by	  B.F.	  Skinner	  in	  his	   book	  Verbal	   behavior,	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   human	   performance	   in	   bodily	   as	   well	   as	  mental	   tasks,	   behaviorism	  promotes	   focusing	   on	   functional	   relations	  between	   stimulus	   and	  response	  only,	  without	  positing	  internal	  representations	  of	  an	  actually	  unapproachable	  mind	  (Skinner,	  1957).	  In	  the	  70s	  and	  80s	  of	  the	  last	  century,	  a	  huge	  part	  of	  research	  separated	  from	  this	   prevalent	   perspective	   in	   order	   to	   move	   on	   to	   directly	   exploring	   the	   organization	   and	  processing	  mechanisms	   of	   human	   perception	   and	   cognition.	   One	   strong	   school	   in	   this	   new	  wave	  especially	  focused	  on	  computer	  models	  and	  language	  to	  model	  cognition.7	  Consequently,	  in	   these	   newly	   arising	   theories,	   perception	   has	   been	   conceptualized	   as	   being	   based	   on	   un-­‐filtered	   sensory	   input	   from	   an	   outside	  world	   passively	   registered	   by	   our	   senses.	   Internally	  then,	   that	   is	   mainly	   in	   the	   brain,	   sharply	   distinct	   and	   highly	   specified	   neural	   mechanisms,	  shaped	   by	   natural	   selection	   and	   encoded	   in	   genetic	   structures,	   process	   and	   combine	   the	  information	   received.	   This	   at	   the	   end	   leads	   to	   discrete	  modal	   as	  well	   as	   combined	   amodal	  representations	   of	   what	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   the	   outside	   world,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   future	  behavior	  can	  be	  planned	  and	  anticipated	  (see	  for	  a	  pointed	  description	  also	  Noë,	  2004,	  p.35).	  Within	   this	   framework,	   fundamental	   research	   of	   the	   last	   decades	   produced	   crucial	   insights	  into	   the	  principles	   of	   human	   cognition	   leading	   to	   enormous	  progress	   in	   sciences	   as	  well	   in	  applied	  fields	  such	  as	  IT,	  medicine	  or	  education.	  	  Nevertheless,	   this	   idea	  of	   the	  mind	  has	  been	  challenged	  by	  embedded,	  embodied,	  extended,	  enacted	   and	   affective	   perspectives	   on	   cognition	   (referred	   to	   as	   4EA	   approaches,	   see	   for	  example	   Ward	   &	   Stapleton,	   2010)	   commonly	   stressing	   the	   highly	   dynamical	   character	   of	  cognition	   described	   as	   arising	   always	   anew	   in	   the	   interaction	   between	   animate	   bodies	   and	  their	   enlivened	  world.	   Shortly	   referring	   to	   the	  different	   aspects	   involved,	   these	   approaches	  can	  be	  described	  as	  characterizing	  the	  mind	  as	  being	  scaffolded	  by	  environmental	  structures	  (à	  embedded	  cognition,	  see	  for	  example	  Donald,	  1991),	  that	  are	  available	  to	  the	  mind	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	   is	  realized	  not	  just	   in	  the	  brain,	  but	  rather	  in	  a	  body	  with	  its	  specific	  sensory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  Horst	  (2011).	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motor	  skills	  (à	  embodied	  cognition,	  see	  for	  example	  O’Regan	  and	  Noë,	  2001;	  Gallese8,	  2008).	  These	  skills	  enable	  the	  embodied	  mind	  to	  even	  integrate	  elements	  of	  the	  world	  in	  its	  cognitive	  functioning	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  body	  as	  such	  (à	  extended	  cognition,	  see	  for	  example	  Clark	  &	   Chalmers,	   1998).	   Furthermore,	   such	   a	   complementation	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   realized	   not	  once	  and	   for	  ever,	  but	  again	  and	  again	   in	  a	  self-­‐refining	  continuous	   interaction	  of	   this	  body	  with	  the	  world,	  including	  other	  social	  agents	  (àenacted	  cognition,	  see	  Varela,	  Thompson	  and	  Rosch,	  1991;	  de	  Jaeger	  &	  di	  Paolo,	  2007).	  Finally,	  it	  is	  taken	  into	  account	  that	  the	  body,	  in	  its	  interaction	  with	  the	  world,	  approaches	  and	  responds	  to	  it	  as	  a	  body	  in	  all	  its	  facets,	  including	  viscerality	   and	   affects	   (à	   affective	   cognition,	   see	   Forgas,	   2000;	   Colombetti	   2014).9	  Taken	  together:	   for	   an	   embedded,	   embodied,	   extended,	   enactive	   and	   affective	   mind	   situated	   in	   a	  world	   “at	   his	   grasp”,	   objects	   are	   not	   just	   passively	   perceived	  with	   regard	   to	   their	   physical	  steady	  features,	  but	  actively	  experienced	  and	  approached	  as	  affording	  interactions.	  The	  pre-­‐cise	  nature	  of	  these	  affordances	  on	  the	  one	  side	  depends	  on	  the	  capacities	  and	  current	  states	  of	   the	  embodied	  mind	  (that	  are	  not	  only	  given	  by	  his	  physical	  and	  sensual	  possibilities	  and	  actual	   feelings	   and	   needs	   but	   also	   by	   his	   prior	   experiences,	   see	   also	   Gibson,	   1979),	   on	   the	  other	  side	  by	  possibilities	  only	  just	  arising	  from	  the	  interactions.	  Consequently,	  the	  realization	  of	   certain	   affordances	  might,	   depending	   on	   body	   and	   objects,	   create	   new	   experiences	   that,	  given	  time	  and	  space,	  give	  rise	  to	  new	  affordances	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  cognition	  is	  a	  work	  in	  progress,	  happening	  and	  evolving	  in	  the	  dynamic	  interaction	  between	  animate	  bodies	  and	  a	  world	  including	  objects	  and	  other	  social	  agents.	  	  	  Some	   scholars	   argue	   that,	   given	   this	   concept,	   one	   can	   abandon	   notions	   such	   as	   “internal	  representations”	  altogether	  (see	  Hutto	  &	  Myin,	  2012),	  while	  others	  only	  claim	  a	  major	  influ-­‐ence	   of	   habits	   of	   body-­‐world	   interactions	   on	   all	   cognitive	   functions	   (still	   involving	  mental	  representations,	  although	  in	  a	  “bodily	  format”,	  see	  Gallese	  and	  Sinigaglia,	  2010,	  2011).	  	  Independent	   of	   this	   question	   and	   the	   answer	   chosen,	   the	   4EA	   approaches	   have	   been	   enor-­‐mously	  influential	  over	  the	  last	  decades	  in	  the	  humanities	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  Especially	  for	  the	  latter,	  this	  is	  mostly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  allow	  to	  reformulate	  old	  and	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  8	  As	  Gallese	  argued:	  “Our	  vision	  of	  the	  world	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  dynamic,	  relational	  and	  intentional.	  As	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  writes	   in	  The	  Phenomenology	  of	  Perception	   (1962),‘The	   identity	  of	   the	   thing	   through	  perceptual	  experience	   is	  only	  another	  aspect	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  one’s	  body	  throughout	  exploratory	  movements;	  thus	  they	  are	  the	  same	  in	  kind	  as	  each	  other’.	  I	  posit	  that	   this	   dynamic	   account	   of	   vision	   depends	   on	   agency.	   In	   this	   respect	   vision	   shares	   with	   other	   dynamic	   senses	   (for	  example,touch)	  the	  same	  logic	  of	  operation	  (2000,	  p.	  34).	  	  9	  Of	  course	  these	  inclusions	  and	  reconceptualizations	  were	  not	  done	  all	  at	  once.	  It	  was	  rather	  a	  slow	  widening	  of	  perspective	  on	  what	   should	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   crucial	   for	   cognition.	   From	   a	   traditional	   view	   describing	   the	   brain	   and	   our	   nervous	  system	   in	   their	   genetically	   prewired	   conditions	   as	   the	   only	   important	   player,	   positions	   step	   by	   step	   opened	   up	   to	   other	  possible	   contributors	   to	   cognition,	   that	   is	   culture	   and	   situational	   context,	   the	   lived	   body,	   and	   an	   inanimate	   and	   animate	  surrounding	  world	  with	  its	  capacities	  and	  helping	  facilities.	  For	  further	  explanations	  see	  back	  in	  the	  text.	  
	   12	  
pose	   new	   questions	   and	   hypotheses	   regarding	   long-­‐known	   problems,	   often	   leading	   to	   sur-­‐prising	  discoveries	   and	  answers	   in	  empirical	   research.	   In	   the	   following,	   I	  will	   illustrate	   this	  with	   respect	   to	   two	  questions,	  which	  are	  of	  apparent	   importance	  also	   for	   the	  perception	  of	  live-­‐action	  edited	  moving	   images:	   firstly,	   the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  know	  about	  the	   inanimate	  environment,	  and	  secondly,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  understand	  animate	  others.	  To	   keep	   a	   clear	   structure,	   I	  will	   talk	   about	   the	   two	   questions	   separately,	   starting	  with	   our	  access	   to	   the	   inanimate	   world.	   Furthermore,	   I	   will	   always	   first	   sketch	   how	   the	   cognitivist	  approach	  to	  cognition	  did	  look	  at	  a	  certain	  problem,	  then	  outline	  the	  problematic	  aspects	  of	  the	   related	  models.	   Following	   this,	   I	   will	   describe	   some	   reconceptualizations	   suggested	   by	  scholars	  defending	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition,	  while	  lastly	  giving	  examples	  of	  experimental	  explorations	  of	  these	  latter	  approaches.	  Results	  will	  be	  summarized	  shortly	  at	  the	  end.	  	  II.1.1	  Question	  1:	  How	  do	  we	  know	  about	  the	  inanimate	  world?	  	  II.1.1.1	  From	  passive	  perception	  to	  active	  exploration	  	  As	   already	   sketched	   above,	   traditional	   cognitivist	   theories	   of	   mind	   and	   related	   scientific	  models	   describe	   perception	   as	   a	   process	   in	   which	   the	   brain	   uses	   a	   set	   of	   evolutionary	  preselected,	   highly	   specialized	   algorithms	   to	   (re-­‐)construct	   a	   detailed	   representation	  of	   the	  outside	   world,	   starting	   from	   the	   “imprints”	   of	   this	   world	   registered	   by	   our	   senses	   (for	  scientific	  models	  describing	  vision	   in	  this	  way,	  see	   for	  example	  Marr,	  1992;	  Poggio,	  Torre	  &	  Koch,	  1985).	  In	  the	  following,	  I	  will	  explicitly	  focus	  on	  visual	  perception	  to	  illustrate	  problems	  and	  new	  solutions	  regarding	  this	  view.	  	  One	  of	  the	  biggest	  difficulties,	  especially	  for	  visual	  sciences,	  has	  been	  the	  question	  of	  “how	  the	  brain	   bridges	   the	   gap	   between	   what	   is	   given	   to	   the	   visual	   system	   and	   what	   is	   actually	  experienced	  by	  the	  perceiver”	  (Noë	  et	  al.,	  2000,	  p.96).	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  growing	  knowledge	  about	   the	   actual	   anatomical	   and	   physiological	   circumstances	   of	   perception,	   such	   as	   the	  constant	  movements	  of	  our	  eyes	  and	  the	  blind	  spot	  of	   the	  retina,	  made	  more	  and	  more	  of	  a	  miracle	   the	   fact	   that	  what	  we	  apparently	  perceive	   is	  not	  rambling	  patches	  of	  a	   fragmentary	  world,	   but	   rather	   smooth	   and	   continuous	   impressions	   of	   a	   stable	   environment.	   Traditional	  cognitivist	  takes	  on	  vision	  accounted	  for	  this	  by	  assuming	  and	  trying	  to	  model	  complex	  innate	  mechanisms	  compensating	  for	  the	  apparent	  flaws	  of	  the	  sensory	  information	  registered.	  This	  has	   been	   described	   as	   equivalent	   to	   attributing	   to	   the	   brain	   the	   task	   to	   produce	  what	   has	  actually	  to	  be	  called	  an	  “illusion”	  of	  the	  world,	  a	  world	  given	  to	  us	  as	  a	  complete	  whole	  only	  in	  form	  of	  an	  inner	  representation	  relying	  on	  sense-­‐substituting	  postperceptual	  processing	  (for	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a	   review	   and	   critical	   discussion,	   see	   Bridgeman,	   Van	   der	   Hejiden,	   &	   Velichkovsky,	   1994;	  Pessoa,	  Thompson,	  &	  Noë,	  1998).	  	  	  One	  way	  to	  expose	  the	  limitations	  of	  such	  a	  view	  is	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  phenomena	  of	  change	  and	  inattentional	  blindness.	  Change	  blindness	  refers	  to	  the	  intriguing	  fact	  that	  under	  certain	   circumstances	   our	   capacity	   to	   detect	   even	   obvious	   perceptual	   changes	   in	   our	   envi-­‐ronment	  can	  be	  significantly	  attenuated,	  even	  if	  we	  are	  explicitly	  told	  to	  watch	  out	  for	  these	  changes.	   While	   early	   investigations	   suggested	   that	   this	   apparent	   perceptual	   failure	   was	  caused	  by	   eye	  movements	   such	  as	   saccades	  or	  blinks	   restricting	   sensory	   input	   (Blackmore,	  Brelstaff,	   Nelson,	   &	   Troscianko,	   1995;	   O’Regan,	   Rensink,	   &	   Clark,	   1996;	   Resink,	   O’Regan,	   &	  Clark,	   1997;	   O’Regan,	   Deubel,	   Clark,	   &	   Rensink,	   2000;	   O’Regan,	   Rensink,	   &	   Clark,	   1997),	  further	  exploration	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  supported	  the	  notion	  that	  instead	  the	  effect	  is	  mostly	  due	   to	   the	  participants’	   attentional	   focus	  only	   (Rensink	  et	   al.,	   1997).	  Maybe	  most	   spectacu-­‐larly,	   this	  was	  demonstrated	  by	  a	  study	  of	  Simons	  and	  Levin	  (1998,	  see	  also	  1997)	  showing	  that	  even	  in	  a	  real	  life	  scenario	  and	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time,	  people	  that	  are	  occupied	  with	  a	  cognitive	  task,	  such	  as	  explaining	  directions	  or	  taking	  a	  photo	  of	  a	  stranger,	  often	  do	  not	  detect	  huge	  changes	  such	  as	  the	  substitution	  of	  this	  stranger	  by	  another10.	  	  These	   results	   were	   taken	   by	   proponents	   of	   4EA	   approaches	   to	   cognition	   as	   evidence	   that	  contrary	  to	  cognitivist	  assumptions,	  in	  normal	  viewing	  conditions	  only	  a	  minimal	  part	  of	  the	  environment	   is	   actually	   sampled	  by	   the	  brain	   (Noë,	  Pessoa,	  &	  Thompson,	  200011).	   Yet,	   it	   is	  also	   a	   false	   idea	   to	   assume	   that	   our	   knowledge	   about	   the	   outside	  world	   relies	   on	   a	   “grand	  illusion”	   –	   that	   is	   a	   complete	   and	   detailed	   mental	   reconstruction	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   disjoint	  snapshots	  of	  minor	  quality.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  build	  such	  an	   internal	   illusion	   because	   “seeing	   constitutes	   an	   active	   process	   of	   probing	   the	   external	  environment	   as	   though	   it	  were	   a	   continuously	   available	   external	  memory”	   (O’Regan,	   1992,	  p.484).	   In	   other	  words,	  we	   experience	   the	  world	   as	   being	   so	   rich	   and	   detailed	   because	  we	  constantly	  have	  access	  to	  a	  spatio-­‐temporal	  continuous	  environment.	  And	  it	  is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	   experience-­‐based	   knowledge	   that	   we	   explore	   the	   world,	   focusing	   on	   the	   information	  supposedly	  needed	  in	  each	  and	  every	  single	  case.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  In	  cases	  in	  which	  participants	  are	  on	  purpose	  asked	  to	  engage	  in	  another	  task,	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  also	  described	  by	  the	  term	  “inattentional	  blindness”.	  It	  has	  meanwhile	  been	  demonstrated	  by	  a	  great	  number	  of	  studies,	  while	  also	  being	  captured	  on	  many	  videos	  to	  be	  found	  on	  the	  Internet.	  For	  an	  example	  from	  an	  American	  television	  show	  see	  	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qN7s9E6M4RQ(last	  visited	  the	  5th	  of	  January	  2015).	  	  11	  However,	  for	  studies	  finding	  evidence	  that	  some	  information	  apparently	  not	  available	  for	  consious	  awareness	  might	  be	  still	  registered	  see	  Williams	  &	  Simons	  (2000)	  and	  Koivisto	  &	  Revonsuo	  (2003).	  Both	  studies	  report	  that	  in	  trials	  of	  change	  blind-­‐ness	  experiments	  in	  which	  the	  participants	  did	  not	  detect	  a	  change	  occuring,	  still	  reaction	  times	  were	  delayed	  in	  comparison	  to	  real	  no-­‐change	  trials,	  suggesting	  that	  “at	  some	  level	  the	  change	  was	  detected	  although	  explicitly	  no	  change	  was	  reported”	  (Koivisto	  &	  Revonsuo,	  2003,	  p.	  425).	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In	   a	   nutshell:	   4EA	   approaches	   propose	   that	   it	   is	   not	   a	   highly	   workloaded	   processing	   and	  optimization	  of	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  passively	  received	  environmental	  stimuli	  that	  leads	  to	  our	  detection	  or	  neglect	  of	  details	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  our	  skill	  and	  our	  experience	  as	  a	  perceiving	   body	   in	   this	   world	   guiding	   our	   explorations	   and	   anticipations.	   This	   reconcep-­‐tualization	  led	  to	  specific	  predictions	  regarding	  neuroimaging	  and	  physiological	  data	  acquired	  during	   stimulus	   perception	   in	   the	   tasks	   reported	   on.	   Specifically,	   scholars	   hypothesised	   to	  find	   activations	   before	   actual	   stimulus	   appearance	   that	   would	   predict	   detection	   as	   well	   as	  further	   processing	   of	   this	   stimulus,	   while	   reflecting	   either	   conscious	   awareness	   or	   neglect.	  Indeed,	  recent	  studies	  by	  Koivisto	  &	  Revonsuo,	  2003;	  Pourtois,	  De	  Pretto,	  Hauert,	  &	  Vuilleu-­‐mier,	   2006	   and	   others	   (for	   a	   review,	   see	   Railo,	   Koivisto,	   &	   Revonsuo,	   2011),	   designed	   fol-­‐lowing	   this	   suggestion,	   describe	   such	   effects.	   Specifically,	   Pourtois	   et	   al.	   (2006),	   in	   an	   ERP	  study,	  found	  that	  visual	  awareness	  of	  a	  change	  was	  associated	  with	  an	  enhanced	  occipital	  P1	  response	  and	  a	  sustained	  frontal	  activity	  after	  the	  first	  display	  of	  the	  image,	  that	  is	  before	  the	  change	  occurred.	  Furthermore,	  Pourtois	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  as	  well	  as	  Koivisto	  &	  Revonsuo	  (2003)	  found	  that	  change	  detection	  elicited	  a	  stronger	  early	  negativity	  and	  a	  more	  pronounced	  late	  positivity	  peaking	  at	  parietal	  sides.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  these	  findings	  in	  Chapter	  III.2.	  For	  the	  moment,	  they	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  how	  the	  described	  change	  in	  the	  theoretical	  paradigm	  conceptualizing	  cognition	  allowed	  the	  development	  of	  new	  hypotheses	  and	  experi-­‐mental	  designs,	  leading	  to	  new	  insights	  into	  basic	  principles	  of	  cognition	  also	  in	  experimental	  cognitive	  neuroscience.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  give	  more	  examples	  of	  that,	  still	  referring	  to	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  inanimate	  world	  while	  stressing	  another	  reconceptualization	  thanks	  to	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition.	  	  II.1.1.2	  From	  amodal	  representation	  to	  multimodal	  body	  knowledge	  	  Based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  what	  we	  know	  about	  the	  world	  is	  the	  passive	  perception	  of	  what	  there	  is	   to	   see	   (see	   last	   section),	   cognitivist	   concepts	   also	   assume	   that	   perception	   is	   explicitly	  designed	   to	   equip	   us	  with	   objective	   information	   about	   the	  world.	   Senses,	   according	   to	   this	  hypothesis,	   are	   described	   as	   entrances	   to	   distinct	   pathways,	   processing	   the	   received	  information	   via	   symbolic	   transformations	   independently	   of	   current	   body	   states	   or	   other	  influences,	  finally	  leading	  to	  an	  objective	  quintessence	  of	  the	  stimulus	  describable	  in	  abstract	  and	  amodal	  symbolic	  terms	  (for	  perspectives	  embracing	  such	  amodal	  account	  see	  Haugeland,	  1991;	  Pylyshyn,	  1973;	  for	  rejections	  see	  Barsalou,	  1999;	  Gallese,	  2000;	  Gibbs,	  2006;	  Wilson,	  2002).	  	  
	   15	  
Again,	  this	  view	  has	  been	  challenged	  in	  the	  last	  years.	  Firstly,	  some	  studies	  indicated	  that	  even	  when	   explicitly	   asked	   for	   a	   neutral	   evaluation	   of	   physical	   information	  of	   the	  world,	  we	   are	  often	  not	  able	   to	  do	  so.	  Secondly,	  studies	   further	   investigating	  how	  stimuli	  are	  processed	   in	  those	   tasks	   indicated	   that	   to	  derive	  knowledge	  about	   the	  world	  we	  rely	  on	   interaction	  with	  the	  world	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  rational	  processing	  of	  neutral	  information.	  To	  give	  a	  prominent	  example	   of	   the	   first	   finding,	   that	   is	   our	   obvious	   incompetence	   to	   neutrally	   evaluate	   the	  physical	   information	   of	   the	   world,	   Bhalla	   and	   Proffitt	   (1999)	   found	   that	   when	   asking	  participants	   to	   judge	   the	   steepness	   of	   a	   hill	   by	   visual	   inspection	   only,	   those	   participants	  carrying	   a	   heavy	   backpack	   during	   this	   task	   judged	   the	   slope	   steeper	   than	   those	   of	   a	  comparison	  group	  not	  carrying	  any	  weight.	  Schnall,	  Harber,	  Stefanucci,	  &	  Proffitt	   (2008)	  on	  the	   other	   hand	   found	   that	   participants	   judged	   hills	   as	   less	   steep	  when	   accompanied	   by	   or	  even	  only	  thinking	  about	  a	  friend.	  Regarding	   the	   second	   finding,	   that	   is	   our	   apparently	   interactive	   processing	   of	   information,	  Shepard	   &	  Metzler	   (1971,	   see	   also	   Kosslyn,	   1980)	   found	   that,	   when	   asking	   participants	   to	  decide	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  if	  the	  difference	  between	  two	  objects	  shown	  after	  each	  other	  was	  only	  in	  the	  orientation	  of	  the	  object	  or	  also	  in	  its	  shape,	  response	  time	  was	  proportional	  to	  the	  degree	   of	   rotation	   distinguishing	   the	   two	   objects.	   According	   to	   scholars	   supporting	   4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition,	  these	  findings	  indicate	  that	  cognition	  is	  fundamentally	  grounded	  in	  the	   needs	   and	   embodied	   capacities	   of	   human	   beings	   (see	   Barsalou,	   2008).	   Rather	   than	  focusing	   on	   the	   extraction	   of	   physically	   correct	   information	   while	   relying	   on	   complex	   and	  resource-­‐demanding	   symbolic	   processing,	   cognition	   proves	   to	   be	   pragmatic,	   i.e.	   it	   uses	   its	  bodily	  capacities	  and	  experience	  to	  come	  to	  an	  action-­‐oriented	  estimation	  of	  the	  situation12.	  Remarkably,	  this	  even	  holds	  for	  tasks	  pursued	  in	  imagery	  only.	  Again,	   this	   new	   view	   on	   cognition	   led	   to	   predictions	   also	   in	   cognitive	   neuroscience,	   for	  example	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  also	  processes	  not	   involving	  direct	  actions,	  such	  as	  pure	  obser-­‐vation,	   recall	   or	   imagery,	   on	   a	   neural	   level	   should	   as	  well	   activate	   networks	   usually	   respo-­‐nsible	   for	   real	   interactions.	   Indeed,	   imaging	   and	  EEG	   experiments	   of	   recent	   years	   collected	  interesting	   evidence	   that	   there	   is	   a	   crucial	   overlap	   of	   activations	   measured	   during	   visual	  perception	   and	   those	   recorded	   during	   visual	   imagination	   (see	   for	   a	   good	   overview	   also	  stressing	  task	  dependent	  differences	  Bértolo,	  2005).	  Most	   impressively	  maybe,	  as	   indicating	  the	   existence	   of	   direct	   action-­‐perception	   links	   even	   on	   a	   single	   cell	   level,	   Murata,	   Fadiga,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  To	  give	  an	  example,	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  you	  have	  to	  decide	  if	  and	  in	  what	  pace	  you	  want	  to	  climb	  a	  mountain,	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  luggage	  to	  be	  carried	  or	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  friend	  can	  make	  a	  crucial	  difference.	  It	  is	  remarkable	  though,	  that	  this	  action	  oriented	  reasoning	  is	  still	  applied	  when	  the	  task	  explicitly	  demands	  to	  solve	  a	  geometric	  problem	  apparently	  unrelated	  to	  any	  active	  decision	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  the	  close	  future.	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Fogassi,	  Gallese,	  Raos,	  &	  Rizzolatti	  (1997)	  described	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  neurons	  in	  the	  ventral	  premotor	  cortex	  (area	  F5)	  of	  macaques	  that	  fire	  during	  grasping	  movements	  as	  well	  as	  during	  the	  observation	  of	  graspable	  objects.13	  Not	  surprisingly,	  since	  their	  discovery	  these	  “canonical	  neurons”	  have	  been	  granted	  enormous	  attention	  in	  further	  research	  exploring	  the	  hypothesis	  of	   4EA	   approaches	   to	   cognition.	   The	   next	   section,	   focusing	   on	   different	   answers	   to	   the	  question	   of	   how	   we	   understand	   animate	   others,	   will	   further	   illustrate	   this	   by	   giving	   the	  example	  of	  another	  type	  of	  neurons	  showing	  similar	  capacities:	  the	  mirror	  neuron.	  	  	  	  II.1.2	  Question	  2:	  How	  do	  we	  understand	  animate	  others?	  -­‐	  From	  mentalizing	  to	  embodied	  forms	  of	  empathy	  	  4EA	   approaches	   to	   cognition	   also	   criticized	   and	   extended	   the	   notion	   of	   empathy	   and	   the	  understanding	   of	   other	  minds	   as	   conceptualized	   in	   traditional	   cognitivist	   theories.	   In	   these	  theories,	   these	   capacities	   were	   almost	   without	   exception	   considered	   as	   based	   on	   “mind	  reading”.	  This	  term	  commonly	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  of	  rationally	  inferring	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  others	   via	   complex	   second-­‐order	   representations	   realized	   either	   by	   means	   of	   a	   domain	  general	   theorizing	  capacity	  or	   the	  maturation	  of	  a	  special	  organ	  dedicated	   to	   the	  domain	  of	  psycho-­‐logy	  (see	  for	  example	  Baron-­‐Cohen,	  Leslie,	  &	  Frith,	  1985,	  or	  Baron-­‐Cohen,	  2001,	  and	  for	  a	  general	  overview	  Marraffa,	  2011).	  	  Even	  before	  the	  rise	  of	  4EA	  approaches,	  the	  idea	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  processes	  being	  the	  only	  base	  of	   action	   understanding	   and	   of	   empathy	   has	   been	   challenged	   from	   developmental	   and	  evolutionary	  psychology.	  The	  main	  criticism	  consisted	  in	  the	  observation	  that	  human	  infants	  and	   even	   human	   primates	   show	   behavior	   that	   would	   typically	   be	   interpreted	   as	   demon-­‐strating	  empathetic	  understanding,	  although	  the	  ones	  behaving	   in	  such	  way	  apparently	   lack	  the	   intellectual	   capacities	   that	   would	   allow	   high	   level	   operations	   underlying	   mindreading.	  Precisely,	  Jules	  Masserman	  et	  al.	  (1964)	  reported,	  that	  rhesus	  monkeys	  refused	  to	  pull	  a	  chain	  supplying	  them	  with	  food	  if	  this	  act	  at	  the	  same	  time	  elicited	  an	  electric	  shock	  being	  given	  to	  another	   monkey	   (Masserman,	   Wechkin,	   &	   Terris,	   1964).	   Also,	   scholars	   studying	   infant	  behavior	  showed	  gaze	  preference	  for	  attacked	  others	  in	  infants	  as	  young	  as	  10	  months	  of	  age	  (Kanakogi,	  Okumura,	   Inoue,	  Kitazaki	  &	   Itakura,	   2013).	   Even	   stronger	  however,	   the	  develop	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  findings	  giving	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  same	  phenomena	  in	  humans	  see	  Martin,	  Wiggs,	  Ungerleider,	  &	  Haxby,	  1996;	  Grafton,	  Fadiga,	  Arbib,	  &	  Rizzolatti,	  1997;	  Perani,	  Schnur,	  Tettamanti,	  Gorno-­‐Tempini,	  Cappa,	  &	  Fazio,	  1999;	  Chao	  &	  Martin,	  2000;	  Gerlach,	  Law,	  Gade,	  &	  Paulson	  2002;	  Boronat,	  Buxbaum,	  Coslett,	  Tang,	  Saffran,	  Kimberg,	  &	  Detre,	  2005;	  Ponseti,	  Bosinski,	  Wolff,	  Peller,	  Jansen,	  Mehdom,	  Büchel,	  &	  Siebner,	  2006;	  Lewis,	  2006;	  Hulme	  &	  Zeki,	  2006. 	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mental	   psychologist	   Vasu	   Reddy	   convincingly	   demonstrated	   that	   if	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  situated	   embodied	  nature	  of	   cognition	   and	   the	   special	   importance	  of	   this	   embeddedness	   in	  infancy,	   signs	   of	   empathy	   and	   action	   understanding	   can	   be	   found	   even	   earlier14.	   Precisely,	  Reddy	   argued	   for	   looking	   at	   infants’	   behavior	   not	   during	   the	   observation	   of	   interactions	  between	  others,	  but	  during	  their	  own	  interactions	  with	  their	  caregivers	  in	  their	  daily	  routines.	  These	   studies	   showed	   that	   infants	   as	   young	   as	   two	   months	   of	   age,	   when	   perceiving	   a	  caregiver	  about	  to	  lift	  them,	  make	  specific	  adjustments	  of	  their	  bodies,	  assisting	  in	  the	  smooth	  execution	   of	   the	   picking	   up	   (Reddy,	   Markova,	   &	   Wallot,	   2013).	   Also,	   Reddy	   reported	   that	  infants	  from	  around	  3	  months	  of	  age	  show	  clear	  signs	  of	  coyness	  (Reddy,	  2001)	  and	  infants	  from	   9	   months	   of	   age	   even	   start	   to	   tease	   others.	   That	   means,	   they	   engage	   adults	   in	  interactions	  in	  which	  they	  offer	  and	  withdraw	  objects,	  deliberately	  not	  comply	  to	  commands	  or	  disrupt	  other’s	  actions,	  while	  looking	  intently	  at	  the	  other’s	  face	  and	  showing	  obvious	  signs	  of	  enjoyment	  as	  a	  response	  to	  adults’	  expressions	  of	  (faked)	  indignation	  (Reddy,	  1991,	  1998,	  2008;	  Reddy,	  Liebal,	  Hicks,	  Jonnalagadda,	  &	  Chintlapuri,	  2012).	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine,	  how	  this	  kind	  of	  behavior	  can	  arise	  and	  be	  realized	   if	   the	  cognitive	  capacities	  of	   infants	  do	  not	  allow	  them	   to	   have	   any	   idea	   about	   feelings,	   sensations	   and	   thoughts	   of	   animate	   others	   –	   which	  according	   to	   classic	   cognitivist	   theories	   have	   to	   be	   constructed	   as	   higher	   order	   represent-­‐tations	  via	  complex	  mentalizing	  processes.	  	  These	  observations	  also	  fit	  to	  a	  maybe	  even	  more	  fundamental	  critique	  of	  cognitivist	  concepts	  of	   empathy:	   phenomenological	   descriptions	   of	   the	   understanding	   actually	   discussed,	   mark	  this	   understanding	   as	   an	   immediate,	   implicit	   and	   (embodied)	   feeling,	   rather	   than	   a	  linguistically	   reflected	   inference	   of	   someone	   else’s	   mental	   state	   based	   on	   time-­‐consuming	  conscious	  interpretations	  (see	  Zahavi,	  2012a,	  2012b,	  Gallese,	  2001,	  2003).	  As	  for	  example	  Dan	  Zahavi	  pointed	  out,	  long	  before	  “knowing”	  about	  the	  “state	  of	  another”,	  we	  feel	  it	  “in	  our	  gut”.	  (Zahavi,	  2012b).	  	  Following	  this	  intuition,	  supporters	  of	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition	  have	  brought	  up	  different	  reconceptualizations	   of	   empathy	   and	   action	   understanding.	   In	   these	   notions,	   primary,	  embodied	   and	   non-­‐inferential	   ways	   of	   knowing	   another’s	   mental	   states	   are	   outlined	   (e.g.	  Gallese	   2001,	   2003,	   2005;	   Goldman	   and	   Gallese,	   1998;	   Goldman,	   2006;	   Iacoboni,	   2009,	  Gallagher	  2005,	   2008,	   2011a,	   b,	   2012;	  De	   Jaegher,	  Di	  Paolo,	  Gallagher,	   2010;	  Rizzolatti	   and	  Sinigaglia	   2010;	   Zahavi	   2005,	   2007,	   2008,	   2010,	   2011,	   2012a,	   b).	   One	   version	   of	   these	  reconceptualizations	   that	   has	   become	   especially	   prominent	   in	   the	   field	   of	   neuroscience	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In	  fact	  Reddy	  stresses	  how	  terms	  related	  to	  the	  old	  conceptualization,	  such	  as	  “intention”	  (as	  refering	  to	  internally	  repre-­‐sented	  action	  goals	  of	  animate	  being)	  also	  need	  a	  crucial	  reconceptualization	   in	  view	  of	   this	  background.	  See	  Reddy,	  V.	   (in	  print)	  as	  well	  as	  Heimann	  &	  Uithol	  (in	  print).	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called	   (Embodied)	   Simulation	   Theory.	   Scholars	   defending	   this	   concept	   claim	   that	   under-­‐standing	  the	  behavior	  and	  feelings	  of	  others	  fundamentally	  involves	  –	  at	  least	  at	  a	  basic	  level	  –	  processes	   of	   automatic	   bodily	   simulation	   building	   on	   the	   reuse	   of	   bodily	   formatted	  representations	   of	   actions,	   emotions	   and	   sensations	   rather	   than	   rational	   inference	   (Gallese	  2003,	  2005;	  Gallese	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2011).	  Watching	  others,	  so	  goes	   the	  hypothesis,	  we	  effort-­‐lessly	  and	  immediately	  “put	  ourselves	  in	  their	  shoes”,	  that	  is,	  we	  literally	  perform	  a	  simulation	  of	   their	   supposed	   state	   using	   the	   capacities	   of	   our	   body	   and	   embodied	   mind	   instead	   of	  engaging	  in	  complex	  mentalizing	  processes.	  	  Again,	  this	  hypothesis	  gave	  rise	  to	  new	  approaches	  investigating	  the	  problem	  also	  in	  cognitive	  neuroscience.	  It	  gained	  even	  stronger	  prominence	  two	  decades	  ago	  with	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  mirror	   neurons,	   disclosing	   a	   likely	   candidate	   of	   a	   neural	   mechanism	   underlying	   such	  simulative	   processes.	   The	   specific	   characteristic	   of	   mirror	   neurons,	   originally	   discovered	  using	   single	   cell	   recordings	   in	   the	  ventral	  premotor	   cortex	   (F5)	  of	  behaving	  macaque	  mon-­‐keys	   (Di	   Pellegrino,	   Fadiga,	   Fogassi,	   Gallese,	   &	   Rizzolatti,	   1992;	   Gallese,	   Fadiga,	   Fogassi,	   &	  Rizzolatti,	   1996;	   Rizzolatti,	   Fadiga,	   Fogassi,	   &	   Gallese,	   1996),	   consists	   in	   their	   mutual	  activation	  during	  the	  performance	  of	  goal-­‐directed	  action	  as	  well	  as	  during	  the	  observation	  of	  another	   individual	   performing	   this	   action.	   Further	   experiments	   showed	   that	   this	   apparent	  direct	  action-­‐perception	  link	  not	  only	  shows	  action-­‐goal	  specificity	  (with	  certain	  neurons	  only	  firing	   for	   performance	   and	   observation	   of	   certain	   actions,	   see	   Rizzolati,	   Fogassi,	   &	   Gallese,	  2001),	  but	  can	  also	  be	  evoked	  even	  when	  the	  action’s	  outcome	  cannot	  be	  seen	  but	  only	  rather	  imagined	  by	   the	  monkey	   (Umiltà,	  Kohler,	  Gallese,	  Fogassi,	   […],	  &	  Rizzolatti,	   2001).	  Further-­‐more,	   it	   was	   discovered	   that	   a	   particular	   class	   of	   mirror	   neurons	   (‘audio-­‐visual	   mirror	  neurons’)	   are	   activated	   not	   only	   by	   action	   observation	   and	   execution	   but	   also	   also	   by	   the	  sound	   produced	   by	   someone	   else’s	   action	   (see	   Kohler,	   Keysers,	   Umiltà,	   Fogassi,	   Gallese,	   &	  Rizzolatti,	   2002;	  Keysers,	  Kohler,	  Umiltà,	   Fogassi,	  Rizzolatti,	  &	  Gallese,	   2003).	   Lastly,	   it	  was	  found,	   that	   the	   activation	   is	   enhanced	   for	   actions	   with	   which	   the	   monkeys	   had	   prior	  experiences	  (see	  for	  example	  Rochat,	  Caruana,	  Jezzini,	  Escola,	  […],	  &	  Umiltà,	  2010).	  From	  the	  very	   beginning,	   therefore,	   mirror	   neurons	   were	   hypothezised	   to	   fundamentally	   serve	   our	  worldly	  orientation	  by	  underlying	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  others.	  	  Recent	  years	  delivered	  extensive	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  similar	  mirror	  systems	  also	  in	  humans	  (see	  Fadiga,	  Fogassi,	  Pavesi,	  &	  Rizzolatti,	  1995;	  Grafton	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Rizzolatti	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Cochin,	  Barthelemy,	  Lejeune,	  Roux,	  &	  Martineau,	  1998;	  Decety,	  Grèzes,	  Costes,	  Perani,	  Jeannerod,	   Procyk,	   Grassi,	   &	   Fazio,	   1997;	   Hari,	   Forss,	   Avikainen,	   Kirveskari,	   Salenius,	   &	  Rizzolatti,	   1999;	   Iacoboni,	  Woods,	   Brass,	   Bekkering,	  Mazziotta,	   &	   Rizzolatti,	   1999;	   Buccino,	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Binkofki,	  Fink,	  Fadiga,	  Fogassi,	   […],	  &	  Freund,	  2001;	  Mukamel,	  Ekstrom,	  Kaplan,	   Iacoboni,	  &	  Fried,	  2010).	  Moreover,	   recent	   findings	   suggested	   that	   similar	   links	  between	   first	   and	   third	  person	   experiences	   can	   be	   assumed	   to	   originate	   in	   shared	   networks	   processing	   sensations	  and	  emotions	  (Gallese,	  2003).	  Specifically,	   it	  was	  found	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  touch	  and	  the	  observation	  of	  somebody	  being	  touched	  (Keysers,	  Wickers,	  Gazzola,	  Anton,	  Fogassi,	  &	  Gallese,	  2004;	  Keysers	  &	  Gazzola,	  2006)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  emotions	  and	  the	  observations	  of	  others	  showing	  matching	  emotional	  expressions	  (in	  case	  of	  a	  match	  of	  theses	  emotions)	  led	  to	  the	  activation	  of	   similar	  brain	  areas	  and	  cortical	  networks	   (see	   for	  example.	  Carr,	   Iacoboni,	  Dubeau,	   Mazziotta,	   &	   Lenzi,	   2003;	   Wicker,	   Keysers,	   Plailly,	   Royet,	   […],	   &	   Rizzotti,	   2003;	  Keysers	  &	  Gazzola,	  2006).	  	  Together	   this	   has	   been	   taken	   as	   evidence	   that	   human’s	   apparent	   knowledge	   about,	   and	  anticipation	  of,	  other	  people’s	   feelings	  and	  future	  actions	  rely	  on	  the	  fundamental	  biological	  principle	   of	   the	   brain	   to	   employ	   the	   very	   same	   networks	   for	   the	   realization	   of	   one’s	   own	  motor	   plans	   and	   the	   observation	   of	   others	  moving,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   experience	   of	   one’s	   own	  emotions	  and	  feelings	  and	  the	  observation	  of	  other’s	  behavior	  or	  expression	  of	  such	  feelings	  (Rizzolatti,	  2005;	  Iacoboni,	  2009;	  Keysers	  &	  Gazzola,	  2006;	  Gallese	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2011;	  though	  for	   thorough	   critique,	   especially	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	   mirror	   neurons	   for	   action	   under-­‐standing,	  see	  Hutto,	  2013;	  as	  well	  as	  Hickok,	  2014).	   I	  will	  specifically	  get	  back	  to	   this	  hypo-­‐thesis	  in	  Chapter	  III.1	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  Taken	   together,	   the	   previous	   sections	   showed	   that	   4EA	   approaches	   to	   cognition	   allow	   a	  fundamental	   reconceptualization	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   humans	   and	   world,	   changing	   the	  picture	   from	   a	   rather	   mechanical	   process	   between	   a	   high-­‐tech	   robot-­‐like	   human	   and	   a	  material	   environment	   behaving	   according	   to	   physical	   laws,	   to	   the	   dynamic	   interaction	  between	   an	   animate	   bodily	   being	   and	   an	   enlived	   habitat	   known	   and	   continuously	   shaped	  through	  enactive	  experience.	  This	  new	  perspective	  highlights	  neuroscientific	  research	  looking	  for	  traces	  of	  cognitive	  processing	  depending	  on	  a)	  situative	  embedding	  (reflected	  for	  example	  in	   attention	   and	   body-­‐state),	   rather	   than	   on	   stimuli	   features	   alone,	   as	  well	   as	   b)	   embodied	  problem	  solutions	   relying	  on	  processes	  of	   (simulated)	   interactions	   rather	   than	  on	   symbolic	  transformations.	   In	   the	   next	   two	   chapters,	   I	   will	   illustrate	   how	   this	   turn	   was	   reflected	   in	  research	  about	  visual	  media	  and	  arts	  in	  general	  and	  film	  in	  particular.	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  II.2	   Enacted,	   embodied,	   embedded,	   extended	   and	   affective	   cognition	   as	   a	   concept	   guiding	  visual	  art	  theory	  and	  empirical	  research	  about	  visual	  art	  perception	  	  As	   the	   introductory	  chapter	  of	   this	   thesis	   illustrated,	  we	  acquire	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  our	  world	  knowledge	  via	  media.	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition	  have	  in-­‐fluenced	  theory	  and	  research	  about	  media	  experiences.	  Film	  being	  a	  relatively	  young	  medium,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  start	  this	  investigation	  by	  looking	  at	  embodied	  approaches	  in	  fields	  dealing	  with	  visual	  representations	  of	  the	  world	  in	  general,	  i.e.	  theory	  and	  philosophy	  of	  images.	  	  	  Interestingly,	   as	   a	   first	   remark,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   perceivable	   reluctance	   to	   leave	   traditional	  cognitivist	   frameworks	  when	   looking	  at	   aesthetic	   evaluations	  of	   artworks	   (see	   for	  previous	  notice	  of	  this	  for	  example	  Sauer,	  2012;	  Freedberg	  &	  Gallese,	  2007;	  Gallese	  &	  Di	  Dio,	  2012).	  At	  least	  three	  reasons	  are	  likely	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  resisting	  hesitation.	  	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  a	  plain	  fact,	  that	  images	  show	  us	  a	  world	  with	  which	  we	  cannot	  interact	  directly,	  that	   is	   in	   the	   crucial	   sense	  of	  bodily	  moving	   in	   and	  exploring	   it.	  Being	   “only”	  on	   the	   image,	  none	   of	  my	   behaviors	  will	   grant	  me	   literal	   access	   to	   this	  world.	   This	   difference	   is	   not	   only	  known	  to	  us	  by	  convention	  and	  experience	  but	  is	  rather	  present	  for	  us	  in	  the	  very	  moment	  of	  perceiving	  an	  image	  –	  “seeing	  a	  world	  in	  an	  image”	  means	  to	  consciously	  perceive,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	   the	   representation	   and	   the	   represented15.	   This	   difference	   from	   real	  world	   perception	  might	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  belated	  discovery	  of	  4EA	  approaches	  in	  the	  field.	  Furthermore,	   secondly,	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   that	   is	   especially	   during	  medieval	   age,	   art,	   creation	  and	  perception	  were	   indeed	  guided	  by	  strong	  conventions,	   such	  as	   the	   symbolic	   represent-­‐tation	  of	  persons	  and	  concepts,	  and	  even	  the	  use	  of	  colors	  and	  materials,	  accessible	  only	  via	  specialized	  knowledge.	  In	  later	  stages	  of	  art	  history,	  knowledge	  of	  the	  representational	  habits	  and	   contents,	   marked	   by	   the	   current	   understanding	   of	   beauty	   or	   by	   politics,	   remained	   of	  tremendous	   relevance.	   This	   accounts	   also	   for	   the	   background	   of	   the	   individual	   artist,	   his	  positioning	  in	  the	  arts	  of	  former	  and	  current	  times	  and	  the	  development	  of	  his	  works	  over	  the	  duration	  of	  his	  career.	  Lastly,	  even	  an	  individual	  artwork	  might	  refer	  to	  a	  context	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  known	  rather	  than	  bodily	  explored	  to	  assess	  the	  fundamental	  dimensions	  of	  this	  work	  of	  art.	  Naturally,	  interpretations	  of	  artworks	  through	  almost	  all	  periods	  are	  strongly	  marked	  by	  this	   access	   through	   knowledge,	   which	   sometimes	   has	   been	   characterized	   as	   similar	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See	  also	  for	  example	  Fingerhut	  (2012),	  referred	  to	  later	  in	  this	  thesis.	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“deciphering”	   rather	   than	   “perceiving”	   or	   “seeing”	   an	   image	   (see	   for	   such	   descriptions	   for	  example	  Sauer,	  1999).	  An	  additional	  role	  in	  supporting	  this	  disembodied	  approach	  to	  arts	  can	  also	  be	  assigned	  to	  traditional	  practices	  of	  art	  exhibition,	  which	  do	  not	  only	  follow	  the	  above	  tradition,	  but	  also	  in	  a	  rather	  embodied	  sense	  intend	  to	  free	  artistic	  judgement	  from	  normal	  perceptual	   routines.	   Until	   today	   concepts	   like	   “the	  white	   cube”	   heavily	   influence	   the	   archi-­‐tecture	  of	  museums,	  leading	  to	  a	  presentation	  favoring	  decontextualization	  and	  estrangement	  from	  the	  real	  world	  rather	   than	  embedded	  cognition	  derived	   from	  this	   real	  world.	  Further-­‐more,	  trends	  like	  audio-­‐guides	  that	  provide	  background	  information	  and	  point	  out	  the	  most	  important	  must-­‐sees	  again	  refer	  to	  art	  history	  rather	  than	  to	  our	  bodies	  and	  perceptual	  and	  cognitive	  skills	  as	   the	  right	  guide	  to	  art	  exploratory	  perception16.	  One	  could	   indeed	  assume,	  that	  the	  perceptual	  habits	  newly	  arising	  in	  such	  a	  interaction-­‐free	  and	  world-­‐detached	  context	  lean	  heavily	   on	   the	   application	   of	   cultural	   knowledge	   and	   symbolic	   reasoning	  best	   purified	  from	  bodily	  groundings.	  Thirdly,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   emphazised	   that	  within	   art	   and	  media	   theory,	   bodily	   responses	   and	  affects,	  which	  undoubtedly	  stand	  in	  the	  center	  of	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition,	  carried	  for	  a	  long	   time	   the	   stigma	  of	   being	  highly	   subjective	   and	   context-­‐dependent,	   and	  were	   therefore	  excluded	   from	   discussions	   that	   investigated	   the	   general	   principles	   of	   aesthetic	   quality	   and	  expression.	  In	  fact,	  in	  his	  canonical	  work	  The	  Principles	  of	  Art,	  R.H.	  Collingwood	  clearly	  states	  that,	   although	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   task	   of	   artists	   to	   express	   emotions,	   they	   have	   to	   do	   so	   by	  liberating	  these	  emotions	  from	  their	  bodily,	  sensous	  base:	  “The	  aesthetic	  activity	  is	  an	  activity	  of	   thought	   in	   the	   form	   of	   consciousness,	   converting	   into	   imagination	   an	   experience	  which,	  apart	  from	  being	  so	  converted,	  is	  sensuous”(Collingwood,	  1938,	  p.	  295).	  Collingwood	  further-­‐more	   indicates	   that	   this	   act	   needs	   to	   convert	   emotion	   from	   something	   non-­‐contingent	   as	   a	  feeling	  or	  a	  body	  state,	  into	  a	  conventional	  symbol,	  thereby	  making	  it	  accessible	  and	  descry-­‐bable	   by	   all	   perceivers	   and	   art	   theory:	   “This	   activity	   [the	   aesthetic	   activity]	   is	   a	   corporate	  activity	  belonging	  not	  to	  any	  one	  human	  being	  but	  to	  a	  community.	  It	  is	  performed	  not	  only	  by	  the	  man	  whom	  we	  individualistically	  call	  the	  artist,	  but	  partly	  by	  all	  the	  other	  artists	  […]	  from	  whom	  he	  borrows,	  executants	  whom	  he	  employs	  and	  audience	  to	  whom	  he	  speaks.”	  (Colling-­‐wood,	   1938,	   p.	   295).	   This	   stance	   was	   carried	   on	   via	   famous	   art	   historicians	   such	   as	   E.H.	  Gombrich	  and	  C.	  Greenberg,	   in	   their	  works	  about	   the	  psychological	  basis	  of	  arts	  exclusively	  focusing	  on	  cognitive	  levels.	  It	  even	  seems	  to	  have	  influenced	  philosophers	  out	  of	  the	  semiotic	  field,	   such	   as	  Nelson	  Goodman	   or	  Umberto	   Eco,	  who	   explicitly	   dedicated	   their	  work	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  With	  this	  I	  am	  not	  referring	  to	  an	  exploration	  in	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  strict	  scientific	  experiment,	  but	  to	  perceptual	  exploration,	  that	  is	  an	  interaction	  of	  the	  spectators	  with	  the	  artwork	  allowing	  them	  to	  be	  guided	  by	  and	  play	  with	  its	  perceptual	  offers	  etc.	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distinction	  of	  language	  and	  other	  representational	  systems	  (see	  Gombrich	  (1960),	  Greenberg	  (1961),	  Eco	  (1998,	  2000),	  Goodman	  (1995)).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  traditional	  art	  history	  or	  semiotics	   did	   not	   contribute	   tremendously	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   non-­‐linguistic	  representations.	  Rather,	  what	  I	  would	  like	  to	  stress	  is,	  that	  some	  topics	  seem	  to	  be	  explicitly	  excluded	   by	   these	   approaches.	   Paradigmatic	   for	   semiotics’	   resistance	   against	   bodily	  groundings	  of	  symbolic	  references	  might	  be	   the	   following	   lines	  by	  Nelson	  Goodman	  writing	  about	  the	  separation	  of	  artistic	  expression	  of	  emotion	  from	  emotion	  per	  se:	  “An	  actor's	  facial	  expression	  need	  neither	  result	   from	  nor	  result	   in	  his	   feeling	   the	  corresponding	  emotions.	  A	  painter	   or	   composer	   does	   not	   have	   to	   have	   the	   emotions	   he	   expresses	   in	   his	   work.	   And	  obviously	   works	   of	   art	   themselves	   do	   not	   feel	   what	   they	   express,	   even	   when	   what	   they	  express	  is	  a	  feeling.”	  (Goodman,	  1995,	  p.47);	  and	  a	  bit	  earlier,	  writing	  about	  the	  conventional	  nature	  of	  “resemblance”:	  “Again,	  what	  will	  deceive	  me	  into	  supposing	  that	  an	  object	  of	  a	  given	  kind	   is	  before	  me,	  depends	  upon	  what	   I	  have	  noticed	  about	  such	  objects,	  and	  this	   in	  turn	   is	  affected	  by	   the	  way	   I	  am	  used	   to	  seeing	   them	  depicted.	  Resemblance	  and	  deceptiveness	   far	  from	  being	  constant	  and	  independent	  sources	  and	  criteria	  of	  representational	  practice	  are	  in	  some	  degree	  products	  of	   it.”	  (Goodman,	  1995,	  p.	  39).	  Even	  when	  talking	  about	  similarity,	  so	  Goodman	  goes,	  we	  in	  fact	  talk	  about	  conventions.	  We	  recognize	  an	  emotion	  when	  seeing	  it	  on	  the	  face	  of	  another,	  as	  we	  learned	  to	  do	  so,	  we	  know	  that	  a	  child	  imitates	  a	  telephone	  when	  talking	  to	  a	  banana	  due	  to	  cultural	  experience	  with	  these	  kind	  of	  denotations	  and	  we	  detect	  vast	  fields	  of	  wheat	  under	  troubled	  skies	  in	  Van	  Gogh’s	  Wheat	  fields	  with	  crowds	  (1890)17	  just	  as	  we	   find	  a	  human	   figure	   in	  a	   stick	  man:	  by	   convention.	  The	   reason	   for	   this	  body-­‐denying	  view	   of	   image	   perception	   can	   only	   be	   guessed	   from	   few	   remarks	   of	   the	   authors	   about	   the	  importance	  of	  body	  and	  (bodily	  being)18.	  Reminiscent	  to	  Collingwood’s	  words	  quoted	  above	  it	  seems	  to	  lie	  in	  the	  will	  to	  prevent	  the	  explorable	  realm	  of	  cultural	  distinctions,	  accessible	  by	  language,	   from	   diving	   into	   the	   subjective	   darkness	   of	   bodily	   being.	   As	   Eco	   formulates	   it:	  "Being	  underpins	  all	  discourses	  except	  the	  one	  we	  hold	  about	  it	  (which	  tells	  us	  nothing	  we	  did	  not	  already	  know	  the	  very	  moment	  we	  began	  to	  talk	  about	  it)”	  (Eco,	  2000,	  p.	  24)19.	  	  	  Obviously,	  none	  of	  these	  three	  reasons	  for	  not	  looking	  at	  images	  from	  a	  4EA	  stance	  withstand	  further	  reflection.	  Firstly,	  referring	  to	  the	  objection	  that	  the	  world	  on	  an	  image	  denies	  bodily	  access,	   Chapter	   II.1	   should	   have	   sufficiently	   illustrated	   that	   the	   real	  world	   as	  well	   is	   never	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Van	  Gogh:	  Wheatfield	  with	  Crows,	  1890.	  Oil	  on	  canvas.	  50.2	  cm	  x	  103	  cm.	  Van	  Gogh	  Museum,	  Amsterdam.	  18	  Admittedly,	  again,	  to	  give	  such	  an	  explanation	  is	  also	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  authors	  in	  their	  brilliant	  and	  most	  illuminating	  writings	  about	  non-­‐linguistic	  representations!	  19	  For	  an	  elaboration	  on	  this	  apparent	  fear	  see	  also	  Heimann	  (unpublished	  Master	  thesis).	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given	   to	   us	   completely.	   This	   is	   not	   only	   true	   due	   to	   selective	   attention	   depending	   on	   my	  current	   task,	   or	  my	   physical	   dependencies	   not	   allowing	  me	   to	   be	   everywhere	   at	   the	   same	  time.	  Indeed,	  some	  things	  we	  think	  we	  know	  of,	  such	  as	  the	  state	  of	  others,	  can	  never	  be	  per-­‐ceived	  in	  the	  exact	  same	  way	  in	  which	  we	  perceive	  ourselves	  or	  an	  object	  we	  handle	  or	  feel.	  	  The	   explanations	   in	   Chapter	   II.1	   should	   have	   illustrated	   then	   how,	   still,	   the	   world	   itself	   is	  experienced	  via	  embodied	  mechanisms.	  Furthermore,	   regarding	   the	   other	   two	   objections	   to	   an	   embodied	   concept	   of	   image	  perception,	   that	   is,	   the	   traditional	   deciphering	   techniques	   and	   the	   learned	   conventions	   of	  representations	  that	  are	  suggested	  as	  the	  main	  and	  most	  useful	  tools	  to	  interpret	  images	  and	  artworks,	  I	  assume	  that	  everyone	  of	  us	  has	  experiences	  with	  such	  representations	  that	  clearly	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  explainable	  by	  such	  knowledge.	  It	  seems	  indeed	  rather	  implausible	  to	  think	  of	  a	  child’s	  charade	  or	  our	  immediate	  interpretation	  of	  the	  flickering	  brushdots	  in	  a	  painting	  of	   Cezanne	   as	   being	   guided	  by	   learned	   rules	   of	   how	   to	   show	   something.	  And	   I	  would	   even	  suggest	   that	   it	   is	   almost	   impossible	   to	   talk	   about	   Goya’s	   etching	  Que	  hay	   che	  hacer	  mas?20,	  showing	  the	  brutal	  genital	  mutilation	  of	  a	  naked	  man	  by	  several	  soldiers	  armed	  with	  sabres,	  without	  including	  our	  almost	  unavoidable	  bodily	  reaction	  to	  it	   in	  our	  descriptions.	  Precisely	  most	  spectators	  might	  strongly	  remember	  responses	  such	  as	  squinting	  the	  eyes	  and	  slightly	  moving	  backwards	  as	  if	  trying	  to	  flee	  the	  painful	  empathy	  evoked	  by	  this	  and	  similar	  paintings	  (see	  also	  Freedberg	  &	  Gallese,	  2007).	   In	   the	   same	  vein,	   it	  does	  not	   seem	  reasonable	   to	   talk	  about	   Anselm	   Kiefer’s	   Die	   Treppe21	  without	   referring	   to	   the	   corporal	   feeling	   and	   behavior	  evoked	   in	   the	   spectator	   by	   the	   overwhelming	   size	   and	  materiality	   of	   the	   artwork.	   Indeed,	  some	   images	   cannot	   only	   be	   felt	   as	   “forcing	   us	   in	   a	   distance”,	   or	   “drawing	   us	   close”	   in	   our	  attempts	  to	  best	  grasp	  (or	  avoid)	  their	  affective(!)	  content,	  but	  also	  as	  influencing	  our	  mood	  and	  whole	  being	  explicitly	  by	  stimulating	  specific	  ways	  of	  perceptual	  explorations:	  rapid	  gaze	  jumps	  or	  long	  fixations,	  such	  as	  those	  evoked	  by	  certain	  material	  formations	  or	  uses	  of	  colors,	  in	  their	  gestural	  nature	  don’t	  leave	  us	  unaffected	  (see	  also	  Sauer,	  2006).	  In	  a	  nutshell:	  neither	  resemblance	  nor	  expression	  (as	  two	  functions	  of	  images	  and	  artworks)	  seem	  to	  be	  capturable	  with	  reference	  to	  learned	  conventions	  only.	  	  As	   remarked	   in	   most	   recent	   attempts	   to	   (re-­‐)introduce	   body,	   emotion	   and	   affect	   into	   the	  discussion	  about	  the	  principles	  of	  art	  perception	  (see	  for	  example	  Freedberg	  &	  Gallese,	  2007;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Goya,	  Que	  hay	  que	  hacer	  mas?	  (What	  more	  is	  there	  to	  do?),	  plate	  33	  from	  Los	  Desastres	  de	  la	  Guerra	  (Disasters	  of	  War),	  etching,	  Bibliothèque	  nationale,	  Paris,	  France.	  21	  Anselm	  Kiefer,	  Die	  Treppe,	  1982/83,	  straw,	  emulsion,	  shellac	  and	  burn	  marks	  on	  photography,	  330	  x	  185	  cm,	  Artmuseum	  Bonn	  –	  permanent	  loan	  Grothe	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Di	  Dio	  &	  Gallese,	  2009;	  	  Gallese,	  2012;	  Gallese	  &	  Di	  Dio,	  2012;	  Sauer,	  2012;	  Fingerhut,	  2012),	  these	   insights	   are	   not	   completely	   new.	   Indeed,	   a	   strong	   tradition	   of	   art	   historians,	   starting	  long	  before	  the	  rise	  of	  cognitive	  sciences,	  emphazises	  the	  crucial	  importance	  of	  the	  living	  body	  and	  its	  experiences	  for	  images	  and	  especially	  visual	  art	  experiences.	  Without	  the	  intention	  to	  give	   a	   complete	   review	   of	   this	   literature	   I	   would	   like	   to	   illustrate	   the	   principal	   ideas	  developed	   over	   time	   using	   some	   selected	   examples.22	  To	   begin	  with	   a	   first	   strong	   position,	  Robert	   Vischer,	   as	   early	   as	   in	   1874,	   created	   the	   term	   “Einfühlung”	   [literally	   translatable	   as	  “feeling-­‐in”,	   K.H.]	   to	   underline	   that	   even	   plainly	   looking	   at	   an	   object,	   and	   especially	   at	   art-­‐works,	   can	   evoke	   non-­‐contingent,	   sensual	   and	   motoric	   responses	   of	   our	   body.	   In	   fact,	  Vischer’s	   explanations	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   body	   is	   used	   as	   the	   main	   access	   to	   the	  artwork,	   when	   he	   writes	   “Mein	   geistig	   sinnliches	   Ich	   transportiert	   sich	   in	   das	   Innere	   des	  Objektes	  und	  erfuehlt	  seinen	  Charakter	  von	  innen	  heraus.”	  (Vischer	  (1874),	  p.	  48;	  “My	  mental	  sensual	   I	   transports	   itself	   in	   the	   inside	   of	   the	   object	   to	   feel	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	   explore)	   its	  character	   from	   the	   inside.”	   Translation	   K.H.).	   This	   view	   is	   apprehended	   and	   further	   deve-­‐loped,	  especially	  in	  the	  field	  of	  architecture,	  by	  Heinrich	  Wölfflin	  (1946),	  who	  stresses	  that	  it	  is	   the	   constitution	  and	  organization	  of	   the	  body	   that	  determines	  our	   comprehension	  of	   any	  kind	  of	  material	  artwork.	  Almost	  reminding	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  “Die	  Grenzen	  unserer	  Sprache	  sind	  die	  Grenzen	  unserer	  Welt”	  (Wittgenstein,	  1922,	  5.6;	  “The	  limits	  of	  my	  language	  mean	  the	  limits	   of	  my	  world”,	   translation	  K.H.),	  Wölfflin	  writes	   “Unsere	   leibliche	  Organisation	   ist	   die	  Form	   unter	   der	   wir	   alles	   Koerperliche	   auffassen.”	   (Wölfflin,	   1946,	   p.	   21;	   “Our	   bodily	  organization	   is	   the	   form	   according	   to	   which	   we	   grasp	   anything	   corporal	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	  material).”	   translation	   K.H.).	   He	   expresses	   further	   that	   this	   bodily	   organization	   is	   nothing	  completely	   stable,	   but	   is	   influenced	   by	   the	   transient	   changes	   of	   our	   situated	   being	   in	   a	  evolving	   world,	   stating	   “Ein	   architektonischer	   Stil	   gibt	   die	   Haltung	   und	   Bewegung	   der	  Menschen	   seiner	   Zeit	   wieder”	   (Wölfflin,	   1946,	   p.	   44;	   “An	   architectonic	   style	   mirrors	   the	  (bodily)	  stance	  and	  movement	  of	  the	  people	  of	  its	  time”,	  translation	  K.H.)	  Nevertheless	  he	  also	  stresses,	   “die	  Organisation	  des	  Körpers	   [sei,	  added	  by	  K.H.]	  der	  bleibende	  Nenner	  bei	  allem	  Wechsel”	   (Wölfflin,	   1946,	   p.	   44;	   “The	   organization	   of	   the	   body	   remains	   the	   common	   deno-­‐minator	   throughout	   all	   changes”).	   This	   clearly	   marks	   the	   dominance	   of	   bodily	   nature	   in	  comparison	   to	   culture	   and	   education	   in	   the	   sense-­‐making	   processes	   referred	   to.	   50	   years	  later,	   Aby	   Warburg	   and	   Bernard	   Berenson	   famously	   picked	   up	   again	   this	   line	   of	   thought.	  While	  Warburg	  emphasizes	  once	  more,	  that	  the	  outward	  look	  of	  a	  human	  figure	  is	  enough	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For	  more	  literature,	  see	  for	  example	  Stueber,	  (2006,	  2009),	  especially	  focusing	  on	  empathic	  feelings	  in	  aesthetic	  appraisal	  and	  Curtis	  &	  Koch	  (2009)	  about	  the	  history	  and	  presence	  of	  “Einfühlung”	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  concept.	  
	   25	  
grant	   us	   a	   look	   in	   its	   inside	   and	   highlights	   the	   immediateness	   and	   automaticity	   of	   this	  impression	   (Warburg,	  1999),	  Berenson	  specifies	   the	  underlying	  mechanism,	   that	   is	   that	   the	  observation	  of	  an	  artwork	  can	  raise	  the	  spectator’s	  inner	  sense	  of	  the	  muscles	  involved	  in	  the	  represented	   posture	   (Berenson,	   1896).	   While	   these	   descriptions	   refer	   apparently	   to	   the	  representation	  of	  human	  figures	  above	  all,	   later	  scholars	  elaborated	  on	  Wölfflin’s	  seemingly	  broader	  claim	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  body	  is	  indeed	  the	  essence	  of	  all	  the	  world	  perceived	  by	   it.	   As	   Merleau-­‐Ponty	   puts	   it:	   “The	   enigma	   derives	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   my	   body	   simulta-­‐neously	  sees	  and	  is	  seen.	  That	  which	  looks	  at	  all	  things	  can	  also	  look	  at	  itself	  and	  recognize,	  in	  what	  it	  sees,	  the	  “other	  side”	  of	  its	  power	  of	  looking.	  […]	  Visible	  and	  mobile,	  my	  body	  is	  a	  thing	  among	   things;	   it	   is	   one	  of	   them.	   […]	  Things	  are	  an	  annex	  or	  prolongation	  of	   itself;	   they	  are	  incrusted	  in	  its	  flesh,	  they	  are	  part	  of	  is	  full	  definition;	  the	  world	  is	  made	  of	  the	  very	  stuff	  of	  the	   body.	   […]	   Since	   things	   and	  my	   body	   are	  made	   of	   the	   same	   stuff,	   vision	  must	   somehow	  come	  about	  in	  them.	  […]	  Quality,	  light,	  color,	  depth,	  which	  are	  there	  before	  us,	  are	  there	  only	  because	   they	   awaken	   an	   echo	   in	   our	  bodies	   […].“(Merleau-­‐Ponty,	   1993,	   p.	   124-­‐125).	   Thirty	  years	  later,	  the	  developmental	  psychologist	  Daniel	  Stern	  proposed	  again	  that	  our	  basic	  access	  to	  the	  world	  surrounding	  us	  consists	  in	  what	  he	  called	  “vitality	  forms”:	  “activation	  contours	  of	  certain	  bodily	  sensations”	  elicited	  in	  response	  to	  motions	  as	  well	  as	  shapes	  via	  an	  immediate	  and	   automatic	   resonance	   activity	   of	   the	   human	   mind,	   bridging	   the	   apparent	   gap	   between	  inside	  and	  outside	  (Stern	  (2000)	  p.89,	  for	  an	  elaboration	  see	  also	  Grueny	  (2014	  and	  unpub-­‐lished	  manuscript)).	  While	  Stern	  admits	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  perception	  can	  in	  later	  stages	  of	  life	  be	  substituted	  by	  other	  mechanisms	  based	  on	  linguistic	  categorizations,	  etc.,	  he	  also	  stresses	  that	  it	  is	  still	  available	  and	  used,	  especially	  in	  situations	  that	  confront	  us	  with	  uncategorizable	  phenomena	  –	  such	  as	  the	  arts	  (see	  Stern,	  2010,	  as	  well	  as	  Langer,	  1953,1957,1984).	  	  It	   is	  with	  explicit	  reference	  to	  this	   line	  of	   thought	  that	  David	  Freedberg	  and	  Vittorio	  Gallese	  	  set	  forward	  in	  2007	  their	  persisting	  call	  to	  finally	  leave	  behind	  the	  primacy	  of	  (disembodied)	  cognition	   in	   art	   research	   while	   instead	   focusing	   on	   the	   role	   of	   embodied	   cognition	   and	  especially	  embodied	  empathetic	  responses	  to	  art.	  Even	  more	  concretely,	  they	  formulated	  two	  distinct	   hypotheses	   regarding	   the	   precise	   functions	   of	   these	   kinds	   of	   responses	   in	   art	  perception.	  	  Firstly,	   they	  suggested	   that	  empathetic	   responses,	   implemented	  via	   fundamental	  action	  and	  emotion-­‐perception	   links	   (e.g.	   shared	   neural	   networks	   and	   canonical	   and	   mirror	   neuron	  mechanisms	   as	   introduced	   in	   Chapter	   II.1	   and	   II.2),	   play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   observer’s	  embodied	   perception	   of	   the	   representational	   content	   of	   the	   artworks	   (action,	   intentions	   or	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emotions	   of	   actors	   as	   well	   as	   affordances	   of	   objects).	   This	   role	   is	   to	   animate	   the	   depicted	  content	  by	  animating	  the	  perceiver.	  As	  the	  descriptions	  of	  prior	  scholars	  have	  demonstrated,	  it	   is	   a	   curious	   fact	   that	   despite	   the	   obvious	   differences	   between	   a	   world	   represented	   by	  artworks	  and	  the	  world	  that	  literally	  surrounds	  us,	  artworks	  show	  the	  clear	  capacity	  to	  bring	  something	   to	   appearance	   rather	   than	   “just	   depicting”	   it 23 .	   Looking	   at	   Michelangelo’s	  
Prisoners24	  or	  Goya’s	  Desastres	  de	  la	  Guerra25,	  we	  do	  not	  perceive	   figures	  bizarrely	   frozen	   in	  time,	  but	  rather	  experience	  strongly	  and	  emotionally	  an	  extended	  moment	  of	  flight,	  fight	  and	  action.	  Freedberg	  and	  Gallese	  suggest	  that	  it	  might	  be	  precisely	  via	  the	  activation	  of	  our	  motor	  system	  mediated	  by	  the	  mirror	  neuron	  system	  and	  embodied	  simulations	  triggered	  by	  such	  that	  this	  is	  possible.	  	  Secondly,	  they	  propose	  that	  empathetic	  responses	  via	  the	  same	  mechanisms	  contribute	  to	  the	  observer’s	  embodied	  perception	  of	  the	  making	  of	  the	  artworks,	  that	  is	  the	  specific	  style	  of	  an	  artwork	  which	  depends	  on	  the	  artist’s	  creative	  gestures.	  Precisely,	  they	  hypothesize	  that	  also	  the	  visible	  traces	  of	  the	  artist’s	  creative	  gestures	  (such	  as	  brushwork	  etc.)	  can	  also	  activate	  the	  observer’s	  motor	  system,	  thus	  influencing	  the	  experience	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  This	  idea	  led	  to	  some	  criticism	  and	  extensions.	  Joerg	  Fingerhut	  (2012)	  discusses	  for	  example	  Shaun	  Gallagher’s	  critique	  of	  Gallese’s	  and	  Freedberg’s	  position	  (Gallagher,	  2011c).	  According	  to	  Gallagher,	  Gallese’s	   and	  Freedberg’s	  argument	  either	  downplays	  what	   there	   is	   to	  be	   said	  with	   respect	   to	   mirror	   neurons	   in	   social	   cognition,	   or	   misses	   out	   on	   aesthetic	   experience,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  encounters	  with	  artworks	  also	  differ	  from	  real-­‐world	   situations.	   One	   way	   to	   mark	   this	   difference	   is	   to	   refer	   back	   to	   the	   relation	   of	  “seeing-­‐in”	  to	  them,	  mentioned	  above:	  artistic	  representation	  are	  always	  perceived	  as	  on	  the	  one	   hand	   showing	   something,	   that	   is	   the	   depicted,	   while,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   also	   showing	  themselves,	   that	   is	   the	   depiction	   itself.	   Fingerhut	   in	   contrast,	   interestingly	   proposes,	   that,	  contrary	   to	   Gallagher’s	   doubt,	   the	   second	   hypothesis	   raised	   by	   Gallese	   &	   Freedberg,	   –	   the	  spectator’s	  affection	  also	  by	  the	  artist’s	  gesture	   itself	  –	  might	   indeed	  be	  a	  way	  to	  explain	  an	  aesthetic	  version	  of	   this	  phenomenon	  of	   seeing-­‐in.	  With	   reference	   to	   fundamental	  works	   in	  vision	   research	   that	  delivered	  evidence	  of	   the	  existence	  of	   two	  different	  pathways	   in	  visual	  perception	  (see	  Ungerleider	  &	  Mishkin,	  1982;	  Millner	  &	  Goodale,	  1995;	  see	  Jacob	  &	  Jeannerod	  2003	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  philosophical	  impact)	  Fingerhut	  suggests	  that	  in	  normal	  viewing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  for	  example	  Paul	  Klee’s	  reflections	  on	  art	  in	  Paul	  Klee,	  1920,	  p.	  28.	  24	  A	  series	  of	  unfinished	  sculptures	  for	  the	  tomb	  of	  Pope	  Julius	  II,	  produced	  1525-­‐1530	  by	  Michelangelo.	  See	  for	  example:	  The	  Awakening	  Slave,	  2.67m	  marble	  staturr,	  Galleria	  dell’accademia,	  Florence.	  25	  A	  series	  of	  82	  graphics	  (aquatinta)	  by	  Francisco	  de	  Goya	  created	  1810-­‐1840,	  showing	  the	  atrocities	  of	  Napoleon’s	  soldiers	  fighting	  against	  the	  revolting	  people	  of	  Spain	  (and	  vice	  versa).	  See	  also	  Paas-­‐Zeidler	  (1978).	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conditions,	   information	   regarding	   the	   surface	   of	   the	   image	   and	   information	   regarding	   the	  depicted	  objects	  might	  be	  processed	  mainly	  separately.	  Indeed,	  while	  research	  has	  described	  a	  ventral	  stream	  that	  was	  suggested	  to	  predominantly	  serve	  our	  conscious	  impression	  of	  the	  environment	  as	  well	  as	  related	  knowledge	  aquisition,	  a	  dorsal	  stream	  has	  been	  proposed	  to	  play	   a	   more	   important	   role	   in	   action	   preparation	   (precisely,	   it	   would	   collect	   fine	   grained	  information	  relevant	   for	  a	  bodily	   interaction	  with	  objects;	  see	  Ungerleider	  &	  Mishkin,	  1982;	  Millner	  &	  Goodale,	  1995;	  and	  Jacob	  &	  Jeannerod,	  2003;	  however	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  making	  a	  too	  strong	  separation	  between	  these	  different	  pathways,	  see	  Gallese,	  2007).	  According	  to	  Finger-­‐hut	  it	  is	  thus	  likely	  that	  while	  the	  depicted	  gets	  mostly	  processed	  via	  the	  ventral	  stream,	  the	  material	  features	  of	  the	  depiction	  itself,	  obviously	  more	  relevant	  for	  a	  direct	  object	  handling,	  might	   be	   rather	   be	   processed	   via	   the	   dorstal	   stream.	   This	   leads	   Fingerhut	   to	   the	   further	  hypotheses	  that	  a)	  our	  feeling	  of	  presence	  of	  the	  depicted	  objects	  might	  fundamentally	  rely	  on	  processing	  via	  ventral	  pathways	  (including	  simulation	  processes	  initiated	  or	  supported	  by	  the	  mirror	  response	  to	  the	  depicted	  figures	  and	  objects26),	  while	  the	  immediate	  processing	  of	  the	  visual	   surface	  of	   the	   image	  via	   the	  dorsal	  pathway	  rather	  elicits	   the	   (simultaneous!)	  aware-­‐ness	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  representation	  –	  the	  material	  of	  the	  artwork	  –	  itself.	  Furthermore,	  he	  suggests	  that	  the	  spectator’s	  perceptual	  activities	  such	  as	  gaze	  and	  head	  movements,	  are	  thereby	  also	   strongly	   influenced	  by	   the	   representation	   (rather	   than	  by	  what	   is	   represented	  only),	  which	  makes	  them	  differ	  from	  the	  ones	  that	  we	  would	  normally	  exhibit	  if	  exploring	  the	  depicted	  objects	  in	  reality.27	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  the	  spectator’s	  possibility	  to	  gain	  new	  skills	   in	  the	   interaction	  with	  the	  artwork,	  as	   it	  allows	  him	  to	  see	  something	  under	  new	  perceptual	  conditions	  precisely	  evoked	  by	  his	  own	  exploratory	  movements	  guided	  by	  the	  representation	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  represented.28	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  these	  hypotheses	  later	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  Remarkably,	  meanwhile,	  Gallese	  and	  Freedberg’s	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  supported	  by	  a	  num-­‐ber	  of	  recent	  neuroscientific	  studies.	  Regarding	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  –	  that	  the	  action	  percep-­‐tion	  links	  reported	  might	  play	  a	  role	  in	  animating	  also	  steady	  images	  of	  actors	  –	  it	  was	  repea-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  added	  that	  mirror	  mechanisms,	  as	  far	  as	  we	  know,	  belong	  to	  and/or	  are	  recipient	  of	  inputs	  from	  the	  dorsal	  stream.	  27	  This	  latter	  interaction	  between	  material	  cues	  and	  orientating	  movements,	  might	  lead	  to	  medium-­‐specific	  new	  perceptual	  habits,	  crucially	  influencing	  not	  only	  how	  but	  also	  what	  we	  see.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  topic	  later	  in	  this	  thesis.	  28	  This	  propositon	  might	  even	  extend	  Gallagher’s	  main	  claim	  that	  artworks,	  by	  confronting	  us	  with	  unfulfillable	  affordances,	  can	  help	  us	  to	  see	  other	  action	  possibilities,	  that	  then	  might	  be	  available	  for	  us	  in	  later	  real	  life.	  Fingerhut	  promotes,	  that	  the	  spectator	  can	  additionaly	  profit	  from	  the	  fulfillable	  aesthetic	  affordances	  of	  the	  representation	  that	  might	  include	  the	  marks	  of	  the	  artists	  that	  could	  lead	  the	  spectator	  to	  a	  bodily	  behavior	  unknown	  from	  the	  real	  world.	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tedly	   shown	   that	  mirror	   and	   canonical	  neurons	   can	  be	  activaed	  during	   the	  observation	  not	  only	   of	   life	   actions	   or	   real	   objects,	   but	   also	   of	  moving	   and	   even	   static	   images	   of	   actions	   or	  objects	   (see	   for	   example	   Johnson-­‐Frey	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Urgesi,	   Moro,	   Candidi,	   &	   Aglioti,	   2006;	  Proverbio,	  Riva,	  &	  Zani,	  2009;	  Grèzes,	  Armony,	  Rowe,	  &	  Passingham,	  2003).	  Furthermore,	   it	  was	   demonstrated	   that	   it	   is	   not	   necessary	   for	   their	   activation	   that	   the	   representation	   be	  naturalistic.	   It	   has	   been	   found	   rather	   that	   also	   abstractions,	   such	   as	   films	   showing	   robots	  instead	  of	  humans	  as	  well	  as	  even	  comics	  can	  elicit	  the	  crucial	  responses	  (Gazzola,	  Rizzolatti,	  Wicker,	  &	  Keysers,	  2007;	  Iwase,	  Ouchi,	  Okada,	  Yokoyama,	  […],	  &	  Watanabe,	  2002).	  Furthermore,	  regarding	  their	  second	  hypothesis	  –	  that	  also	  traces	  of	  artistic	  creations	  might	  be	  able	  to	  elicit	  the	  mirror	  mechanism	  –	  most	  recent	  studies	  showed	  that,	  next	  to	  life	  actions	  and	   abstract	   static	   representations	   of	   such,	   even	   the	   mere	   traces	   of	   actions,	   such	   as	  handwritten	   letters	   on	   or	   cuts	   in	   paper	   can	   elicit	   the	   activations	   of	   the	  motor	   system	   (see	  Longcamp,	  Tanskanen	  &	  Hari,	  2006;	  Longcamp,	  Boucard,	  Gilhodes,	  Anton,	  […],	  &	  Velay,	  2008;	  Heimann,	   Umiltà,	   &	   Gallese,	   2012;	   Umiltà,	   Berchio,	   Sestito,	   Freedberg,	   &	   Gallese,	   2012).	  Indeed,	   results	   also	   indicated	   that	   the	   responses	   to	   such	   stimuli	   were	   modulated	   by	   the	  detailed	   form	   of	   the	   representations,	   that	   is	   the	   precise	   actions	   needed	   to	   produce	   the	  stimulus,	   such	  as	   typing,	  handwriting	  or	  brushpainting.	  For	  example,	  Longcamp	  et	  al.	   found	  that	  printed	  letters	  elicited	  a	  lower	  motor	  response	  than	  hand-­‐written	  ones.	  (Longcamp	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Furthermore,	  directly	  looking	  at	  abstract	  works	  of	  arts,	  Umiltà	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  found	  that,	  in	   comparison	   with	   control	   stimuli	   consisting	   of	   matching	   linework	   produced	   in	   Adobe	  Photoshop,	  only	  original	  artworks	  by	  Luciano	  Fontana	  consisting	  of	  cuts	  in	  a	  canvas	  elicited	  a	  motor	   response	   during	   observation.	   An	   ERP	   study	   by	   Sbriscia-­‐Fioretti,	   Berchio,	   Freedberg,	  Gallese,	  &	  Umiltà	  (2013)	  gave	  similar	  results	  when	  comparing	  responses	  to	  original	  paintings	  of	   Franz	  Kline	  with	   similar	   line-­‐art	   not	   exposing	   the	   dynamic	   features	   of	   the	   brushstrokes.	  Importantly	   also,	   the	   later	   two	   studies	   found	   significant	   results	   in	   tasks	   assessing	   the	  aesthetic	   subjective	   experiences	   of	   spectators	   supporting	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   stronger	  activation	  of	  the	  motor	  system	  coincided	  with	  enhanced	  aesthetic	  appraisal	  of	  the	  stimuli.	  	  	  Taken	  together	  these	  findings	  clearly	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  future	  research	  looking	  at	  visual	  arts	   or	   visual	   representations	   in	   general	   should	  no	   longer	   neglect	   embodied	   approaches	   to	  perception	   but	   should	   rather	   invest	   in	   further	   exploration	   of	   the	   hypotheses	   raised.	   In	   the	  next	  subchapter	  I	  will	  illustrate,	  why	  this	  is	  especially	  needed	  regarding	  the	  case	  of	  research	  about	  life-­‐action	  moving	  images.	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  II.3	   Enacted,	   embodied,	   embedded,	   extended	   and	   affective	   cognition	   as	   a	   concept	   guiding	  empirical	  research	  about	  the	  perception	  of	  life-­‐action	  moving	  images	  	  In	   her	   professorial	   dissertation	   “Der	   Leihkoerper”	   (“The	   surrogate	   body”)	   philosopher	   of	  media	  and	  the	  arts	  Christiane	  Voss	  argues	  that	  cine	  film,	  above	  all,	  is	  a	  medium	  of	  illusion	  that	  needs	  an	  aesthetics	  of	   illusion	  (Voss,	  2013).	  For	  people	  from	  outside	  of	   the	  aesthetic	   field	   it	  shall	   be	   remarked	  here	   that,	   even	  when	  disregarding	  discussion	  of	  4EA	  approaches	   to	   cog-­‐nition	  and	   their	   rejection	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  perception	  as	  an	   illusion,	   this	   is	  a	  problematic	  or	  even	  provocative	  claim.	  At	  least	  since	  modern	  age	  the	  term	  illusion	  in	  discussions	  of	  art	  and	  aesthetics	   is	  highly	  discredited.29	  Illusion	   is	  effectively	  equated	  with	  delusion	  or	  better	  even	  deception.	   In	   the	   affectively	   involving	   and	   convincing	   presentation	   of	   the	   represented,	   the	  artistic	  representation	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  concealing	  itself	  as	  something	  actually	  being	  made	  –	   that	   is	   it	  makes	   itself	   transparent.	   The	   dreaded	   result	   of	   this	   self-­‐negating	   process	   is	   un-­‐questioned	   belief	   instead	   of	   critical	   consciousness	   of	   the	   political	   nature	   of	   every	   repre-­‐sentation.	  To	  avoid	  this	  delusion,	  postmodern	  art	  rejects	  all	  modes	  of	  re-­‐presenttations	  that	  aim	   at	   transcendence	   of	   the	  medium	   itself	   such	   as	   naturalism	   in	   visual	   arts	   or	   linearity	   of	  narration	  in	  literature.	  Instead	  it	  strives	  to	  show	  itself	  as	  the	  representation	  it	  is	  by	  stressing	  the	  media	  used	   relying	  on	  means	   such	  as	   leaving	   linearity	   and	   rationality,	   yes	  becoming	  as	  bulky	   and	   non-­‐immersive	   as	   possible.	   Via	   this,	  Warburg	   scholar	   Sierek	   claims,	   the	   artwork	  represents	   a	   reflection	   demanding	   intervention	   rather	   than	   a	   self-­‐disguising	   transparent	  realization.	  Exemplifying	  this	  dynamical	  approach	  to	  pictures	  on	  the	  works	  of	  artists	  like	  Rene	  Magritte	   or	   Oleg	   Kulik	   he	   writes:	   “[Diese	   Kuenstler	   verstehen	   (ergaenzt	   durch	   K.H.)]	   das	  Bildfenster	  eher	  als	  Eingriff	  denn	  als	  Einsicht	  und	  ersetzen	  Transparenz	  durch	  eine	  andere	  –	  uebrigens	   auch	   der	   visuellen	   Metaphorik	   entnommene	   –	   Eigenschaft:	   durch	   Reflexion.”	  (Sierek,	  2007,	  p.	  147).	  (“[These	  artists	  understand	  (complemented	  by	  K.H.)]	  the	  picture	  gate	  rather	   as	   an	   intervention	   than	   a	   simple	   insight	   and	   substitute	   transparency	   by	   another	  property	  –	  incidentally	  also	  stemming	  from	  visual	  metaphores:	  reflection.”]	  Even	   the	   most	   postmodern	   cine	   films	   however,	   so	   Voss’	   emphasis,	   only	   partly	   fulfill	   this	  promise.	  Of	  course,	  also	  when	  confronted	  with	  film,	  we	  don’t	  completely	  forget	  that	  what	  we	  see	   on	   the	   screen	   is	   not	   the	   reality	   surrounding	   us.	   Also	   in	   film,	   we	   “see	   the	   world	   in”	   a	  medium,	  at	   the	   same	   time	  being	  aware	  of	   the	   representation	  and	   the	   represented	   (see	  also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Indeed,	  this	  criticism	  can	  already	  be	  found	  as	  early	  as	  in	  the	  texts	  of	  Platon.	  See	  for	  example	  Platon	  (2007).	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Fingerhut’s	  description	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  Chapter	  II.2	  (Fingerhut,	  2012)).	  However,	  with	  reference	  to	  our	  own	  experience	  with	  cinema	  it	  seems	  hard	  to	  defend	  the	  claim	  that	  illusion	  or	  even	  delusion	  in	  fact	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  major	  practice	  of	  most	  films.	  Movies	  apparently	  explicitly	  aim	  at	  reaching	  out	  of	  the	  screen,	  that	  is	  carrying	  us	  off	   in	  other	  times,	  spaces	  and	  plots,	  with	  the	  absolute	  surrender	  of	  the	  spectator	  to	  the	  fictional	  world	  being	  the	  ultimate	   goal	   for	   some.	   A	   goal	   seemingly	   not	   so	   far	   from	   to	   be	   reached:	   It	   is	   a	   common	  experience	   to	   see	   spectators	   spellbound	   in	   front	   of	   the	   big	   screen,	   their	   gaze	   and	   body	  completely	  controlled	  by	  the	  stimuli	  of	  the	  fictional	  world	  only,	  while	  all	  the	  other	  that	  is	  “the	  real”	   world	   surrounding	   them	   seems	   neglected.30	  Furthermore,	   the	   influence	   of	   moving	  pictures	  obviously	  often	  goes	  beyond	  an	  engagement	  of	  our	  cognitive	  powers.	  Movies,	  even	  in	  their	   most	   artistic	   forms,	   unquestionably	   affect	   us	   bodily,	   they	   let	   us	   laugh	   out	   loud,	   cry	  uncontrollably	  and	  jump	  from	  our	  seats,	  they	  literally	  move	  or	  excite	  us	  and	  they	  might	  even	  frighten	  or	  disgust	  us	  so	  much,	  that	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  ultimate	  method	  of	  switching	  them	  off	  or	  leaving	  the	  room	  to	  escape	  their	  grasp.	  Most	  impressively,	  not	  even	  this	  last	  act	  might	  let	  us	  astray	  from	  their	  influence,	  as	  movies	  are	  also	  well	  known	  for	  their	  aftereffects.	  Not	  only	  can	  a	  movie	  affect	  me	  in	  a	  way	  that	  might	  change	  my	  mood	  and	  with	  this	  my	  world	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  day;	  movies	  can	  even	  haunt	  us	  in	  our	  dreams.31	  	  	  Naturally,	   this	   strong	   involving	  power	  of	  movies	  has	   equally	   fascinated	  audience	  as	  well	   as	  film	   scholars	   from	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   film	   history	   –	   that	   is	   long	   before	   the	   invention	   of	  color	  and	  sound	  film.	  As	  early	  as	  in	  189632	  indeed,	  the	  Russian	  author	  and	  journalist	  Maxim	  Gorky	  wrote	  in	  the	  French	  press	  about	  the	  first	  movies	  seen	  	  “Quelle	   que	   soit	   la	   scène	   ainsi	   prise	   et	   si	   grand	   que	   soit	   le	   nombre	   des	   personnage	   ainsi	  surpris	  dans	  les	  actes	  de	  leur	  vie,	  vous	  le	  revoyez	  avec	  toute	  l’illusion	  de	  la	  vie	  réelle.	  […]	  Vos	  nerfs	   se	   tendent,	   votre	   imagination	   vous	   etraîne	   dans	   une	   vie	   étrange,	   artificiallement	   uni-­‐forme,	  privée	  de	  couleurs	  et	  de	  sons,	  mais	  pleine	  de	  mouvement.	  […]	  C’est	  la	  vie	  même,	  c’est	  le	  mouvement	  pris	  sur	  le	  vif.”	  (Gorky,	  [1896];	  “No	  matter	  what	  scene	  is	  recorded,	  no	  matter	  how	  large	  the	  amount	  of	  characters	  caught	  in	  it	  in	  their	  daily	  actions,	  you	  can	  see	  it	  all	  again	  just	  like	   in	   real	   life.	   […]	   Your	   nerves	   get	   tense,	   your	   imagination	   leads	   you	   into	   a	   strange	   life,	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  A	   very	   interesting	   paper	   about	   the	   actual	   irritation	   of	   the	   spectator	   happening	   in	   case	   that	   this	   focus	   of	   the	   screen	   is	  disturbed	  by	  the	  outer	  world	  forcing	  itself	  back	  into	  consciousness	  has	  been	  published	  by	  Julian	  Hanich	  (2013).	  31	  A	  study	  of	  Eva	  Murzyn	  (2008)	  even	   indicated	  that	  movies	  might	   influence	  the	  general	  nature	  of	  our	  dreams	  by	  showing	  that	  the	  exposure	  to	  black	  and	  white	  movies	  correlated	  with	  the	  recall	  of	  greyscale	  dreams.	  See	  also	  Fingerhut	  (2014).	  32	  Remarkably,	  this	  is	  not	  even	  one	  year	  after	  the	  first	  payed	  presentation	  of	  a	  movie:	  “La	  Sortie	  des	  usines	  Lumière”	  by	  Louis	  Lumière	  (firstly	  screened	  in	  front	  of	  a	  paying	  audience	  on	  the	  8th	  of	  December	  at	  the	  Grand	  Café	  in	  Paris.)	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artificially	  uniform,	  deprived	  of	  colours	  and	  sounds,	  but	  full	  of	  movement.	  […]	  It	  is	  life	  itself,	  it	  is	  movement	  caught	  live,	  then	  and	  there.”,	  translation	  K.H.)	  These	  words	  also	  underline	  that	  films	  manage	  to	  engage	  us	  in	  their	  fictional	  world	  in	  a	  way	  especially	  hard	  to	  explain	  by	  referring	  to	  symbolic	  processes	  and	  cognitive	  inferences.	  In	  his	  enthusiastic	   descriptions,	   Gorky	   is	   neither	   dwelling	   on	   cultural	   conventions	   nor	   our	   know-­‐ledge	  about	  how	   film	   footage	   is	  produced	   -­‐	   that	   is	   the	   fact	  of	   film	  being	  a	   recording	  of	   “the	  real”,	   by	   this	   still	   subliminally	   carrying	   the	   illusion-­‐fostering	   reputation	   of	   a	   trace	   and	   an	  imprint	   rather	   than	   a	   depiction33.	   Rather,	   what	   he	   naturally	   puts	   his	   emphasis	   on	   is	   a	  movement	  taking	  over	  our	  nerves	  and	  body	  with	  this	  catapulting	  us	  in	  another	  here	  and	  now.	  An	  intuition	  as	  such	  might	  be	  the	  reason,	  why	  film	  theory	  much	  earlier	  than	  theory	  of	  visual	  arts	  in	  general	  opened	  up	  for	  notions	  of	  film	  granting	  the	  spectator’s	  body	  and	  worldly	  being	  a	  crucial	  role	   in	  the	  aesthetic	  experience	  involved.	  Of	  course	  cognitivist	  approaches	  to	  cinema	  can	   still	   be	   found	   in	   canonical	  works	   of	   scholars	   such	   as	   Goodman	   (1970[1945]),	   Bettetini	  (1973,	  p,	  93-­‐96),	  Gianetti	   (1976,	  p.	  110-­‐123)	  and	  Mast	  (1977,	  p.	  177-­‐180)	  who	  strictly	  des-­‐cribe	   movies	   as	   sequences	   of	   hundreds	   and	   thousands	   of	   separate	   images	   produced	   by	   a	  camera	  mechanically	   moving	   in	   a	   geometric	   space;	   images	   that	   then	   by	   a	   row	   of	   complex	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  associations	  and	  transformations	  of	  our	  computationally	  functioning	  mind	  get	  connected	  and	  interpreted	  to	  finally	  form	  a	  narrative.	  Mostly,	  however,	  even	  in	  these	  descriptions,	   the	   immediate	   and	  physical	   impact	   of	   film	  on	   our	   bodies	   is	   granted	   at	   least	   a	  notice	   –	   if	   not	   a	   significant	   role.	   Just	   as	   in	   Chapter	   II.2	   regarding	   embodied	   approaches	   to	  images,	  I	  will	  shortly	  sketch	  some	  important	  historical	  positions	  stressing	  the	  dependence	  of	  film	  perception	  on	  the	  perceiver’s	  experiences	  off	  the	  screen.34	  	  	  One	   of	   the	   earliest	   works	   to	   name	   here	   might	   be	   “The	   photoplay”	   by	   the	   psychologist	  Münsterberg,	   published	   as	   early	   as	   1916.	   Though	   Münsterberg	   still	   quite	   cognitivistically	  suggested,	   that	   the	  “illusive”	  power	  of	   the	  cinema	  that	  make	  us	  see	  a	  world	  with	  depth	  and	  motion	   instead	   of	   sequences	   of	   flat	   pictures	   is	   due	   to	   the	   intensive	   “work	   of	   our	   mental	  mechanism”	  (Münsterberg,	  1916,	  p.71)	  he	  also	  proposed,	  that	  the	  narrative	  structures	  of	  film	  function	   by	   letting	   us	   recall	   the	   way	   we	   normally	   perceive,	   think	   and	   imagine.	   In	   1917,	  elaborating	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  “recall”,	  the	  doctors	  Toulouse	  and	  Mourgue	  (1917),	  investi-­‐gating	   physiological	   responses	   such	   as	   breathing	   performance	   of	   film	   audience,	   suggested	  that	   during	  movie	  watching	   a	   phenomenon	  would	   take	   place,	   close	   to	  what	   happens	   to	   us	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  apparent	  indexicality	  especially	  regarding	  photography	  see	  Barthes,	  1980	  and	  Sontag,	  1977.	  34	  For	  an	  excellent	  review	  about	  the	  development	  of	  cinema	  studies	  see	  also	  Grieveson	  &	  Wasson	  (2008).	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during	  hypnosis.	  Specifically,	   they	  stressed	   that	   this	   ‘hypnosis-­‐like-­‐effect’	  would	  be	  possible	  via	  the	  “motor	  suggestibility”	  of	   the	  spectator,	  who,	  by	  the	  movie,	  could	   literally	  be	  put	   into	  the	  situation	  shown	  on	  the	  screen.	  A	  few	  years	  later	  in	  the	  20s,	  the	  famous	  director	  Eisenstein	  who	  also	  published	  a	  number	  of	  essays	  about	   filmmaking	  recommended	  several	   techniques	  how	   to	   use	   camera	   and	   especially	   montage	   to	   elicit	   emotional	   responses	   in	   the	   spectator	  precisely	   by	   using,	   challenging	   or	   violating	   habits	   of	   every	   day	   perception	   (see	   Eisenstein,	  2007).	  In	  1935	  then,	  Walter	  Benjamin	  described	  how	  the	  new	  medium	  of	  film	  builds	  on	  and	  at	  the	   same	   time	   further	   transforms	  contemporary	  perceptual	  habits	   (Benjamin,	  1935)	  and	   in	  1960	  Siegfried	  Kracauer	  expressed	  his	  conviction,	  that	  it	  is	  in	  its	  mimetic	  play	  with	  real	  world	  perception,	  that	  film	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  phenomenology	  of	  this	  real	  world	  experience.	  Lastly,	  Maurice	   Merleau-­‐Ponty,	   already	   in	   1964	   further	   explicated	   this	   by	   stressing	   that	   film	  experience	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   if	   we	   take	   it	   to	   be	   guided	   by	   real	   world	   perception,	  precisely	  meaning,	  that	  we	  do	  not	  perceive	  seperate	  images	  but	  rather	  a	  continuous	  “form	  in	  time”	   due	   to	   our	   overevaluating	   their	  movement	   as	   the	   action	   of	   an	   intentionally	   directed	  consiousness	  (Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  1964).	  	  	  Especially	   this	   last	   position	   of	  Merleau	   Ponty	  was	   elaborated	   by	  what	   has	   been	   called	   “the	  ecological	   theory	  of	   film”	  with	   James	   J.	   Gibson	  being	  one	  of	   the	   founding	   fathers.	  The	  main	  argument	   of	   this	   position	   is	   precisely	   that	   film	   perception	   is	   not	   depending	   on	   acquired	  conventions,	   but	   based	   on	   nothing	   but	   the	   constitution	   of	   human	   vision.	   This	   vision	   is	  described	  precisely	  as	  found	  also	  in	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition:	  that	  is	  as	  the	  skilled	  bodily	  exploration	   of	   an	   environment	   already	   known	   from	   experience.	   As	   Gibson	   stresses,	   indeed	  there	   are	   no	   incompatibilities	   between	   film	   and	   reality	   obstructing	   the	   viewers	   ability	   to	  perceive	  a	  film	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Rather,	  the	  changing	  visual	   field	  presented	  within	  a	  shot	   is	  similar	  enough	  to	  what	  we	  know	  from	  real	  world	  perception,	  to	  allow	  perceivers’	  immersion	  in	   the	   scene	   via	   an	   activation	   of	   the	  whole	   body	   (see	   Gibson,	   1979	   as	  well	   as	  more	   recent	  positions	   elaborating	   on	   this	   such	   as	   Tan	   (1995),	   Anderson	   (1996),	   Platinga	   (1999,	   2009),	  Grodal	   (1999,	   2009),	   Rutherford	   (2003),	   Cutting	   (2004),	   and	   especially	   Sobchack	   (1982,	  2004)	  and	  Voss	  (2011,	  2013)).	  As	  for	  example	  Christiane	  Voss	  pointedly	  puts	  it	  “It	  is	  the	  spectator’s	  body,	  in	  its	  mental	  and	  sensorial-­‐affective	  resonance	  with	  the	  events	  on	  screen,	   which	   “loans”	   a	   three-­‐dimensional	   body	   to	   the	   screen	   and	   thus	   flips	   the	   second	  dimension	  of	  the	  film	  event	  over	  into	  the	  third	  dimension	  of	  the	  sensing	  body.	  The	  spectator	  thus	   becomes	   a	   temporary	   “surrogate	   body”	   for	   the	   screen,	   and	   this	   body	   is,	   for	   its	   part,	   a	  constituent	  feature	  of	  the	  filmic	  architecture.”	  (Voss,	  2011,	  p.146)	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What	   we	   are	   talking	   about	   might	   in	   fact	   be	   best	   described	   as	   a	   potentiation	   of	   embodied	  world	  perception.	  Obviously,	  namely,	  the	  similarities	  between	  experiences	  in	  film	  and	  in	  real	  world	   are	   countered	   by	   salient	   differences,	   that	   is	   for	   example	   the	   lack	   of	   corresponding	  information	   via	   our	   olfactory,	   gustatory,	   haptic	   and	   proprioceptive	   senses.	   Nevertheless	  human	   cognition	   seems	   to	   overcome	   this	   gap	   via	   dwelling	   on	   its	   real	   experiences	  with	   the	  world.	   Just	   like	   we	   do	   not	   always	   have	   to	   really	   turn	   around	   the	   dice	   to	   know	   about	   the	  number	  in	  the	  back,	  and	  just	  like	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  end	  of	  an	  action	  started	  to	  be	  sure	  about	   its	  goal,	   film	  seems	  to	  be	  able	  to	  engage	  our	  whole	  way	  of	  being,	  hence	  being	  understood	  via	  experience	  rather	  than	  through	  symbolic	  interpretation	  only.	  	  This	  does	  get	  even	  clearer	  when	   looking	  at	  how	  precisely	  camera	  movements	  and	  montage	  are	  described	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  first	  bodily	  activation.	  It	  is	  especially	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Voss	  and	  Sobchack	  that	  we	  get	  a	  chance	  to	  do	  so.	  Film,	  according	  to	  both	  of	  these	  authors,	  needs	  to	  be	   conceptualized	   as	   in	   its	   very	   fundaments	   operating	   with	   a	   suggestive	   stance	   because	  camera	  movements	  and	  continuity	  editing,	  via	  certain	  moving	  images	  they	  create,	  establish	  a	  continuous	  illusion	  in	  spectators’	  perception.	  Remarkably,	  the	  illusive	  nature	  referred	  to	  here	  consists	  in	  the	  fact,	  that	  the	  world	  experienced	  in	  a	  movie	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  world	  in	  our	  life	  off	  the	  screen	  –	  is	  indeed	  not	  out	  there	  “ready	  for	  our	  grasp”.	  This	  fact	  however	  is	  suggested	  to	  be	   overwritten	   by	   the	   special	   activation	   of	   our	   embodied	   vision	   by	   the	   film,	   which	   is	   to	   a	  certain	  degree	  simulating	  this	  vision.	  	  	  In	   this	   sense	   talking	   about	   camera	  movements,	   Vivian	   Sobchack	   stresses	   that	   it	   is	   the	   real	  bodily	  movement	  of	  the	  camera	  (remarkably	  put	  in	  contrast	  to	  artificial	  movements	  such	  as	  the	  zoom)	  that	  is	  “prereflectively	  understood	  as	  the	  incarnate	  movement	  of	  an	  animate	  body	  in	   an	   intersensory	  and	   lived	  unity	  within	   the	  world”	   (Sobchack	   (1982),	   p.	   317)	   -­‐	   the	  world	  with	  which	  the	  embodied	  mind	  interacts	  in	  meaningful-­‐directedness.	  Exactly	  as	  much	  as	  our	  own	  physical	  movement	   in	  this	  world	   is	  experienced	  as	  serving	  nothing	  but	   this	   intentional	  interaction,	  Sobchack	  explains	  further,	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  camera	  is	  “disregarded	  in	  favor	  of	  our	   attending	   to	   that	  which	   the	   camera	  moves	   toward	  or	   away	   from”	   (Sobchack	   (1982),	   p.	  318).	   Or	   also:	   “At	   this	   primary	   level	   of	   the	   body	   subject,	   the	   viewer	   intersubjectively	   and	  prereflectively	   recognizes	   and	  understands	   the	   camera	  as	   sharing	   the	  manner	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  existence,	  as	  manifestion	  of	  the	  material	  and	  kinetic	  code	  of	  an	  embodied	  and	  intentional	  consciousness.”	  (Sobchack,	  1982,	  p.	  327).	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And	   Voss,	   specifically	   referring	   to	   the	   contribution	   of	   montage	   in	   this	   interaction	   writes:	  “Diese	   kognitiv	  wie	   perzeptiv	   unaufloesbare	   Bewegungsillusion,	   die	   in	   dem	   Eindruck	   eines	  fliessenden	   Übergangs	   der	   Einzelbilder	   in	   der	   Zeit	   besteht,	   laesst	   sich	   als	   eine	   anthropolo-­‐gisierende	   Annaeherung	   der	   kinematographischen	   Visualität	   an	   die	   gängigen	   Bewegungs-­‐wahrnehmungen	  verstehen,	  denen	  wir	  unsere	  Zuschreibungen	  von	  Lebendikeit	  entnehmen;	  denn	   den	   im	   vermeintlichen	   Fluss	   der	   Kinobilder	   zum	   Vorschein	   kommenden	   Handlungen	  des	  konstellierten	  Materials	  wird	  durch	  die	  an	   ihnen	  wahrgenommene	  Eigenbewegtheit	  der	  Charakter	   einer	   selbsttätigen	   Lebendigkeit	   automatisch	   verliehen.	   Dieser	   automatischen	  Zuordnung	   des	   Praedikats	   “Lebendigkeit”	   zu	   einer	   wahrnehmbaren	   Entität,	   die	   selbsttätig	  bewegt	   erscheint,	   entlehnen	  wir	   unserer	   Alltagspraxis	   und	   Erfahrung	  mit	   der	   empirischen	  Wirklichkeit.”	  (Voss,	  2013,	  S.	  40;	  “This	  cognitively	  as	  well	  as	  perceptually	  inextricable	  illusion	  of	  movement	  that	  consists	  in	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  fluent	  transition	  of	  the	  single	  shots	  in	  time	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  anthropologizing	  assimilation	  of	  the	  cinematographic	  visuality	  to	  our	  usual	   habits	   of	   movement	   from	   which	   we	   derive	   our	   attribution	   of	   vitality;	   due	   to	   the	  perception	   of	   this	   movement,	   we	   automatically	   assign	   an	   intrinsic	   vitality	   to	   the	   actions	  appearing	   in	   the	   alleged	   continuity	   of	   shots.	   This	   automatic	   attribution	   of	   the	   predicate	  “vitality”	  to	  a	  perceivable	  entity	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  intrinsically	  moved,	  we	  derive	  from	  our	  daily	  practice	  and	  experience	  with	  the	  empirical	  reality.”;	  translation,	  K.H.)	  	  	  In	   quintessence	   these	   descriptions	   indicate	   that	   film,	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   “works”	   by	   using	  special	  ways	  of	  camera	  handling	  and	  montage,	  creating	  images	  close	  enough	  to	  what	  we	  know	  from	  our	  own	  bodily	  explorations	  of	   the	  real	  world,	   in	  order	   to	  activate	  our	  whole	  mode	  of	  embodied	  beings	  exploring	  the	  world	  by	  moving	  our	  body	  and	  eyes	  in	  it.	  In	  an	  act	  of	  “signing	  over”	   thus,	   these	   moving	   images	   become	   the	   visions	   of	   an	   animate	   body	   actively	   moving	  through	  the	  world	  he	   inhabits,	  on	  which	  he	  depends	  and	  which	  he	  shapes.	  Taken	  seriously,	  this	  conceptualization	  of	  movie	  viewing	  describes	  film	  perception	  as	  an	  interaction	  between	  a	  (fictional)	   world	   and	   an	   embodied	   mind,	   an	   interaction	   not	   radically	   different	   from	   the	  interaction	  of	  the	  body	  and	  his	  environment	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  	  	  This	   allows	   for	   a	   last	   hypothesis.	   Obviously,	   perception	   in	   the	   real	   world	   relies	   on	   stable	  patterns	  given	  by	  the	  lasting	  constitution	  of	  our	  body	  and	  the	  world.	  Any	  strong	  violation	  of	  such	  patterns	  will	  disturb	  a	  perceiver	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  might	  even	  let	  him	  doubt	  in	  himself	  or	  the	   world.	   For	   example,	   most	   of	   us	   will	   be	   familiar	   with	   the	   already	   deeply	   disturbing	  experience	  of	  getting	  up	  from	  the	  bed,	  but	  falling	  on	  the	  floor,	  because	  a	  leg	  had	  gone	  to	  sleep.	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Even	  more	   so,	   we	   can	   all	   imagine,	   that	   if	   right	   now	   I	   would	   start	   seeing	   colors	   out	   of	   the	  normal	  visual	  spectrum,	  grow	  a	  third	  limb,	  or	  experience	  my	  friend	  Anna	  materializing	  in	  this	  room,	  without	   having	   used	   the	   door	   or	   even	   the	  window,	   I	   would	   probably	   scream	   out	   of	  shock	  and,	  even	  after	  a	  first	  recovery,	  ask	  myself	  if	  I	  might	  dream	  or	  have	  gone	  insane.	  If	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  my	  previously	  half	  blind	  and	  ever	  limping	  grandfather	  from	  New	  York	  would	  suddenly	  enter,	  walking	  upright	  and	  stable	  and	  without	  any	  stick	  or	  glasses	  straight	  through	  the	  door,	  I	  might	   just	  assume	  he	  finally	  got	  his	  new	  hip,	  a	   laser	  operation	  adjusting	  his	  eyes	  and	  had	  taken	  a	  plane	  to	  visit.	  	  Which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  interactions	  between	  us	  and	  the	  world	  are	  open	  for	  transient	  changes	  –	  some	   of	   which	   not	   even	   depending	   on	   technology.	   Pregnant	   women	   happen	   to	   bump	   into	  doors	  with	  their	  bellies	  not	  being	  used	  to	  their	  “new	  shape”,	  but	  an	  overweight	  person	  does	  not;	  patients	  that	  lost	  a	  limb	  often	  suffer	  from	  phantom	  pain,	  but	  mostly,	  after	  some	  time	  and	  body	  therapy,	  they	  recover.	  And	  finally,	  coming	  back	  to	  our	  habituation	  to	  future	  technologies	  involving	  new	  media,	   I	   am	  pretty	   sure	   that	   in	   a	   few	  decades	   I	  will	   completely	   expect	  Anna	  habitually	   materializing	   in	   my	   room	   –	   if	   not	   in	   person,	   than	   as	   a	   speaking	   and	   moving	  hologram	  substituting	  Skype	  video	  calls.	  Not	  to	  think	  of	  what	  Anna	  will	  be	  able	  to	  do	   in	  the	  movies	  those	  days.35	  That	  however	  means	  that,	  while	  the	  base	  of	  spectator’s	  embodiment	  in	  the	  fictional	  film	  world	  might	  be	  guaranteed	  by	  images	  close	  to	  experiences	  known	  from	  vision	  in	  real	  life,	  time	  and	  repetitive	  experience	  with	   this	   fictional	  world	  could	   integrate	  even	  effects	   initially	  violating	  perceptional	   habits	   with	   such	   force	   that	   they	   risk	   to	   interrupt	   film’s	   illusion.	   Undoubtedly	  such	  an	  integration	  has	  already	  started,	  enabling	  movies	  to	  use	  faster	  and	  faster	  cutting	  rates	  and	  more	  experimental	  camera	  techniques	  year	  by	  year	  (see	  for	  example	  Cutting	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Most	  likely	  these	  new	  perceptual	  habits	  have	  an	  effect	  also	  on	  our	  interaction	  with	  the	  world	  off	  the	  screen,	  that	  is	  in	  our	  dreams,	  in	  our	  imagination	  or	  even	  in	  reality.36	  At	  this	  point	  the	  importance	  of	   explicitly	   investigating	   film	  perception	  when	   trying	   to	   explore	   contemporary	  human	  cognition	  has	  hopefully	  been	  revealed	  in	  its	  full	  dimension.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Indeed,	  the	  question	  how	  artworks	  do	  foresee	  what	  will	  happen	  to	  us	  in	  the	  far	  future	  is	  one	  of	  the	  points	  of	  discussions	  in	  the	  new	  field	  of	  posthuman	  aesthetics.	  	  36	  First	  experimental	  proof	  for	  this,	  as	  mentioned,	  is	  given	  by	  Eva	  Murzyn	  (2008).	  In	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  formu-­‐late	  some	  ideas	  for	  further	  investigations	  of	  this	  crucial	  point.	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  II.4	  Hypotheses	  derivable	  from	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  film	  for	  neuroscientific	  experiments	  	  	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  declared	  main	  goals	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  show	  how	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition	  as	  a	  new	  theoretical	  framework	  can	  influence	  empirical	  work	  on	  film	  perception	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  suggest	  hypotheses	  for	  experimental	  research	  that	  other	  conceptual	  backgrounds	  would	  not	  have	  yielded.	  This	   is	   to	  stress,	   that	   the	  experiments	  reported	  on	   in	  the	  next	  chapter	  are	  not	  designed	  to	  decide	  between	  the	  truth	  of	  cognitivist	  or	  constructivist	  notions	  of	   film	  and	  positions	  more	   influenced	  by	   4EA	   approaches	   to	   cognition.	   Rather,	   they	   explicitly	   dwell	   on	  ideas	  developed	  under	  the	  elected	   influence	  of	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition	  suggesting	  that	  film	   experience,	   as	   we	   know	   it	   especially	   from	   Hollywood	   cinema	   explicitly	   aiming	   at	  completely	  involving	  the	  spectator	  in	  a	  fictionally	  world,	  is	  most	  likely	  not	  based	  on	  symbolic	  processing	   linked	   to	   learned	   conventions.	   Instead	   the	   chosen	   notion	   of	   film	   perception	  suggests	  that	  moving	  images,	  in	  their	  character	  similar	  to	  how	  we	  perceive	  world	  in	  the	  real,	  activate	  embodied	  vision	  per	  se,	  as	  a	  bodily	  interaction	  with	  a	  fictional	  world.	  Such	  an	  inter-­‐action	  crucially	  builds	  on	  our	  experience-­‐based	  skill	  to	  not	  consciously	  miss	  information	  that	  is	  not	  always	  completely	  given	  to	  us	  via	  direct	  sensory	  input	  in	  all	  situations.	  Consequently	  it	  seems	   to	   be	   able	   to	   extend	   its	   normal	   habitual	   patterns	   to	   immediately	   perceive	   moving	  images	  as	  (motivated	  by)	  the	  vision	  of	  a(nother)	  animate	  body	  in	  a	  responding	  world.37	  	  This	   conceptualization	   gives	   rise	   to	   the	   following	   hypotheses	   testable	   by	   experimental	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  	  	  1)	  Detecting	  Violations	  of	  Visual	  Habits:	  New	  Stimulus	  or	  Violation	  of	  Action	  According	   to	   the	   above	   view,	   and	   drawing	   back	   on	  Merleau	   Ponty’s	   original	   phrasing38,	   all	  moving	   images	  should	  be	  perceived	  as	   “forms	   in	   time”,	   that	   is,	   the	  results	  of	   the	  perceptual	  observations	  of	  a	  directed	  consiousness	  continuously	  exploring	  a	  constantly	  accessible	  world.	  This	   includes	  moving	   images	  that,	  due	  to	   the	  application	  of	  special	  narrative	  devices	  of	   film	  actually	   exceed	   our	   visual	   capacities	   as	   the	   embodied	   beings	  we	   are,	   sometimes	   even	   to	   a	  degree	   that	   we	   explicitly	   note	   these	   deviations	   (see	   also	   Chapter	   III.1.1	   and	   III.2.1	   of	   this	  thesis).	  Therefore,	  abrupt	  visual	  changes	  happening	  in	  movies,	  such	  as	  caused	  by	  editing	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Remarkably	  the	  brackets	  are	  added	  in	  this	  last	  sentence	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  camera	  not	  always	  has	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  the	  eye	  of	  a	  person,	  that	  is	  “a	  fictional	  me”,	  moving	  through	  the	  fictional	  world	  (though	  this	  might	  be	  an	  adequate	  description	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  some	  camera	  and	  montage	  work).	  Rather	  by	  partly	  simulating	  experience	  as	  we	  know	  it,	  film	  can	  dwell	  also	  on	  our	  intuitive	  understanding	  of	  body	  metaphors	  etc.,	  as	  will	  be	  further	  illustrated	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  38	  See	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  (1964)	  and	  Chapter	  II.3	  of	  this	  thesis.	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shots,	  should	  be	  detected	  directly	  as	  violations	  of	  the	  depicted	  action/scene	  rather	  than	  as	  the	  plain	  onset	  of	  a	  new	  stimulus.	  	  As	   Chapter	   III.2	   will	   elaborate,	   such	   distinctions	   (differentiating	   between	   a	   totally	   new	  stimulus	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  slight	  violation	  of	  an	  expectation)	  can	  be	  traced	  via	  early	  ERP	  components	  directly	  following	  the	  change	  of	  shot.	  On	  the	  base	  of	  the	  above	  outlined	  it	  is	  thus	  predictable	   that	   cuts	   in	   comparison	   to	   plain	   onsets	   of	   visual	   stimuli	  would	   elicit	   early	   ERP	  components	   previously	   correlated	  with	   the	   detection	   of	   the	   violations	   of	   perceived	   actions	  rather	  than	  the	  onset	  of	  new	  visual	  stimuli.	  	  2)	  Processing	  Violations	  of	  Visual	  Habits:	  Repair	  or	  Reflexion	  According	  to	  the	  above	  presented	  view,	   furthermore,	   the	   interaction	  between	  spectator	  and	  the	   fictional	  world	   of	   a	  movie	   is	   substantiated	   by	  moving	   images	   closely	   resembling	   visual	  experiences	   in	   the	   real	   world.	   Due	   to	   this	   grounding,	   so	   the	   outlined	   argument,	   even	  violations	  of	  visual	  habits	  do	  not	  completely	  interrupt	  our	  interaction	  with	  the	  fictional	  world	  and	   thus	  our	   immersion	   in	   the	   film’s	  story.	  Nevertheless	  we	  all	  know	   from	  experience,	   that	  while	  sometimes	  we	  do	  not	  grant	  a	  thought	  to	  the	  camera	  or	  the	  montage	  used	  to	  produce	  the	  moving	   image	   we	   currently	   perceive,	   at	   other	   times	   these	   narrative	   devices	   are	   actually	  drawn	   in	   our	   conscious	   awareness.	   We	   predict	   that	   this	   experiential	   difference	   is	   due	   to	  differences	  in	  postperceptual	  processing	  of	  detected	  violations,	  in	  their	  nature	  depending	  on	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  moving	  image	  produced	  via	  the	  use	  of	  such	  narrative	  devices.	  Again,	  such	  processes	  can	  be	  traced	  by	  ERP	  analysis,	  specifically	  looking	  for	  differences	  in	  later	  phases	  of	  processing.	   We	   thus	   hypothesize	   to	   find	   differences	   in	   late	   ERP	   responses	   between	   edits	  producing	   images	   more	   or	   less	   closely	   resembling	   human	   vision	   in	   the	   real.	   Furthermore,	  these	   differences	   should	   explain	   the	   different	   subjective	   experiences	   connected	   to	   the	  perception	  of	  the	  respective	  stimuli.	  	  3)	  Familiar	  Vision	  and	  Action	  Perception	  Links	  Lastly,	   recent	  discussions	   about	   the	   role	  of	   embodied	   cognition	   in	   art	  perception	  have	   sug-­‐gested	  that	  action	  perception	  links	  enable	  our	  body	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  depicted	  and	  fictional	  world	  by	  providing	  access	  to	  an	  environment	  not	  completely	  open	  to	  us.	  	  A	  mechanism	   that	   has	   been	   repeatedly	   claimed	   to	   enable	   that	   is	   the	  mirror	  mechanism	   as	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  II.2	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Precisely	  the	  mirror	  mechanism	  has	  been	  suggested	  to	  play	   a	  major	   role	  not	   only	   in	   simulation	  processes	   associated	  with	   action	  understanding	  (see	  Gallese	  &	  Sinigaglia	  (2010,	  2011))	  or	  action	  preparation	  in	  the	  real	  world	  (see	  Gallagher	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(2001,	  2007),	  Hutto	  (2013))	  but	  also	  in	  the	  immediate	  feeling	  of	  presence	  of	  what	  is	  “seen	  in”	  an	   image	   (see	   Fingerhut,	   2012).	   Combined	   with	   the	   already	   presented	   assumption,	   that	  spectators’	  immersion	  in	  film	  is	  crucially	  substantiated	  by	  moving	  images	  closely	  resembling	  visual	  experiences	  known	   from	  real	  world	   interaction,	   this	  gives	   rise	   to	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  this	  substantiation	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  stronger	  activation	  of	  the	  mirror	  mechanism,	  measurable	  via	  respective	   motor	   cortex	   activations	   during	   action	   observation.	   We	   thus	   predict	   that	   the	  activation	  of	  the	  motor	  cortex	  during	  the	  observation	  of	  actions	  perceived	  via	  moving	  images	  is	  modulated	  by	   the	  similarity	  of	   these	  moving	   images	  with	  visual	  experiences	  produced	  by	  the	  encounter	  with	  the	  real	  world.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  elaborate	  on	  these	  hypotheses	  while	  precisifying	  them	  for	  the	  different	  stimuli	  investigated,	  as	  well	  as	  presenting	  the	  results	  achieved	  in	  the	  experiments	  created	  to	  test	  them.	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III.	  Experiments	  and	  Results	  III.1.	  Moving	  Mirrors	  –	  A	  high	  density	  EEG	  study	  investigating	  the	  effect	  of	  camera	  movements	  on	  motor	  cortex	  activation	  during	  action	  observation	  	  In	  her	  text	  about	  the	  semiotic	  structure	  of	  camera	  movement	  in	  cinema	  Vivian	  Sobchack	  talks	  about	  four	  basic	  kinds	  of	  movements	  defining	  motion	  pictures:	  the	  subject	  movement	  of	  living	  beings	   and	   objects	   within	   the	   projected	   image,	   the	   movement	   between	   projected	   images	  called	  editing,	  the	  optical	  or	  visual	  movement	  of	  the	  camera	  lens	  from	  a	  fixed	  position,	  such	  as	  the	   zoom,	   and	   finally	   the	   bodily	   movement	   of	   the	   camera	   itself,	   the	   camera	   movement.	  (Sobchack,	  1982).	  The	  first	  empirical	  study	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  was	  explicitly	  dedicated	  to	  the	  latter	  two	  kinds	  of	  movements.	  Specifically,	  it	  investigated	  how	  the	  application	  of	  different	  camera	   and	   lens	  movements	   in	   film	   affected	   spectators’	   brain	   activity	  when	  watching	   such	  stimuli.	   The	   analysis	   focused	   on	   differences	   in	   the	   activation	   of	   the	   motor	   system	   during	  action	   observation.	   Before	   reporting	   about	   experimental	   setup	   and	   results,	   the	   following	  section	   will	   clarify	   the	   precise	   hypotheses	   behind	   the	   investigation	   by	   more	   elaborately	  illustrating	   the	   idea	   of	   camera	  movements	   being	   a	   fundamental	   mean	   of	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  fictional	  world	  by	  activating	  and	  extending	  the	  spectator’s	  body.	  	  	  III.1.1	   Introduction:	   Different	   camera	   movements,	   their	   narrative	   functions	   and	   their	  grounding	  in	  embodied	  perception	  	  Literature	  on	  film	  making	  distinguishes	  around	  eleven	  basic	  ways	  of	  using	  a	  camera,	  five	  not	  involving	  a	  real	  displacement	  of	  the	  camera	  to	  another	  coordinate	  in	  space,	  and	  six	  others	  that	  involve	  such	  displacement	  (see	  for	  example	  Mercado,	  2011;	  Bettman,	  2013).	  To	  start	  with	  the	  first	   five:	  a	  scene	  can	  be	  recorded	   from	  a	   fixed	  position,	  mostly	  realized	  by	  help	  of	  a	   tripod	  holding	  the	  camera.	  This	  stable	  setup	  also	  allows	  what	  is	  commonly	  refered	  to	  by	  the	  terms	  “tilting”	  and	  “panning”	  of	  the	  camera.	  “Tilting”	  refers	  to	  moving	  the	  camera’s	  lens	  up	  or	  down	  while	   keeping	   its	   horizontal	   axis	   constant.	   Remarkably,	   in	   filmmaking-­‐guides	   this	   is	   often	  compared	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  “looking	  down”	  or	  “looking	  up”,	  while	  only	  moving	  the	  eyeballs,	  not	  the	  whole	  head.	  “Panning”,	  likewise,	  refers	  to	  moving	  the	  camera’s	  lens	  to	  the	  right	  or	  to	  the	  left	   while	   keeping	   its	   vertical	   axis	   constant.	   Again,	   the	   effect	   of	   this	   movement	   is	   often	  illustrated	   by	   referring	   to	   “glancing”	   to	   your	   left	   or	   “glancing”	   to	   your	   right	   via	   sliding	   the	  eyeballs	   only.	   Stronger	   versions	   of	   these	   last	   two	  movements	   can	   be	   achieved	   via	   pedestal	  camera	  movements.	  That	  is,	  instead	  of	  moving	  the	  lens	  only,	  a	  tripod	  enables	  also	  to	  move	  the	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whole	  camera	  horizontally	  or	  vertically.	  A	  vertical	  pedestal	  movement	  is	  often	  compared	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  moving	  your	  chin	  to	  your	  chest	  to	  look	  down	  or	  raising	  your	  chin	  towards	  the	  sky	  to	  look	  up	  instead	  of	  only	  sliding	  the	  eyeballs	  up	  or	  down.	  A	  horizontal	  pedestal	  movement,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   is	  described	  as	   looking	  to	  the	  right	  or	  the	   left	  while	  turning	  the	  whole	  head	  instead	  of	  only	  sliding	   the	  eyeballs	   to	  one	  side.	  Lastly,	   lens	   technique	  allows	   to	  magnify	   the	  recorded	   scene	  without	  moving	   the	   camera	   in	   space.	   This	   is	   called	   “zooming”.	  Remarkably,	  zooming	  cannot	  be	  illustrated	  by	  referring	  to	  a	  movement	  of	  the	  human	  body.	  	  Furthermore	   there	   are	   six	   continuous	   camera	   movements	   comprising	   a	   real	   spatial	  displacement	  of	  the	  camera.	  To	  start	  with	  the	  first	  two,	  a	  camera	  can	  be	  moved	  by	  mounting	  it	  on	  a	  small	  wagon	  gliding	  on	  tracks	  either	  forward	  and	  backward,	  called	  dollying,	  or	  sideward,	  called	   trucking.	   Furthermore,	   there	   is	   the	  possibility	   of	   plain	  handheld	   shooting,	   that	   is	   the	  cameraman	  moving	  through	  the	  room	  while	  holding	  the	  camera	  in	  his	  hand.	  Since	  1971,	  there	  exists	   also	   a	   technically	   stabilized	   version	   of	   this	   latter	   movement,	   achieved	   by	   use	   of	   a	  “floating	  cam”	  or	  “steadicam”.	  These	  terms	  refer	  to	  a	  construction,	  originally	  invented	  by	  the	  camera	   man	   Garrett	   Brown,	   in	   its	   simplest	   versions	   consisting	   of	   a	   harness	   worn	   by	   the	  cameraman,	  an	   iso-­‐elastic	  arm	  attached	   to	   this	  harness	  and	  a	   steadicam	  armature,	  with	   the	  camera	  mounted	  at	  one	  end	  and	  a	  counterbalance	  weight	  on	  the	  other,	  connected	  to	  the	  iso-­‐elastic	  arm	  via	  a	  multiaxis	  and	  ultra-­‐low	  friction	  gimbal.	  In	  effect,	  the	  camera	  can	  be	  directly	  carried	   by	   the	   cameraman	   through	   the	   room	   while	   avoiding	   rough	   and	   shaky	   pictures	   as	  produced	  by	  handmovements	  directly	  holding	  the	  camera.	  Lastly	  jibs,	  cranes	  or	  drones	  can	  be	  used	   to	   lift	   the	   camera	   off	   the	   ground	   and	   let	   it	   “fly”,	   “swift”	   or	   “flow”	   through	   the	   room.	  Obviously,	  combinations	  of	  all	  of	  these	  techniques	  are	  possible	  and	  often	  applied.	  	  	  In	   film,	   the	   reason	   for	   these	   application,	   at	   least	   in	  most	   cases,	   is	   of	   course	   not	   a	   technical	  demonstration.	   Rather,	   camera	   movements,	   being	   one	   of	   the	   two	   most	   traditional	   filmic	  narrative	   devices,	   serve	   distinct	   narrative	   functions.	   In	   his	   doctoral	   dissertation	   “Camera	  Movement	  in	  Narrative	  Cinema	  –	  a	  Taxonomy	  of	  Functions”,	  Jacob	  Isak	  Nielson	  distinguishes	  six	  of	  these	  basic	  functions	  of	  camera	  movements	  (Nielson,	  2008).	  The	  following	  section	  will	  briefly	   report	   about	   these	  while	   pointing	   out	   few	   selected	   examples	   illustrating	   how	   all	   of	  them	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  building	  upon	  a	   common	  underlying	  process	   -­‐	   that	   is	   the	  use	  of	  camera	  movement	  to	  simulate	  and	  extend	  embodied	  being	  and	  perception.	  	  The	   six	   basic	   functions	   of	   camera	   movement	   for	   film	   narration,	   according	   to	   Nielson,	   are	  orientation,	   pacing,	   inflection,	   focalization,	   reflexion	   and	   abstraction.	   Firstly,	   thus	   camera	  movement	  can	  orientate	  the	  viewer	  regarding	  space	  or	  action.	  One	  possibility	  for	  this	  is	  done	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by	  the	  camera	  articulating	  depth,	  that	  is	  rendering	  a	  2D	  environment	  hard	  to	  interpret	  in	  a	  3D	  environment	  as	  known	  from	  normal	  perception.	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  Nielson	  quotes	  filmmaker	  Vilos	  Zsigmond,	  cameraman	  and	  steadicam	  inventor	  Garrett	  Brown	  as	  well	  as	  director	  George	  Miller	  explaining	  the	  use	  of	  camera	  movement	  as	  a	  strategy	  in	  film-­‐making:	  	  “We	  decided	  to	  create	  a	  third	  dimension	  on	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  film	  not	  only	  with	  lighting	  and	  composition	  but	  also	  with	  constantly	  moving	  the	  camera.	  Since	  the	  objects	  change	  positions	  differently	  in	  different	  planes,	  the	  camera	  move	  reveals	  the	  right	  perspective	  of	  the	  objects	  in	  space,	  thus	  creating	  the	  missing	  third	  dimension.”	  (Zsigmond	  to	  the	  camera	  in	  a	  documentary	  by	  Carson,	  2002)”	  	  	  “When	  the	  camera	  begins	  to	  move,	  we	  are	  suddenly	  given	  the	  missing	  information	  as	  to	  shape	  and	  layout	  and	  size.	  The	  two-­‐dimensional	  image	  acquires	  the	  illusion	  of	  three-­‐dimensionality	  and	  we	  are	  carried	  across	  the	  divide	  of	  the	  screen,	  deeper	  and	  deeper	  into	  a	  world	  that	  is	  not	  contiguous	  to	  our	  own.”	  (Brown	  in	  his	  documentary	  about	  the	  Moving	  Camera	  part	  I,	  2003)	  	  “It’s	   a	   compulsion	   of	   mine	   to	   move	   the	   camera,	   and	   I	   now	   know	   why.	   It	   enhances	   three-­‐dimensionality.	   It	  puts	  you	   in	   the	  space,	  and	   if	  you	  move	   the	  camera	   the	  audience	  becomes	  aware	  of	  the	  space.	  (Miller	  quoted	  in	  Bordwell	  &	  Thompson	  2004,	  p.	  269)”	  	  Interestingly,	   these	   descriptions	   are	   reminiscent	   of	   conceptual	   reformulations	   of	   the	   basic	  mechanisms	   underlying	   depth	   perception	   within	   4EA	   approaches	   to	   cognition.	   Indeed,	  understanding	  depth	  perception	  has	  kept	   the	   cognitive	   sciences	  busy,	   as	   attempts	   trying	   to	  model	  3D	  perception	  via	  algorithms	  extracting	  depth	  information	  out	  of	  singular	  2D	  pictures	  (as	   captured	   on	   the	   retina),	   faced	   serious	   computational	   challenges.	  With	   the	   upcoming	   of	  4EA	   approaches	   to	   the	   problem	   it	   was	   suggested	   that	   such	   costly	   operations	   might	   be	  significantly	  simplified	  by	  the	  embodied	  mind	  using	   its	  ability	  to	  move	  in	  space	  to	  orientate	  and	  avoid	  ambiguous	   information.	   (O’Regan	  and	  Noë,	  2001).	  A	  moving	  camera	  as	  described	  by	   the	   filmmakers	   above	   seems	   to	   simulate	   this	   normal	   strategy	   of	   orientation,	   hence	  simulating	   our	  normal	   embodied	  world	   consciousness,	   that	   is	   the	   awareness	   of	   a	   3D	   space	  despite	  the	  restricted	  actual	  sensual	  information	  (see	  Chapter	  II.1).39	  Something	  similar	  can	  be	  said	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  second	  way	  by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  camera	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Obviously,	  there	  are	  also	  camera	  movements	  that	  do	  not	  produce	  images	  close	  to	  what	  we	  know	  from	  our	  normal	  percep-­‐tion.	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  fact	  later.	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orient	   the	   spectator,	   that	   is	   by	   directing	   spectator’s	   attention.	   As	   argued	   by	   Nielson,	   the	  camera	  can	  stress	  the	   importance	  of	  an	  event,	  object	  or	  character	  by	   insistingly	   focusing	  on	  the	  essential	  cue,	  as	   it	   is	   for	  example	  done	  by	  long	  lateral	  tracking	  shots,	   following	  only	  one	  person.	  Again,	  to	  illustrate	  the	  principle	  behind	  this	  effect,	  Nielson	  adds	  a	  quote	  of	  cameraman	  Michael	  Chapman,	  precisely	  talking	  about	  this	  task:	  “The	  job	  of	  the	  cinematographer	  is	  to	  tell	  the	  audience	  where	  to	  look.”	  (Chapman	  in	  a	  documentary	  by	  Glassman,	  1992)	  Tellingly,	   again,	   this	   citation	   describes	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   manipulation	   –the	   camera	  movement	  –	  as	  a	  simulation	  of	  active	  vision,	  rather	  than	  a	  series	  of	  images	  to	  be	  interpreted	  by	   cognitive	   strategies.	   Indeed,	   as	   the	   examples	   of	   Change	  Blindness	   in	  Chapter	   II.1	   should	  have	  demonstrated,	  as	  bodily	  beings	  exploring	  a	  world	  “at	  our	  grasp”	  we	  are	  used	  to	  actually	  perceiving	   only	   a	   part	   of	   what	   there	   is	   to	   see	   as	   a	   product	   of	   our	   own	   selective	   behavior,	  guided	   by	   the	   objects	   of	   our	   current	   attention.	   The	   quote	   thus	   indicates,	   that	   a	   camera	  focusing	  on	  certain	  contents,	   in	  a	  way	  similar	   to	  what	  happens	  during	  normal	  vision,	  might	  exactly	  substantiate	  vision	  –	  that	  is	  the	  active	  exploration	  of	  a	  world	  known	  from	  experience	  by	  an	  embodied	  being.	  	  	  Now,	  it	  obviously	  is	  one	  of	  the	  intriguing	  features	  of	  film,	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  able	  to	  imitate	  our	  normal	   perception.	   Rather	   it	   seems	   to	   have	   the	   crucial	   capacity	   to	   extend	  our	   vision	   –	   and	  with	  that	  our	  bodily	  being.	  To	  begin	  with,	  camera	  movement,	  according	  to	  Nielson,	  can	  also	  minimize	  cues	  of	  depth	  and	  volume	  –	   for	   instance	  by	  swish-­‐panning	  or	  otherwise	  making	  a	  blur	  or	  smear	  out	  of	  the	  image	  –	  in	  this	  way	  creating	  insecureness,	  disorientation	  or	  feelings	  of	   estrangeness	   in	   the	   spectator.	   Also,	   it	  might	   be	   used	   to	   distract	   our	   attention	   from	   cues	  actually	  relevant	  to	  the	  narration,	  such	  as	  a	  character’s	  actual	  identity	  etc.	  Both	  effects,	  so	  the	  rather	  intuitive	  suggestion	  of	  Nielson,	  can	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  creating	  arcs	  of	  suspenses,	  as	  known	  from	  e.g.	  criminal	  stories.	  	  	  Indeed,	  I	  would	  say	  that	  the	  other	  five	  functions	  of	  camera	  movements	  that	  Nielson	  describes,	  can	   equally	   be	   presented	   as	   cases	   of	   such	   apparent	   fluctuations	   between	   simulation	   and	  deviations	  from	  orientation	  in	  the	  normal	  world.	  Nielson	  for	  example,	  talking	  about	  “pacing”,	  refers	   to	   the	   “the	   determination	   of	   the	   velocity	   at	   which	   visual	   information	   transpires”	   by	  means	  of	  the	  moving	  camera	  (Nielson,	  2008,	  p.	  230).	  Clearly,	  again,	  this	  velocity,	  achieved	  by	  the	   camera	   movement,	   can	   correspond	   to	   “human	   vision	   in	   the	   wild”,	   that	   is	   the	   flow	   of	  images	  during	  perception	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  varying	  according	  to	  our	  situation.	  Vision	  differs	  during	   a	   relaxed	   Sunday	   walk	   and	   a	   rushed	   flight	   or	   fierce	   fight.	   Nielson	   assigns	   to	   the	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category	  “sustained	  pace”	  films	  imitating	  these	  different	  kind	  of	  flows	  and	  thereby	  most	  likely	  helping	  us	  in	  feeling	  immersed	  in	  the	  presented	  scene.	  Moreover	  however,	  directors	  often	  use	  the	   technical	  means	  of	   today	   to	  accelerate	  or	  retard	   the	  camera	  movement	   to	  a	  degree	   that	  clearly	   supersizes	   the	   capacities	   of	   our	   eyes	   and	   bodies.	   As	   Nielson	   seems	   to	   suggest,	   this	  possibly	  enables	  the	  experience	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  visions	  and	  bodies:	  The	  camera	  in	  “Amour”	  of	  Haneke	  (2012),	  moving	  less	  and	  less	  the	  further	  the	  physical	  and	  psychological	  decay	  of	  the	  main	  actress	  goes	  and	  sometimes	  getting	  stopped	  in	  weird	  positions	  not	  allowing	  to	  visually	  follow	  the	  auditorily	  ongoing	  scene,	   literally	  puts	  us	  in	  the	  stuck	  body	  of	  a	  dying	  person.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  fast	  camera	  drone	  flight	  over	  a	  vast	  area,	  might	  let	  us	  directly	  perceive	  the	  bodily	   and	   thus	   perceptual	   allmightyness	   of	   a	   superhero.	   Under	   the	   term	   “inflection”	   and	  “focalization”,	   Nielson	   summarizes	   similar	   functions	   of	   the	   camera,	   this	   time	   imbuing	   the	  scene	  by	  manipulating	   the	  mode	  of	   its	  movement	  rather	   than	   its	  velocity.	  While	   illustrating	  “inflective”	   uses,	   Nielson	   reports	   how	   camera	  movements	  might	   crucially	   enhance	   physical	  appearance	  and	  behavior	  of	   some	  represented	  characters	  by	   for	  example	   ”following	  a	  stout	  elderly	   man	   by	   means	   of	   robust,	   weighty	   and	   slow	   dolly	   movements,	   or	   alternately	   by	  following	   a	   nimble	   gazelle	   by	  means	   of	   a	  weightlessly	   drifting	   steadicam	   camera”	   (Nielson,	  2008).	  In	  cases	  of	  “focalizative”	  uses,	  such	  effects	  are	  not	  applied	  to	  further	  characterize	  the	  figures	  or	  object	  in	  the	  frame,	  but	  rather	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  certain	  subjective	  viewpoint,	  that	  is	  the	  vision	  of	  one	  of	  the	  characters	  on	  their	  world.	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  camera,	  granting	  us	  a	  look	  from	  within	  a	  protagonist	  on	  the	  world	  as	  perceived	  by	  him,	  can	  be	  given	  by	  the	  movie	  “Dallas	  Buyers	  Club”	  by	  Vallée	  (2013),	  which	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  the	  life	  and	  suffering	  of	  an	  HIV	  patient.	  One	  of	  the	  marked	  features	  of	  this	  film	  is	  the	  use	  of	  a	  steadicam,	  which	  indeed	  often	  manages	  to	  make	  the	  spectator	  see	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  protagonist.	  Very	  impressively,	  via	  the	   unexpected	   sagging,	   trundling	   or	   spinning	   of	   this	   camera,	   the	   spectator	   is	   able	   to	   even	  anticipate	  the	  protagonist	  fainting	  by	  being	  granted	  a	  direct	  experience	  of	  the	  actual	  physical	  syndromes	   preceding	   such	   a	   breakdown.	   Nielson	   also	   states	   that	   it	   is	   via	   such	  means	   that	  cinema	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  let	  us	  experience	  even	  a	  glimpse	  through	  another	  “mind’s	  eye”,	  that	  is	   not	   the	   perceptual	   experiences	   of	   another	   person	   or	   creature	   in	   real	   life,	   but	   also	   the	  dreams,	   imaginations	   or	   hallucinations	   of	   somebody	   else.	   Precisely	   he	   writes:	   “Der	   letzte	  
Mann	  (Murnau,	  1924)	  contains	  an	  impressive	  long	  take	  where	  the	  porter	  (Emil	  Jannings)	  in	  a	  drunken	   stupor	   imagines	   himself	   walking	   into	   Hotel	   Atlantic	   carrying	   a	   huge	   suitcase	   and	  tossing	  it	  up	  in	  the	  air	  as	  if	  it	  were	  light	  as	  a	  feather.	  These	  events	  are	  presented	  in	  distorted	  images	   and	   by	   means	   of	   a	   camera	   mounted	   on	   Karl	   Freund’s	   chest	   following	   Jannings’	  character	  through	  the	  revolving	  door”	  (Nielson,	  2008,	  p.244).	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Similar	   descriptions,	   stressing	   camera	   movement	   simulating	   and	   deviating	   from	   the	  spectator’s	  experiences	  with	  the	  real	  world,	  could	  be	  made	  for	  the	  functions	  of	  reflective	  and	  abstract	  uses	  of	  camera	  movements.	  This	  however	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.40	  	  	  The	  examples	  given	  should	  be	  enough	  though	  to	   illustrate	  a	  basic	  claim.	  This	   is	  that	  camera	  movements,	  via	  imitating	  experiences	  from	  normal	  vision,	  are	  able	  to	  immerse	  the	  spectator’s	  body	   in	   a	   fictional	   environment.	   On	   this	   base	   then,	   the	   same	   body	   can	   be	   extended	   by	  deviations	   from	  this	  embodied	  vision	   in	  the	  real	  world.	  First	  engaged	  in	  an	   interaction	  with	  the	  fictional	  world,	  the	  spectator	  in	  his	  body	  is	  able	  to	  explore	  another	  kind	  of	  being.	  	  	  III.1.2.1	  Experimental	  idea	  and	  hypothesis	  	  It	   is	   the	   main	   hypothesis	   of	   the	   following	   experiment,	   that	   this	   special	   relation	   between	  spectator	  and	  movie	  should	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  brain	  activity	  of	  the	  spectator	  while	  watching	  movies.	  Specifically,	  the	  hypothesis	  is,	  that	  despite	  the	  possibility	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  visions	  due	   to	   film,	   our	   body	   should	   react	   stronger	   to	  moving	   images	   that	   better	   resemble	  normal	  visual	   experiences.	   This	   should	   be	   especially	   the	   case	   with	   regard	   to	   activations	   possibly	  serving	   the	   understanding	   of	   or	   the	   response	   to	   what	   can	   not	   be	   (better)	   perceived	   by	  physical	   contact	   or	   movement	   –	   such	   as	   a	   film.	   Such	   activations,	   so	   goes	   the	   further	  hypothesis,	  might	   in	   fact	   help	   the	   spectator’s	   immersion	   in	   the	  movie,	   thus	  most	   probably	  correlating	  with	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  involved	  in	  the	  scene.	  	  	  The	   experiment	   reported	  on	   in	   the	   following	   sections	   thus	   specifically	   tested	   if	  movie	   clips	  that	  more	  closely	  resemble	  usual	  vision	  in	  real	  life	  would	  stronger	  activate	  action	  perception	  links	  suggested	  to	  serve	  the	  understanding	  of	  and	  interaction	  with	  the	  real	  world,	  seen	  from	  a	  distance,	   and	   furthermore,	   if	   such	   activations	   correlate	   to	   a	   subjective	   experience	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  A	  very	  interesting	  case	  though	  is	  described	  for	  the	  abstract	  use	  of	  camera	  movement,	  that	  is	  the	  representation	  of	  abstract	  ideas	  by	   this	  narrative	  device.	  As	   an	  example,	  Nielson	   refers	   to	   a	   famous	   scene	  out	  of	  Wim	  Wender’s	  movie	   “Der	  Himmel	  ueber	  Berlin”	   in	  which	   the	   transfer	  of	  a	   soul	   from	  a	  dying	  body	   to	   the	  realm	  of	  god	  by	   the	  help	  of	  a	   sent	  angel	   (“Damiel”)	  seems	  to	  be	  understood	  via	  a	  pendulous	  movement	  of	  the	  camera.	  Nielson	  quotes	  the	  director	  himself	  stating:	  “I	  thought	  that	  going	  back	  and	  forth	  sort	  of	  showed	  more	  what	  Damiel	  was	  actually	  doing,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  he	  is	  -­‐	  as	  the	  man	  is	  dying	  -­‐	  that	  he's	  taking	  him	  over,	  so	  to	  speak.	  In	  a	  way,	  in	  a	  strange	  way,	  this	  "action"	  as	  well	  as	  the	  pain	  that	  came	  with	  it,	  were	  in	  that	  camera	  movement.	  [...]	  as	  it	  was	  somehow	  about	  a	  transition	  between	  life	  and	  death,	  it	  did	  translate	  something:	  not	   so	  much	  his	   p.o.v.,	  more	   a	  mental	   attitude.	  Damiel's	   tenderness	   and	  his	   care	   for	   the	  man	  were	   in	   that	   back-­‐and-­‐forth	  movement”	   (Wenders	   in	  Raskin,	   1999,	   p	   7;	   see	   also	  Nielson,	   2008,	   p.	   258).	   This	   example	   explicitly	   stresses	   the	   impact	   of	  bodily	  dimensions	  even	  on	  something	  that	  might	  best	  be	  described	  as	  a	  “filmic	  metaphor”,	  reminding	  of	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnsons	  work	  “Metaphors	  we	   live	  by”	  (see	  Lakoff	  &	  Johnson,	  1980)	   in	  which	  they	  emphasize	  the	  crucial	   influence	  of	  our	  bodies	  on	  something	  as	  much	  depending	  on	  convention	  as	  language.	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involvement	   in	   the	   scene.	   Stimuli	   were	   clips	   of	   the	   same	   scene	   filmed	   once	   with	   a	   fixed	  camera,	  once	  while	  applying	  a	  zoom,	  once	  while	  approaching	  the	  scene	  with	  the	  camera	  on	  a	  dolly	  track	  and	  once	  while	  approaching	  the	  scene	  with	  the	  camera	  carried	  by	  a	  camera	  man	  and	   stabilized	   by	   a	   steadicam	   construction.	   Importantly,	   these	   different	   uses	   of	   the	   camera	  can	   be	   expected	   to	   correspond	   to	   different	   degrees	   of	   similarities	   of	   the	   produced	  moving	  images	  with	  perception	  as	  known	  from	  real	  life.	  Exactly,	  while	  we	  can	  hold	  the	  head	  still	  like	  a	  camera	   on	   a	   tripod	   or	   walk	   through	   the	   room	   like	   a	   steadicam	   fixed	   on	   the	   body	   of	   a	  cameraman,	   we	   more	   seldomly	   move	   on	   tracks	   (although,	   sometimes	   we	   might	   do,	   when	  watching	  out	  of	  the	  head	  window	  of	  a	  train),	  and	  we	  always	  need	  technical	  support	  to	  “zoom	  in”	  on	  things.	  	  	  As	  the	  further	  paragraphs	  will	  describe	  in	  detail,	   the	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  a	  high	  density	  EEG	  recording,	  registering	  brain	  activity	  of	  the	  spectators	  during	  the	  watching	  of	  the	  different	  movie	  clips.	  Furthermore,	  we	  added	  a	  rating	  task	  to	  assess	  spectators’	  conscious	  experiences	  with	  the	  movies.	  Our	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  videos	  produced	  by	  camera	  movements	  most	  likely	  to	  elicit	  experiences	  close	   to	  spectators’	  vision	   in	   real	   life,	   should	  not	  only	  be	   judged	  as	   the	  most	   naturalistic	   and	   involving,	   but	   also	   most	   strongly	   activate	   what	   has	   previously	   been	  described	  as	  the	  mirror	  mechanism	  –	  an	  action-­‐perception	  link	  likely	  to	  serve	  understanding	  of	   and	   response	   preparation	   to	   actions	   of	   others	   as	   well	   as	   our	   feeling	   of	   presence	   of	   the	  surrounding	  world	  (see	  also	  Chapter	  II.4)	  .	  	  An	   established	   marker	   of	   the	   mirror	   neuron-­‐related	   activity	   in	   the	   human	   brain	   is	   the	  desynchronization	   of	   the	   “mu	   rhythm”	   in	   EEG	   (see	   for	   instance	   Muthukumaraswamy,	  	  Johnson,	  &	  McNair,	   2004;	   Pineda,	   2005;	   Ramachandran	  &	  Oberman,	   2006).	   The	   term	   “mu-­‐rhythm”	  refers	  to	  an	  EEG	  rhythm	  with	  one	  component	  in	  the	  alpha	  band	  (8–14	  Hz)	  and	  one	  component	  in	  the	  lower	  beta	  band	  (14-­‐20	  Hz),	  recorded	  from	  central	  electrodes.	  This	  rhythm	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  desynchronize	  not	  only	  during	  the	  execution	  of	  active	  movements,	  but	  also	  during	  their	  observation	  (Cochin	  et	  al.,	  1998,	  1999;	  Altshuler,	  Vaknov,	  Wang,	  Ramachandran,	  &	  Pineda,	  1997;	  Altschuler,	  Vankov,	  Hubbard,	  Roberts,	  […],	  &	  Pineda,	  2000);	  Hari	  et	  al.,	  1998,	  Derambure,	   Defebvre,	   Dujardin,	   Bourriez,	   Jacquesson,	   Destee,	   Guieu,	   1993;	   Leocani,	   Toro,	  Manganotti,	   Zhuang,	   &	   Hallet,	   1997;	   Pfurtscheller	   &	   Lopes	   Da	   Silva,	   1999;	   Pfurtscheller	   &	  Aranibar,	   1979;	   Pfurtscheller	   &	   Berghold,	   1989;	   Stancak	   and	   Pfurtscheller,	   1996;	   Toro,	  Deutschl,	   Thatcher,	   Sato,	   […],	   &	   Hallet,	   1994).	   It	   has	   therefore	   been	   suggested	   that	   its	  suppression	   (also	   termed	   event-­‐related	   desynchronization	   (ERD))	   is	   due	   to	   a	  neurophysiological	  mechanism	  of	  motor	  resonance,	  the	  mirror	  mechanism,	  caused	  by	  similar	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neurons	   to	   the	   ones	   originally	   found	   in	   the	   maquaque's	   brain	   (Muthukumaraswamy	   &	  Johnson,	   2004;	   Pineda,	   2005;	   Ramachandran	   &	   Oberman,	   2006).	   Our	   precise	   hypothesis	  therefore	  consisted	  in	  the	  prediction	  that	  event	  related	  desynchronization	  (ERD)	  of	   the	  mu-­‐rhythm	  would	  be	  modulated	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  similarity	  with	  vision	  in	  the	  real	  world	  achieved	  by	  the	  camera	  movement	  used	  for	  producing	  the	  movie	  watched	  by	  participants.	  	  The	   following	   paragraphs	   will	   report	   the	   details	   of	   setup,	   analysis	   and	   results	   of	   this	  experiment.	  	  III.1.2.2	  Participants,	  materials	  and	  methods	  	  19	   healthy	   volunteers,	   recruited	   by	   public	   announcement,	   participated	   in	   the	   experiment.	  Two	  participants	  were	  subsequently	  excluded	  from	  analysis	  due	  to	  artifacts	   in	  the	  EEG	  data	  or	  lack	  of	  typical	  ERD	  pattern	  (see	  Section	  EEG	  recording	  and	  analysis).	  Among	  the	  remaining	  participants,	  7	  were	  males,	  10	  females,	  the	  mean	  age	  was	  22.8,	  and	  all	  were	  right	  handed	  as	  assessed	  by	  the	  Edinburgh	  Handedness	  Inventory	  (Oldfield,	  1971).	  All	  participants	  were	  paid	  25	   euros	   as	   reimbursement.	   Before	   the	   experiment,	   they	   received	   written	   and	   oral	  experimental	   instructions.	   After	   the	   experiment	   each	   participant	   was	   debriefed.	   Written	  informed	  consent	  was	  obtained	  from	  all	  participants	  before	  entering	  the	  study.	  The	  study	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  local	  Ethical	  Committee.	  	  	  Stimuli	  consisted	  of	  short	  video	  clips	  of	  3	  seconds	  length	  showing	  an	  agent	  (one	  female,	  one	  male)	  grasping	  an	  object	  from	  a	  table	  placed	  in	  front	  of	  the	  agent.	  The	  background	  consisted	  of	  a	  black	  wall	  in	  front	  of	  which	  we	  placed	  a	  panel	  with	  a	  black	  and	  white	  geometrical	  pattern	  to	   enforce	   the	  3D	  perception	  of	   the	   room.	  Grasped	  objects	   included	  a	  marble,	   a	   battery,	   an	  eraser,	  a	  roll	  of	  scotch	  tape,	  an	  espresso	  cup,	  a	  plastic	  mug,	  a	  plastic	  ball	  of	  8	  cm	  radius,	  and	  a	  packet	  of	  tissues	  (See	  Figure	  1,	  next	  page). 	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Figure 1. Objects presented in the video clips and in the attentional task. Figure	  taken	  from	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014.	  	  Video	  clips	  were	  recorded	  in	  a	  professional	  film	  studio,	  enabling	  us	   to	   film	   the	   same	   scene	  4	   times	  under	  highly	   controlled	   con-­‐ditions.	   The	   camera	   starting	   position	   was	   always	   260	   cm	   far	  from	  the	  object,	  the	  end	  position	  (in	  case	  of	  movement)	  was	  80	  cm	   from	  the	  object.	  The	  camera	  movement	  speed	  as	  well	  as	   its	  height	   from	   the	   ground	   were	   kept	   constant	   across	   the	   three	  different	   movement	   conditions,	   so	   that	   the	   only	   difference	  among	  them	  consisted	  in	  the	  type	  of	  movement	  and	  approach	  to	  the	   scene:	   In	   25%	   of	   the	   videos,	   the	   camera	   stayed	   fixed	   on	   a	  tripod,	  260	  cm	  away	  from	  the	  object.	  In	  other	  25%,	  a	  zoom	  was	  applied,	  resulting	  in	  a	  magnification	  of	  the	  object	  corresponding	  to	   its	   presentation	   in	   a	   distance	   of	   80	   cm.	   In	   25%,	   the	   camera	  during	  recording	  was	  moved	  towards	  the	  scene	  by	  means	  of	  an	  automatic	  transport	  on	  dolly	  tracks	  (programmed,	  steady	  pace)	  stopping	   in	   a	  distance	  of	   80	   cm	   from	   the	  object.	  And	   finally,	   in	  the	   last	   25%,	   the	   camera	   was	   carried	   towards	   the	   scene	   by	  means	   of	   a	   steadicam	   construction	   carried	   by	   a	   professional	  camera	  man.	  Figure	  2	  (on	  the	  right)	  shows	  4	  still	   frames	  taken	  from	   a	   video	   clip	   filmed	  with	   such	   a	   steadicam,	   including	   start	  and	  end	  positions	  of	  the	  camera.	  	  	  
Figure	   2.	   Single	   frames	   ex-­‐tracted	  from	  one	  video	  clip	  in	  which	   the	   camera	   (steadi-­‐cam)	   approaches	   the	   agent.	  Figure	  taken	  from	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014.	  
	  
	   48	  
The	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  two	  different	  parts	  comprising:	  	  1)	  a	  50	  minutes	  EEG	  recording	  session;	  	  2)	  a	  10	  minutes	  rating	  task	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1)	  EEG	  The	  EEG	  was	  recorded	  during	  five	  blocks	  of	  about	  10	  minutes	  length	  each.	  After	  each	  block	  participants	  were	  given	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  short	  break.	  Each	  block	  consisted	  of	  80	  trials	  (16	  per	   condition	   –	   still,	   zoom,	   dolly,	   steadicam	   and	   action	   execution,	   for	   details	   see	   below).	  Participants	  were	   seated	   in	  an	   isolated	  EEG	   lab	   in	   front	  of	   a	   computer	   screen	  placed	  on	  a	  table	   at	   a	   distance	   of	   50	   cm.	   Participants	   were	   then	   instructed	   about	   the	   experimental	  procedure:	  Each	   trial	   began	  with	   a	   fixation	   cross	   of	   200ms,	   followed	  by	   a	   video	   (of	   3	   sec.	  length	  each,	  presented	  in	  random	  order).	  In	  80%	  of	  the	  trials,	  after	  stimulus	  presentation	  a	  grey	   screen	   was	   displayed	   for	   5	   seconds	   (guaranteeing	   the	   return	   of	   brain	   activity	   to	  baseline).	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  blink	  only	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  grey	  screen	  period	  to	  minimize	  movement	  artifacts	  also	  in	  the	  resynchronization	  phase.	  In	  the	  remaining	  20%	  of	   the	   trials	   (action	   execution	   condition),	   after	   stimulus	   presentation	   and	   before	   the	   grey	  screen,	  in	  addition,	  the	  photo	  of	  an	  object	  (see	  above)	  appeared,	  and	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  tell	  whether	  the	  object	  was	  the	  same	  they	  had	  seen	  being	  grasped	  in	  the	  video	  displayed	  just	  before.	  The	  answer	  had	  to	  be	  given	  by	  clicking	  the	  mouse	  with	  their	  right	  index	  finger.	  The	  mouse	  was	  positioned	  on	  the	  table	  in	  front	  of	  participants	  at	  a	  distance	  of	  15	  cm	  from	  their	   right	   hand.	  When	   the	   object	   photo	   appeared,	   participants	  were	   asked	   to	  move	   their	  hand	   from	  start	  position	   to	   the	  mouse	  and	  click	  either	   the	   left	  button	  of	   the	  mouse,	  when	  seeing	  the	  same	  object	  as	  in	  the	  video	  just	  displayed	  before,	  or	  the	  right	  button	  of	  the	  mouse,	  when	  seeing	  a	  different	  object.	  They	  were	  furthermore	  asked	  to	  move	  back	  the	  hand	  to	  start	  position	  right	  after	  the	  click.	  If	  participants	  gave	  a	  wrong	  answer	  or	  did	  not	  answer	  within	  3	  seconds,	   they	  were	   told	   the	   trial	  was	   incorrect	  or	   the	  answer	  given	   too	  slow,	  and	   the	   trial	  was	   repeated.	   This	   action	   execution	   condition	   served	   both	   as	   control	   for	   attention	   and	   to	  record	  participants’	  ERD	  during	  action	  execution	  (for	  experimental	  paradigm,	  see	  Figure	  3	  next	  page).	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Figure	  3.	  Experimental	  paradigm	  employed	  during	  EEG	  recording.	  Figure	  taken	  from	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014.	  	  2)	  Rating	  task	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  a	  Rating	  task.	  For	  this	  task,	  out	  of	  the	  previous	  64	   video	   clips,	   twelve	  were	   chosen	   again	   (three	   per	   condition).	   Participants,	   still	   sitting	   in	  front	  of	  the	  screen	  as	  during	  the	  EEG	  recording	  session,	  were	  again	  shown	  these	  video	  clips	  and	  for	  each	  were	  asked	  six	  different	  questions	  (in	  6	  separate	  blocks	  (one	  for	  each	  question)	  always	  conducted	  in	  the	  same	  order):	  	  1)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  involved	  in	  the	  scene?	  	  2)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  like	  the	  actor?	  	  3)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  as	  if	  you	  yourself	  would	  approach	  the	  scene?41	  	  4)	  How	  comfortable	  did	  you	  feel	  watching	  the	  scene?	  5)	  How	  realistic	  did	  you	  find	  the	  camera	  movement?	  	  6)	   How	   much	   did	   you	   feel	   the	   camera	   movement	   resembled	   a	   person's	   movement	   when	  approaching	  the	  scene?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Questions	  3,	  5	  and	  6	  were	  not	  asked	  for	  still	  camera	  video	  clips.	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The	   first	   three	   questions	   were	   designed	   to	   investigate	   participants’	   potential	   feeling	   of	  involvement	  with	  the	  observed	  scene	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  empathy	  with	  the	  actor	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  embodiment	   with	   the	   camera.	   The	   fourth	   question	   was	   designed	   to	   explore	   how	   at	   ease	  participants	  were	  with	   the	  different	  ways	  of	   filming	   the	  scene.	  The	   last	   two	  questions	  were	  designed	   to	   measure	   participants’	   estimation	   of	   the	   ecological	   plausibility	   of	   the	   different	  types	  of	  camera	  movements	  with	  respect	  to	  those	  of	  a	  real	  observer	  approaching	  the	  scene.	  The	  rating	  was	  given	  by	  using	  the	  mouse	  to	  place	  a	  cursor	  on	  a	  0-­‐100	  rating	  scale	  below	  each	  stimulus.	  	  
	  EEG	  data	  was	  acquired	  by	  a	  128-­‐channel	  Sensor	  Net	  (Electrical	  Geodesic,	  Eugene,	  USA)	  and	  recorded	   within	   standard	   EGI	   package	   Net	   Station	   4.3.1.	   EEG	   was	   sampled	   at	   250	   Hz	   and	  band-­‐pass	  filtered	  at	  0.3–100	  Hz,	  electrodes	  impedance	  was	  kept	  less	  than	  50	  kΩ	  (controlled	  after	  each	  block).	  The	  raw	  EEG	  data	  was	  recorded	  with	  the	  vertex	  (Cz)	  as	  the	  online	  reference	  and	  re-­‐referenced	  off-­‐line	  to	  the	  common	  average	  (Muthukumaraswamy,	  Johnson,	  &	  McNair,	  2004).	  Stimuli	  were	  presented	  with	  E-­‐Prime	  2.0,	  and	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  trial,	  all	  event	  markers	  were	  sent	   to	  Net	  Station.	  Participants’	  motion	  was	  monitored	  by	   the	  experimenter	  and	  video-­‐recorded	  for	  off-­‐line	  analysis;	  if	  participants	  moved	  during	  the	  observation	  or	  rest	  conditions,	   the	  trial	  was	  excluded	  from	  further	  data	  analysis.	  EEG	  data	  were	  filtered	  off-­‐line	  with	  band-­‐pass	   filter	  0.3–30	  Hz	  and	  segmented	   into	  specific	   time	  epochs.	  From	  observation	  trials	   the	   whole	   three	   seconds	   of	   stimulus	   presentation	   plus	   the	   first	   two	   seconds	   of	   grey	  screen	  (resynchronization	  phase,	  see	  below)	  was	  analyzed.	  As	  baseline	  we	  used	  1000	  ms	  of	  grey	  screen	  ending	  1	  second	  before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  new	  trial	  (the	  appearance	  of	  the	  fixation	  cross)	  in	  the	  observation	  trials.	  From	  the	  action	  execution	  trials,	  segments	  of	  1000	  ms	  were	  cut,	   starting	   500	  ms	   before	   the	  motor	   response	   (button	   press)	   and	   ending	   500	  ms	   after	   it.	  Only	  the	  trials	   in	  which	  participants	  responded	  correctly	  were	  analyzed.	  The	  trials	   in	  which	  participants	   produced	   eye-­‐blinks	   and	  movement	   artifacts	  were	   rejected	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  artifacts	  detection	  tool	  supplied	  by	  Net	  Station	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  subsequent	  careful	  visual	  inspection	   of	   each	   segment.	   A	   minimum	   number	   of	   50	   trials	   for	   each	   condition	   was	   kept	  (fulfilled	  by	  all	  but	  one	  participant,	  who	  was	  consequently	  excluded	  from	  further	  analysis).	  	  The	  time–frequency	  analysis	  was	  performed	  by	  continuous	  Morlet	  wavelet	  transformation	  in	  0.5	  Hz	  intervals	   in	  the	  frequency	  range	  from	  1	  to	  30	  Hz.	  Frequency-­‐power	  coefficients	  were	  calculated	   by	   taking	   the	   average	   across	   trials.	   The	   wavelet	   transformation	   was	   calculated	  separately	  for	  each	  participant	  in	  all	  128	  channels	  for	  each	  condition.	  It	  was	  scaled	  by	  division	  using	  250ms	  out	  of	  the	  preceding	  fixation	  cross	  period.	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Statistical	   analysis	  was	  performed	  on	  a	   selected	   cluster	  of	  8	   electrodes	   in	   each	  hemisphere	  located	  around	  standard	  C3	  and	  C4	  sites	  (Electrodes	  30,	  31,	  36,	  37,	  41,	  42,	  53,	  54	  left	  and	  79,	  80,	   86,	   87,	   93,	   103,	   104,	   105	   right,	   as	   used	   in	   prior	   studies,	   see	   Streltsowa	   et	   al.,	   2010;	  Muthukumaraswamy	   &	   Johnson	   2004;	  Muthukumaraswamy	   et	   al.	   2004	   ;	   Bernier,	   Dawson,	  Webb,	  &	  Murias,	  2007).	  	  Data	  were	  analyzed	  with	  regard	  to	  frequency	  power	  changes	  of	  the	  different	  components	  of	  the	  rolandic	  mu-­‐rhythm,	  reported	  to	  be	  modulated	  by	  voluntary	  action	  execution	  as	  well	  as	  action	   observation	   (Derambure	   et.	   al.,	   1993;	   Leocani	   et	   al.,	   1997;	   Pfurtscheller	  &	   Aranibar,	  1979;	   Pfurtscheller	   &	   Berghold,	   1989;	   Stancak	   &	   Pfurtscheller,	   1996;	   Toro	   et	   al.,	   1994;	  Pfurtscheller	  &	  Lopez	  da	  Silva,	  1999).	  As	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  also	  the	  ERS	  following	  ERD	  of	  the	  rolandic	  mu-­‐rhythm	  shows	  a	  specific	  pattern	  that	  can	  be	  modulated	  by	  contextual	  conditions	  (Muthukumaraswamy	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Pfurtscheller,	   Neuper,	   Brunner,	   &	   Lopez	   Da	   Silva,	   2005,	  Heimann	   et	   al.,	   2013),	   we	   analyzed	   four	   different	   consequent	   time	   windows	   representing	  early	   ERD,	   beginning	   of	   ERS,	   rebound	   (over-­‐synchronization)	   and	   return-­‐to-­‐baseline	   stages	  (see	  statistical	  analysis	  section	  for	  details).	  	  For	   each	  participant,	   specific	   alpha-­‐frequency	  bands	  were	   selected	   in	   the	   range	  of	   8–14	  Hz	  following	   the	  procedure	  described	   in	  previous	  studies	   (Oberman	  et	  al.,	  2007a,b;	  Babiloni	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  The	  individual	  peak	  (F)	  of	  attenuated	  frequency	  was	  determined	  by	  calculating	  the	  ratio	  between	   the	   frequency	  power	   in	  action	  execution	   trials	  and	  during	  baseline	   in	   the	   six	  following	   sub-­‐frequency	  bands:	  8–9,	  9–10,	  10–11,	  11–12,	  12–13,	  13–14	  Hz.	  Each	  value	  was	  then	  transformed	  into	  a	  log-­‐ratio,	  and	  the	  frequency	  that	  corresponded	  to	  the	  log-­‐ratio	  with	  the	  most	  negative	  value	  was	   taken	  as	  F.	  A	  3	  Hz	   range	   frequency	  band	  was	   chosen	   for	   each	  participant	  (F	  -­‐	  1;	  F	  +	  1).	  For	  the	  following	  statistical	  analyses,	  the	  frequency	  power	  in	  this	  3	  Hz	  range	  was	  extracted	  in	  all	  conditions	  (number	  of	  participants	  selected	  per	  range:	  7-­‐10	  Hz:	  0;	   8-­‐11	   Hz:	   6;	   9-­‐12	   Hz:	   2;	   10-­‐13	   Hz:	   8;	   11-­‐14	   Hz:	   1;	   12-­‐15	   Hz:0).	   The	   data	   of	   a	   second	  participant	   for	   which	   no	   significant	   difference	   between	   baseline	   and	   action	   execution	  condition	   was	   found	   in	   any	   of	   the	   checked	   frequency	   bands,	   was	   excluded	   from	   further	  analysis.	  Since	  the	  central	  alpha	  frequency	  band	  (8–14	  Hz)	  overlaps	  with	  the	  posterior	  alpha	  band,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  recordings	  in	  central	  areas	  might	  be	  affected	  by	  this	  posterior	  activity.	  In	  order	  to	  check	  whether	  the	  alpha	  recorded	  in	  central	  areas	  was	  affected	  by	  posterior	  alpha,	  for	  the	  alpha-­‐range	  selected	  for	  each	  participant	  we	  performed	  an	  additional	  analysis	  in	  4	  electrodes	  per	  hemisphere	  in	  occipital	  areas	  (electrodes	  69,	  70,	  73,	  74	  in	  left	  occipital	  lobe	  &	  electrodes	  82,	  83,	  88,	  89	  in	  right	  occipital	  lobe)	  using	  the	  same	  frequency	  bands	  as	  previously	  described.	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Furthermore,	  in	  every	  participant	  three	  beta-­‐frequency	  ranges	  were	  analyzed	  (a	  lower	  band	  of	   14-­‐20	   Hz,	   a	   middle	   band	   of	   18-­‐24	   Hz	   and	   an	   upper	   band	   of	   24-­‐30	   Hz)	   using	   the	   same	  central	   electrode-­‐cluster	   as	   for	   the	   alpha-­‐range	   (regarding	   range	   selection	   see	   Avanzini,	  Fabbri-­‐Destro,	  Dalla	  Volta,	  Daprati,	  […],	  &	  Cantalupo,	  G.,	  2012).	  	  On	   the	   results	   of	   the	   statistical	   extraction	  we	   applied	   an	   outlier	   detection	   (+/-­‐	   2	   standard	  deviations	   from	  mean)	   revealing	   outlier	   values	   in	   zoom	   condition	   of	   one	   participant.	   Such	  outlier	   values	   were	   replaced	   with	   the	   corresponding	   average	   values	   of	   the	   remaining	  participants.	  	  
	  In	  order	   to	   assess	   central	   alpha	   and	  beta	  desynchronization	   in	   sensory-­‐motor	   areas	  during	  different	  observation	  and	  action	  execution	  trials,	  we	  compared	  the	  frequency	  power	  extracted	  from	  wavelet	  transformation	  for	  the	  different	  conditions	  using	  several	  ANOVAs.	  1) In	   order	   to	   generally	   assess	   central	   alpha	   and	   beta	   ERD	   in	   sensory-­‐motor	   areas,	   for	  every	  band	   range	   considered	   (alpha,	   low	  beta,	  middle	  beta,	  high	  beta)	  we	  compared	  the	  frequency	  power	  extracted	  from	  wavelet	  transformation	  during	  baseline	  (average	  of	  1000ms	  of	  period	  of	  grey	  screen	  ending	  1000ms	  before	  fixation	  cross)	  with	  its	  value	  during	  observation	  conditions	   (average	  of	  3000ms	  of	  video	  presentation)	  and	  action	  execution	  condition	  (average	  of	  1000ms:	  500ms	  before	  and	  500ms	  after	  button	  press)	  using	  a	  repeated	  measures	  2x6	  ANOVA	  with	  two	   levels	  of	  Hemisphere	  (right	  vs.	   left)	  and	  six	  levels	  of	  Condition	  (baseline,	  four	  observation	  conditions	  (still,	  zoom,	  dolly	  and	  steadicam)	  and	  action	  execution).	  	  2) In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  time	  course	  of	  central	  alpha	  and	  beta	  ERD/ERS	  in	  sensory-­‐motor	  areas	  during	  the	  four	  observation	  conditions,	  for	  every	  band	  range	  considered	  (alpha	  and	  low	  beta	  –	  middle	  beta	  and	  high	  beta	  were	  left	  out,	  due	  to	  results	  of	  analysis	  I,	  see	  below)	  we	   firstly	   analyzed	   frequency	   power	   in	   20	   separate	   epochs	   of	   250ms	   length	  each.	  Due	  to	  the	  typical	  ERD/ERS/rebound	  pattern	  seen	  in	  the	  descriptive	  analysis	  of	  this	   analysis,	   we	   then	   chose	   4	   time	  windows	   to	   assess	   statistical	   differences	   among	  conditions	   in	   the	  different	   stages	  of	   the	   event-­‐related	  modulation	  of	   the	  mu	   rhythm.	  The	   selected	   four	   windows	   were:	   ERD	   window,	   consisting	   of	   the	   first	   second	   of	  stimulus	   presentation;	   ERS	   window,	   consisting	   of	   the	   second	   and	   third	   second	   of	  stimulus	  presentation;	  Rebound	  window,	  consisting	  of	   the	   first	  second	  after	  stimulus	  offset;	   Return	   to	   baseline	   window,	   consisting	   of	   the	   second	   second	   after	   stimulus	  offset.	   With	   the	   values	   of	   the	   power	   analysis	   for	   these	   4	   windows	   we	   performed	   a	  repeated	  measures	  2	  x	  4	  x	  4	  ANOVA	  with	  2	  levels	  of	  Hemisphere	  (right	  vs.	  left),	  4	  levels	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of	  Condition	  (still,	  zoom,	  dolly,	  steadicam),	  and	  4	   levels	  of	  Time	  (see	  above).	  To	  keep	  the	  relation	  to	  baseline	  in	  the	  picture,	  values	  used	  for	  this	  ANOVA	  were	  the	  log	  values	  of	  the	  condition/baseline	  division.	  	  3) To	  control	  for	  effects	  in	  occipital	  electrodes	  for	  the	  alpha	  band,	  both	  ANOVAs	  described	  above	  were	  repeated	  for	  the	  occipital	  electrodes	  in	  the	  same	  frequency	  ranges.	  	  Results	   of	   the	   Rating	   task	   were	   analyzed	   using	   a	   Repeated-­‐measures-­‐ANOVA	   for	   each	  question	  with	  the	  single	  main	  factor	  of	  Condition.	  	  In	  all	  performed	  ANOVAs	  (of	  EEG	  analysis	  and	  Rating	  task)	  we	  applied	  Duncan	  post-­‐hoc	  tests	  to	   further	   explore	   significant	   factors	   and	   interactions.	   Reported	   results	   are	   automatically	  adjusted	  for	  multiple	  comparisons.	  Error	  bars	  in	  all	  the	  graphs	  represent	  standard	  errors.	  In	  figure	  6	  and	  7,	  conditions	  are	  represented	  next	  to	  each	  other	  for	  the	  ease	  of	  visualization.	  	  	  III.1.4	  Results	  III.1.4.1	  Results	  -­‐	  EEG	  	  In	   order	   to	   generally	   assess	   central	   alpha	   ERD	   in	   sensory-­‐motor	   areas,	   we	   compared	   the	  frequency	  power	  for	  selected	  alpha	  frequency	  ranges	  extracted	  from	  wavelet	  during	  baseline	  with	   observation	   conditions	   (still,	   zoom,	   dolly,	   steadicam)	   and	   action	   execution	   condition.	  Descriptive	  analysis	  (see	  Figure	  4)	  showed	  that,	  compared	  to	  baseline,	  ERD	  was	  present	  in	  all	  four	   observation	   conditions	   as	   well	   as	   during	   action	   execution	   (button	   press),	   with	   a	  maximum	   in	   the	   latter	   condition.	   A	   2x6	   ANOVA	   (Hemisphere	   x	   Condition)	   showed	   only	   a	  significant	  main	  effect	  for	  Condition	  (F(5,80)=17.882,	  p<0.001).	  	  
	  
Figure	   4.	   Central	   alpha	   frequency	  power	   during	   baseline,	   action	   obser-­‐vation,	  and	  action	  execution.	  	  Condition	   effect:	   F(5,	   80)	   =	   17.882,	  p<0.001.	   Figure	   taken	   from	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014.	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Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	   frequency	   power	   for	   baseline	   was	   significantly	   higher	  than	  for	  all	  other	  conditions	  and	  that	  frequency	  power	  for	  action	  execution	  was	  significantly	  lower	  than	  for	  all	  other	  conditions	  (for	  all	  these	  comparisons	  p<0.001).	  Differences	  between	  different	  observation-­‐conditions	  were	  not	  significant	  (for	  all	  p>0.3).	  	  To	  control	   for	   similar	  effects	   in	  occipital	   regions	  we	  repeated	   the	  analysis	   just	  described	   in	  occipital	  electrodes.	  The	  2x6	  ANOVA	  with	  2	  factors	  of	  Hemisphere	  and	  6	  factors	  of	  Condition	  (baseline,	  still,	  zoom,	  dolly,	  steadicam	  and	  action	  execution)	  in	  the	  occipital	  region	  showed	  a	  main	   effect	   of	   Condition	   (F(5,80)=21.08,	   p<0.001).	   Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	  frequency	  power	  for	  baseline	  was	  significantly	  higher	  than	  for	  all	  other	  conditions	  (p<0.001),	  while	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  among	  observation	  conditions	  and	  action	  execution	  condition.	   These	   results	   support	   the	   notion	   that	   alpha	   ERD	   in	   occipital	   regions	   is	  discriminable	  from	  alpha	  ERD	  in	  central	  regions.	  	  The	  ANOVA	  also	  showed	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	  Hemisphere	  x	  Condition	  (F(5,80)=3.3,	  p<0.01).	  Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	   this	   difference	   was	   due	   to	   differences	   of	   the	   baseline	  values	   only,	   with	   the	   right	   hemisphere	   having	   a	   higher	   baseline	   value	   than	   the	   left	  hemisphere	   (p<0.01).	   We	   therefore	   computed	   the	   lateralization	   index	   (Baseline	   right	   –	  Baseline	   left	   )/	   (Mean	  of	  Baseline	   right	   and	   left)	   for	   all	  participants	   in	   central	   and	  occipital	  electrodes	   for	   this	   condition	   and	   applied	   a	   paired	   samples	   t-­‐test	   to	   check	   for	   differences	  between	   the	   two	  regions.	  Descriptive	  analysis	   showed	   that	   the	  mean	   lateralization	   index	  of	  baseline	   values	   in	   central	   electrodes	   was	   0.082,	   while	   the	   mean	   lateralization	   index	   of	  Baseline	  values	  in	  occipital	  electrodes	  was	  0.096	  (indicating	  a	  slightly	  higher	  lateralization	  to	  the	   right	   hemisphere	   in	   Occipitals).	   However,	   the	   paired	   sampled	   t-­‐test	   did	   not	   show	   a	  significant	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   regions	   (t(16)=-­‐0.240921,	   p	   >	   0.8).	   This	  means	   that	  our	  data	  cannot	  support	  a	  hemispheric	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  regions	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  occipital	   cortex	   regarding	   the	   mean	   power	   frequency	   over	   the	   whole	   time	   of	   video	  observation.	  	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   generally	   assess	   beta	  ERD	   in	   central	   sensory-­‐motor	   areas	   (as	   part	   of	   the	   mu-­‐rhythm),	  we	  compared	  the	  frequency	  power	  of	  three	  different	  beta-­‐ranges	  (low,	  middle	  and	  high	   beta)	   extracted	   from	   wavelet	   transformation	   during	   baseline	   with	   frequency	   power	  during	  observation	  conditions	  and	  during	  action	  execution	  (see	  Figure	  5,	  next	  page).	  	  Descriptive	  analysis	  for	  the	  low	  beta	  range	  (14-­‐20	  Hz,	  see	  Figure	  5a,	  next	  page)	  showed	  that	  compared	   to	  baseline	  ERD	  was	  present	   in	   all	   four	  observation	   conditions	   as	  well	   as	  during	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action	  execution,	  with	  a	  maximum	  in	  the	  steadicam	  condition.	  A	  2x6	  ANOVA	  (Hemisphere	  x	  	  Condition)	  accordingly	  showed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  for	  Condition.	  Post-­‐hoc	  comparisons	  revealed	   that	   the	  significant	  differences	  occurred	  between	  baseline	  and	  all	  other	  conditions	  (p<0.001),	  as	  well	  as	  between	  steadicam	  and	  action	  execution	  (p<0.01).	  	  Descriptive	  analysis	  for	  the	  middle	  beta	  range	  (18-­‐24	  Hz,	  see	  Figure	  5b,	  next	  page)	  as	  well	  as	  for	   the	  high	  beta	   frequency	  range	  (24-­‐30	  Hz,	  see	   Figure	  5c,	  next	  page)	  showed	  no	  ERD	  for	  observation	  or	  action	  execution	  and	   the	  2x6	  ANOVAs	   (Hemisphere	  x	  Condition)	   showed	  no	  significant	  main	  effect	   for	  Condition	  or	  Hemisphere	  x	  Condition	   interaction.	  The	   results	  are	  contrasted	  to	  each	  other	  by	  the	  following	  figure	  (Figure	  5).	  	  
	  
Figure	   5.	   (A)	   Central	   lower	   beta	   frequency	   power	   during	   baseline,	   action	   observation	   and	   action	   execution.	   Condition	   effect:	   F(5,	   80)	   =	  7.0747,p	  <0.001.	  (B)	  Central	  middle	  beta	  frequency	  power	  during	  baseline,	  action	  observation,	  and	  action	  execution.	  Condition	  effect:	  F(5,	  80)	  =.93231,	  p	  =	   .46468.	  (C)	  Central	  high	  beta	  frequencypower	  during	  baseline,	  action	  observation,	  and	  action	  execution.	  Condition	  effect:	  F(5,	  80)	  =	  0.453,	  p	  =	  .809618.	  Figure	  taken	  from	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014.	  	  Due	   to	   these	   results,	  we	  decided	   to	   further	   investigate	  only	   the	   two	  ranges	   that	  gave	   signi-­‐ficant	  results:	  the	  selected	  alpha	  frequency	  range,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  low	  beta	  frequency	  range.	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In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  precise	  time-­‐course	  of	  ERD/ERS	  in	  sensory-­‐motor	  areas	  during	  the	  four	  different	   observation	   conditions	   in	   the	   frequency	   ranges	   of	   interest,	   we	   compared	   the	   log	  values	   of	   the	   frequency	   power	   of	   the	   chosen	   frequency	   ranges	   extracted	   from	   wavelet	  transformation	   during	   the	   different	   observation	   conditions	   divided	   by	   baseline.	   For	   each	  frequency	  range,	  a	  2x4x4	  ANOVA	  design	  was	  created	  with	  2	  levels	  of	  Hemisphere	  (left	  versus	  right),	   4	   levels	   of	   Condition	   (still,	   zoom,	   dolly,	   steadicam)	   and	   4	   levels	   of	   Time	   (4	   time	  windows	   representing	   early	   ERD,	   beginning	   of	   ERS,	   rebound	   (over-­‐synchronization)	   and	  return-­‐to-­‐baseline	  stages).	  For	  a	  better	  illustration	  of	  the	  time	  course,	  in	  the	  graphs	  we	  show	  the	  20	  epochs	  separately,	  marking	  the	  selected	  windows	  on	  the	  bottom.	  
	  
Alpha	  range	  	  The	   results	   of	   the	   2x4x4	  ANOVA	   (Hemisphere	   x	   Condition	   x	   Timewindow)	   for	   the	   selected	  alpha	  frequency	  ranges	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Time	  (F(3,48)=20.1	  p<0.001)	  as	  well	   as	   significant	   interactions	   of	   Condition	   x	   Time	   (F(9,144)=1.97,	   p<0.05).	   Descriptive	  analysis	   regarding	   the	  main	  effect	  of	  Time	  showed	  a	   typical	  ERD-­‐ERS-­‐rebound	  pattern	   (see	  also	   Avanzini	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   Descriptive	   and	   Post-­‐hoc	   analysis	   regarding	   the	   interaction	   of	  Condition	   x	   Time	   showed	   the	   following	   characteristics	   (see	  Figure	   6,	   next	   page).	   1)	   In	   the	  ERD	   phase	   (first	   second	   of	   video	   observation)	   in	   the	   selected	   alpha	   range,	   no	   significant	  differences	   among	   conditions	   were	   observed.	   2)	   In	   the	   following	   time	   window	   of	   further	  ERD/beginning	  ERS	  (second	  and	  third	  second	  of	  video	  observation)	  conditions	  differentiated.	  Descriptive	  analysis	  showed	  that	  ERD	  was	  strongest	  for	  the	  steadicam,	  followed	  by	  dolly,	  then	  zoom,	   then	   still	   condition.	   Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	   differences	   were	   significant	  between	  still	  and	  steadicam	  condition	  (p<0.001),	  zoom	  and	  steadicam	  condition	  (p<0.05),	  and	  between	   still	   and	   dolly	   condition	   (p<0.05).	   3)	   In	   the	   rebound	   window	   (first	   second	   after	  stimulus	  offset)	  order	  of	  power	  values	  changed	  with	  descriptive	  analysis	  showing	  that	  zoom	  had	   the	   highest	   power,	   followed	   by	   dolly,	   then	   still,	   then	   steadicam.	   Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	  showed	   that	   differences	   were	   significant	   between	   zoom	   and	   still	   (p<0.01)	   and	   zoom	   and	  steadicam	   (p<0.05).	   4)	   In	   the	   returned-­‐to-­‐baseline	   window	   (second	   second	   after	   stimulus	  offset)	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  conditions	  were	  measured.	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Figure	  6.	  Central	  alpha	  frequency	  power	  over	  20	  epochs.	  Statistics	  over	  four	  time	  windows	  as	  indicated.	  Condition	  x	  Time	  interaction,	  F(9,	  144)	  =	  1.97,	  p	  <	  .05.	  Figure	  taken	  from	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014.	  	  To	  control	  for	  effects	  in	  occipital	  regions	  we	  repeated	  the	  analysis	  done	  in	  central	  electrodes	  for	  occipital	  electrodes.	  The	  2x4x4	  ANOVA	  (2	  levels	  of	  Hemisphere	  (left	  vs	  right),	  4	  levels	  of	  Condition	  (still,	  zoom,	  dolly,	  steadicam)	  and	  4	  levels	  of	  Time	  (see	  above)	  showed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Hemisphere	  (F(1,16)=4.74,	  p<0.05),	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Time	  (F(3,48)=66.17,	  p	  <0.001)	  and	  a	  significant	   Hemisphere	   x	   Time	   interaction	   (F(3,48)=4.98,	   p	   <0.01).	   No	   effect	   was	   found	  regarding	  Condition	  x	  Time	  (p>0.4).	  Descriptive	  analysis	  regarding	  the	  effect	  of	  hemisphere	  showed	   that,	   as	   already	   reported	   for	   the	   2x6	   ANOVA,	   ERD	   was	   stronger	   in	   the	   right	  hemisphere.	   Descriptive	   analysis	   regarding	   the	   effect	   of	   Time	   showed	   an	   ERD	   pattern	   as	  expected	   (due	   to	   the	   presentation	   of	   a	   visual	   stimulus).	   Descriptive	   analysis	   regarding	   the	  effect	  of	  Hemisphere	  x	  Time	  showed	  that	  ERD	  was	  stronger	   in	   the	  right	  hemisphere	   for	   the	  first	   3	   time	   windows.	   Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	   all	   of	   these	   differences	   were	  significant	  (for	  window	  1	  and	  2	  p	  <0.001,	  for	  window	  3	  p<0.05).	  	  Due	  to	  these	  results,	  we	  repeated	  the	  comparison	  of	  the	  lateralization	  index	  for	  occipital	  and	  central	  electrodes.	  For	  this,	   for	  each	  participant	  and	  each	  region,	  we	  took	  the	  mean	  value	  of	  alpha	  frequency	  power	  over	  the	  four	  conditions	  of	  the	  right	  hemisphere	  in	  each	  time	  window,	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subtracted	   the	   mean	   value	   of	   alpha	   frequency	   power	   over	   the	   four	   conditions	   of	   the	   left	  hemisphere	  and	  divided	  the	  result	  by	  the	  mean	  value	  of	   these	  two	  numbers.	  Then,	  with	  the	  results	   of	   this	   calculation,	  we	   conducted	   a	   repeated	  measure	   2x4	  ANOVA	  with	   2	   factors	   of	  Region	  and	  4	  factors	  of	  Time.	  	  Still,	  as	  results	  did	  not	  show	  any	  significant	  Condition	  effect	  or	  Condition	  x	  Time	  interaction	  they	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  alpha	  ERD	  in	  occipital	  cortices	  is	  discriminable	  from	  alpha	  ERD	  in	  motor	  areas,	  showing	  only	  effects	  likely	  due	  to	  visual	  attention	  without	  differing	  results	  for	  the	  conditions	  of	  interest.	  	  	  
Low	  Beta	  range	  (14-­‐20	  Hz)	  The	  results	  of	  the	  2x4x4	  ANOVA	  for	  the	  low	  beta	  range	  (14-­‐20	  Hz)	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	   of	   Time	   (F(3,48)=41.03,	   p<0.001)	   as	  well	   as	   a	   significant	   interaction	   Condition*Time	  (F(9,144)=2.02,	   p<0.05).	   Descriptive	   analysis	   regarding	   the	   main	   effect	   of	   Time	   showed	   a	  typical	  ERD-­‐ERS-­‐rebound	  pattern	  (see	  also	  Avanzini	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  Descriptive	  and	  Post-­‐hoc	  analysis	  regarding	  the	   interaction	  of	  Condition	  x	  Time	  showed	  the	  following	  characteristics	   (see	  Figure	   7,	  next	  page).	  1)	   In	   the	  beta	  range,	  already	   in	   the	   first	  ERD	  phase	  (first	  1000	  ms	  of	  stimulus	  presentation)	  conditions	  differed.	  Descriptive	  analysis	  showed	  that	  early	  ERD	  was	  strongest	   for	  steadicam,	   followed	  by	  dolly,	   then	  zoom,	  then	  still	  condition.	  Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	  differences	  were	   significant	  between	  still	   and	  steadicam	  (p<0.05),	  zoom	  and	  steadicam	  (p<0.05)	  and	  dolly	  and	  steadicam	  (p<0.05).	  2)	  Also	  in	  the	  following	  time	  window	  of	  further	  ERD/early	  ERS	  conditions	  differentiated.	  Descriptive	  analysis	  showed	  that	  ERD	  was	  still	  strongest	  for	  the	  steadicam,	  followed	  by	  dolly,	  then	  zoom,	  then	  still	  condition.	  Post-­‐hoc	  comparisons	  showed	  that	  differences	  were	  significant	  between	  still	   and	   steadicam	   condition	   (p<0.001),	   still	   and	   dolly	   condition	   (p<0.05),	   zoom	   and	  steadicam	   condition	   (p<0.05),	   as	  well	   as	   dolly	   and	   steadicam	   condition	   (p<0.01).	   3)	   In	   the	  rebound	  window	  (first	  second	  after	  stimulus	  offset)	   the	  order	  changed.	  Descriptive	  analysis	  showed	  that	  zoom	  had	  the	  highest	  power,	   followed	  by	  dolly	  then	  still,	   then	  steadicam.	  Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	   differences	   were	   significant	   between	   zoom	   and	   steadicam	  (p<0.05)	  and	  dolly	  and	  steadicam	  (p<0.05)	  condition.	  4)	  In	  the	  returned-­‐to-­‐baseline	  window	  no	  significant	  differences	  among	  conditions	  were	  measured.	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Figure 7. Central low beta frequency power over 20 epochs. Statistics over four time windows as indicated. Condition * Time interaction, 
F(9, 144) = 2.02, p < .05. Figure	  taken	  from	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014.	  	  III.1.4.2	  Results	  –	  Rating	  task	  	  Results	  of	  the	  rating	  task	  for	  question	  one	  (see	  Figure	  8A,	  page	  61)	  showed	  that	  participants	  felt	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  scene	  when	  the	  camera	  was	  approaching	  the	  agent	  in	  comparison	  to	  when	  the	  still	  camera	  was	  used.	  A	  One-­‐way	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  single	  factor	  of	  Condition	  (still,	  zoom,	  dolly,	  steadicam)	  showed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  (F(3,48)=13.54,	  p<0.001).	  Post-­‐hoc	  comparisons	  showed	  significant	  differences	  between	  still	  and	  all	  other	  conditions	  (p<0.001).	  	  	  Similarly,	   results	  of	   the	   rating	   task	   for	  question	   two	   (see	  Figure	   8B,	   page	  61)	   showed	   that	  participants	  felt	  more	  like	  the	  actor,	  that	  is,	  like	  being	  in	  the	  position	  of	  the	  actor	  in	  the	  scene	  when	   the	   camera	  was	  approaching	   the	  agent	   in	   comparison	   to	   the	   still	   camera.	  A	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  single	  factor	  of	  Condition	  (still,	  zoom,	  dolly,	  steadicam)	  showed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	   (F(3,48)=11.29,	  p	  <0.001).	  Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	  significant	  differences	  between	  still	  and	  all	  other	  conditions	  (p<0.001).	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Results	   of	   the	   rating	   task	   for	   question	   three	   (see	   Figure	   8C,	   next	   page)	   showed	   that	  participants	   felt	   the	   zoom	   as	   less	   effective	   in	  making	   them	   feel	   like	   they	   themselves	   were	  approaching	  the	  scene.	  A	   One-­‐way	   ANOVA	   with	   the	   single	   factor	   of	   Condition	   (zoom,	   dolly,	   steadicam)	   showed	   a	  significant	   main	   effect	   (F(2,32)=6.77,	   p<0.01).	   Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   significant	  differences	  between	  zoom	  and	  all	  other	  conditions	  (p<0.01).	  	  Results	   of	   the	   rating	   task	   for	   question	   four	   showed	   that	   participants	   did	   not	   feel	   any	  difference	  among	  conditions	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  way	   they	   felt	   at	   ease	  while	  watching	   the	  video	  clips.	   A	   One-­‐way	   ANOVA	  with	   the	   single	   factor	   of	   Condition	   (still,	   zoom,	   dolly,	   steadicam)	  showed	  no	  significant	  main	  effect	  (F(3,48)=0.59,	  p>0.6).	  	  	  Results	   of	   the	   rating	   task	   for	   question	   five	   (see	   Figure	   8D,	   next	   page)	   showed	   that	  participants	  found	  the	  camera	  movement	  more	  realistic	  when	  the	  steadicam	  was	  used.	  A	  One-­‐way	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  single	  factor	  of	  Condition	  (zoom,	  dolly,	  steadicam)	  showed	  a	  significant	  main	   effect	   (F(2,32)=6.91,	   p<0.01).	   Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   significant	   differences	  between	  steadicam	  and	  zoom	  (p<0.01)	  and	  between	  steadicam	  and	  dolly	  (p<0.05).	  	  The	   results	   for	   question	   six	   (see	   Figure	   8E)	   showed	   that	   participants	   found	   the	   camera	  movement	  more	  resembling	  a	  person’s	  movement	  approaching	  the	  scene	  when	  the	  steadicam	  was	   used.	   A	   One-­‐way	   ANOVA	  with	   the	   single	   factor	   of	   Condition	   (zoom,	   dolly,	   steadicam)	  showed	   a	   significant	   main	   effect	   (F(2,32)=16.14,	   p<0.001).	   Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	  significant	  differences	  between	  zoom	  and	  steadicam	  as	  well	  as	  between	  dolly	  and	  steadicam	  (p<0.001).	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Figure	  8.Results	  of	  the	  rating	  task	  including	  several	  questions	  assessing	  spectator’s	  subjective	  experiences	  with	  the	  movie	  clips.	  	  (A)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  involved	  in	  the	  scene?	  F(3,	  48)	  =	  13.544,	  p	  <0.001.	  (B)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  like	  the	  actor?	  F(3,	  48)	  =	  11.291,	  p	  <0.001.	  (C)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  as	  if	  you	  yourself	  would	  approach	  the	  scene?	  F(2,	  32)	  =	  6.7766,	  p	  <0.01.	  (D)	  How	  realistic	  did	  you	  find	  the	  camera	  movement?	  F(2,	  32)	  =	  6.9131,	  p<0.01.	  (E)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  the	  camera	  movement	  resembled	  a	  personʼs	  movement	  when	  approaching	  the	  scene?	  F(2,	  32)	  =	  16.138,	  p	  <0.001.	  Figure	  taken	  from	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014.	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III.1.5	  Summary	  and	  discussion	  of	  results	  	  Previous	   studies	   showed	   that	   during	   the	   execution	   and	   the	   observation	   of	   goal	   directed	  actions	   rolandic	  mu-­‐rhythm	   shows	   ERD	   in	   both	   of	   its	   supposed	   components:	   central	   alpha	  frequency	  range	  and	  central	  lower	  beta	  frequency	  range	  (Derambure	  et.	  al.,	  1993;	  Leocani	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Pfurtscheller	  &	  Lopez	  Da	  Silva,	  1999;	  Pfurtscheller	  &	  Aranibar,	  1979;	  Pfurtscheller	  &	  Berghold,	   1989;	   Stancak	   &	   Pfurtscheller,	   1996;	   Toro	   et	   al.,	   1994).	   In	   the	   present	   study	  we	  specifically	   investigated	   if	   this	   typical	  ERD/ERS	  pattern	   is	  modulated	  by	   the	  observation	  of	  video	   clips	   produced	   via	   four	   different	   uses	   of	   the	   camera.	   All	   videos	   showed	   an	   actor	  grasping	  an	  object	  from	  a	  table	  in	  front	  of	  him.	  In	  25%	  of	  the	  video	  clips,	  the	  camera	  recording	  the	  scene	  stayed	  fixed	  on	  a	  tripod	  260	  cm	  away	  from	  the	  object;	  in	  another	  25%	  of	  the	  video	  clips	  a	  zoom	  was	  applied	  slowly	  magnifying	  the	  scene	  until	  the	  size	  of	  the	  object	  correspond-­‐ded	  to	  the	  size	  it	  would	  have	  if	  the	  camera	  would	  have	  been	  placed	  in	  a	  distance	  of	  80	  cm	  from	  it;	   in	   the	   third	  25%	  of	   the	  video	  clips	  during	  recording	   the	  camera	  was	  moved	   towards	   the	  scene	   by	   means	   of	   an	   automatic	   transport	   on	   dolly	   tracks	   (preprogrammed,	   steady	   pace)	  stopping	  when	  the	  camera	  reached	  a	  distance	  of	  80	  cm	  from	  the	  object;	   in	  the	   last	  25%	  the	  camera	  was	   carried	   towards	   the	   scene	  until	   reaching	   the	   same	  distance	   of	   80	   cm	   from	   the	  object	   by	   means	   of	   a	   steadicam	   construction	   used	   by	   a	   professional	   camera	   man.	   This	  experimental	   setup	  was	  based	  on	   the	  before	  portrayed	  hypothesis,	   that	  camera	  movements	  play	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  the	  spectators’	   immersion	  in	  movies	  (see	  Chapter	  II.3).	  Precisely,	  descriptions	  of	  such	  camera	  movements	  underline	  that	  especially	  camera	  movements	  able	  to	  closely	  simulate	  vision	  in	  real	  life	  can	  activate	  the	  spectator’s	  whole	  body,	  by	  this	  enabling	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  moving	  images	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  vision	  of	  an	  intended	  consciousness	  exploring	  world.	   The	   statements	   of	   several	   scholars	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	   embodied	   cognition	   and	  especially	   action-­‐perception	   links	   in	   art	   perception	   (see	   for	   example	   Gallese	   &	   Freedberg,	  2007;	  Fingerhut,	  2012;	  Gallese	  &	  Guerra,	  2014)	  have	  furthermore	  suggested	  that	  this	  process	  could	  be	  crucially	  supported	  by	  the	  mirror	  mechanism,	  proposed	  to	  play	  a	  major	  role	  not	  only	  in	  action	  understanding	  (see	  Gallese	  &	  Sinigaglia	  2010,	  2011)	  or	  action	  preparation	  in	  real	  life	  (for	  a	  critiques	  of	  the	  simulation	  theory	  of	  Gallese	  &	  Sinigaglia	  see	  Gallagher,	  2001,	  2007)	  but	  also	   in	   the	   immediate	   feeling	  of	  presence	  of	   things	  and	  beings	  seen,	   if	  depicted	  or	   real	   (see	  Fingerhut,	  2014).	  This	  led	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  moving	  images	  closer	  resembling	  the	  vision	  we	   entertain	   in	   real	   life	   would	   be	   correlated	   with	   a	   stronger	   ERD	   of	   the	   mu-­‐rhythm,	   a	  commonly	  used	  marker	  of	  the	  mirror	  mechanism	  in	  humans.	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Analysis	  of	  the	  present	  EEG	  data	  showed	  the	  following:	  	  1)	  As	  shown	  in	  Figures	  4	  and	  5,	  execution	  and	  observation	  of	  goal-­‐directed	  hand	  movements	  produced	  significant	  ERD	  in	  both	  hemispheres	  for	  selected	  central	  alpha	  frequency	  ranges	  (8-­‐14	  Hz)	  as	  well	  as	  central	  lower	  beta	  frequency	  ranges	  (14-­‐20	  Hz)	  when	  comparing	  the	  mean	  value	   of	   frequency	   power	   of	   the	   whole	   time	   of	   action	   observation.	   No	   significant	   ERD	   for	  middle	  and	  high	  beta	  ranges	  (24-­‐30	  Hz)	  was	  detected.	  Furthermore,	  central	  alpha	  ERD	  was	  strongest	   during	   the	   participants’	   own	   hand	   action	   execution,	   while	   for	   lower	   beta	   action	  execution	   did	   not	   evoke	   stronger	   ERD	   than	   during	   action	   observation.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  steadicam	  condition	  evoked	  significantly	  stronger	  lower	  beta	  ERD	  than	  action	  execution.	  	  These	   findings	   in	  general	  corroborate	  previous	  research	  describing	  central	  alpha	  and	   lower	  beta	  ERD	  during	  the	  execution	  as	  well	  as	  the	  observation	  of	  goal-­‐directed	  hand	  actions.	  	  2)	  Remarkably,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figures	  6	  and	  7,	  in	  both	  frequency	  ranges	  that	  had	  been	  described	  to	   show	   ERD	   during	   execution	   and	   observation	   of	   goal-­‐directed	   actions,	   two	   common	  characteristics	   of	   the	   EEG	   time-­‐course	   were	   observed.	   First,	   during	   the	   time	   of	   video	  observation	  (time	  windows	  1	  and	  2),	  descriptive	  analysis	  showed	  the	  strongest	  ERD	  for	  the	  steadicam,	   followed	  by	   the	  dolly,	   then	   the	  zoom,	   then	   the	  still	   condition.	  Statistically,	   in	   the	  alpha	   frequency	  range,	   significant	  differences	  were	   found	  between	  still	  versus	  steadicam	  as	  well	  as	  between	  zoom	  versus	  steadicam,	  and	  still	  versus	  dolly	   from	  1000	  ms	  after	  stimulus	  onset	  until	  stimulus	  offset.	  In	  lower	  beta	  frequency	  range,	  significant	  differences	  to	  steadicam	  included	   still	   versus	   steadicam,	   zoom	   versus	   steadicam	   as	   well	   as	   dolly	   versus	   steadicam.	  These	   differences	   reached	   significance	   from	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   stimulus	   presentation.	  Furthermore,	   in	  the	  second	  time	  window,	  also	  in	  the	  beta	  range	  the	  difference	  between	  still	  and	  dolly	  became	  significant.	  	  Second,	  during	   the	   rebound	  phase	   (third	   time	  window),	   in	  both	   ranges	  descriptive	  analysis	  showed	  the	  steadicam	  condition	  having	  the	  lowest	  power,	  but	  now	  first	  followed	  by	  still,	  then	  dolly,	  and	  lastly	  zoom	  condition.	  In	  the	  alpha	  range	  significant	  differences	  occurred	  between	  zoom	   and	   still	   and	   between	   zoom	   and	   steadicam,	  while	   in	   the	   lower	   beta	   frequency	   range	  differences	  between	  zoom	  steadicam	  and	  dolly	  and	  steadicam	  were	  significant.	  Taken	   together,	   these	   results	   indicate	   that	   reducing	   the	   distance	   between	   observer	   and	  observed	  agent,	  realized	  by	  moving	  the	  camera	  towards	  the	  scene,	  evokes	  stronger	  ERD	  of	  the	  mu-­‐rhythm	  during	   the	   observation	   of	   goal-­‐directed	   hand	   actions.	   This	   difference	  was	  most	  pronounced	  when	   the	  camera	  movement	  was	  realized	  by	  using	   the	  steadicam	  (significantly	  different	   from	   the	  zoom	  and	   the	  still	   in	   the	   second	  and	   third	  window	   in	  alpha	  and	   from	  all	  other	  conditions	  in	  the	  first	  three	  windows	  in	  beta,	  except	  for	  the	  difference	  from	  the	  still	  in	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time	  window	  three.	  Results	  of	  occipital	  control	  recordings	  did	  not	  support	  the	  interpretation	  that	  this	  difference	  might	  be	  due	  to	  increased	  overall	  attention	  evoked	  by	  the	  observation	  of	  these	  specific	  filmed	  actions.	  	  Results	  of	  our	  Rating	  task,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  8,	  furthermore	  showed	  that	  participants	  clearly	  rated	  those	  movies	  in	  which	  the	  camera	  approached	  the	  scene	  as	  more	  involving	  than	  those	  filmed	   by	   a	   still	   camera.	   Furthermore,	   they	   perceived	   the	   movements	   of	   the	   steadicam	   as	  being	  the	  most	  natural	  and	  most	  resembling	  the	  movements	  of	  an	  approaching	  observer,	  thus	  eliciting	  the	  feeling	  that	  the	  observer	  him/herself	  would	  walk	  towards	  the	  scene.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  always	  possible	   to	  distinguish	  between	  steadicam	  and	  dolly	  cam	  regarding	   the	   last	  question.	  	  These	   results	   indicate	   that	   approaching	   the	   scene	   by	   means	   of	   a	   camera	   enhances	   the	  observers’	  mirror	  mechanism	  when	  watching	  the	  video	  clip	  (showing	  a	  goal	  related	  action).	  However,	  this	  effect	  only	  appears	  if	  the	  perceptual	  experience	  induced	  by	  the	  different	  video	  clips	  and	  the	  visual	  experience	  we	  normally	  employ	  while	  moving	  ourselves	  actually	  resemble	  each	   other.	   Such	   similarity	   seems	   to	   depend	   on	   the	   filming	   technique	   and	   appears	   to	   be	  strongest	  when	  video	  clips	  are	  filmed	  with	  the	  steadicam.	  	  Furthermore	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  observation	  of	  images	  produced	  by	  other	  camera	  movements	  and	   uses,	   such	   as	   the	   dolly	   cam	   and	   the	   zoom,	   correlate	  with	   a	   faster	   rebound	   of	   the	  mu-­‐rhythm.	  Indeed,	  in	  this	  phase	  (third	  time	  window)	  the	  differences	  between	  still	  and	  steadicam	  are	  no	  longer	  significant	  in	  either	  band	  range,	  while	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  between	  still	   versus	   zoom	   as	   well	   as	   between	   steadicam	   versus	   zoom	   and	   steadicam	   versus	   dolly.	  Interestingly,	   Koelewijn	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   reported	   that	   beta	   oscillations	   were	   modulated	   in	   a	  similar	   way	   by	   the	   correct/incorrect	   nature	   of	   the	   observed	   action.	   In	   their	   study,	   they	  recorded	  EEG	  during	  an	  execution/observation	  task.	  In	  the	  execution	  task	  participants	  were	  asked	   to	   execute	   button	   responses	   according	   to	   instructional	   cues.	   In	   the	   observation	   task	  they	   saw	   other	   persons	   performing	   the	   same	   task,	   giving	   correct	   or	   incorrect	   responses.	  Results	   showed	   that	   beta	   oscillations	   during	   action	   observation	   were	   more	   strongly	  modulated	   if	   the	   action	   observed	  was	   “incorrect”	   according	   to	   the	   given	   cue.	   This	   stronger	  modulation	   was	   especially	   visible	   in	   the	   rebound	   phase,	   with	   beta	   showing	   a	   significantly	  stronger	   rebound	  when	   the	  answer	  was	   incorrect.	  We	  suggest	   that	   the	   results	  of	  our	   study	  might	   be	   interpreted	   as	   showing	   a	   similar	   effect	   -­‐	   though	  not	   so	  much	  based	   on	   a	   training	  performed	  directly	  beforehand,	  but	  rather	  on	  participants’	  previous	  perceptual	  experience	  of	  the	  real	  world.	  That	   is	  we	  propose	   to	  consider	   the	  zoom	  and	  dolly	  conditions	  as	  presenting	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the	  observer	  with	  an	  “incorrect”	  representation	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  camera	  does	  not	   resemble	   the	  movement	   of	   an	   actual	   person.	   Hence,	   the	   still	   and	   steadicam	   conditions	  would	  correspond	  to	  natural,	  thus	  “correct”,	  visual	  experiences.	  	  In	   conclusion,	   we	   propose	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   familiarity	   effect	   regarding	   visual	   traces	   of	  camera	   movements	   in	   filmed	   stimuli.	   This	   effect	   can	   modulate	   the	   mirror	   mechanism	  activation	  during	  observation	  of	  goal-­‐related	  hand	  actions.	  That	  is,	  among	  videos	  dynamically	  reducing	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  observer	  and	  the	  observed	  agent,	  only	  videos	  simulating	  the	   “natural”	   vision	   of	   a	   human	   observer	   approaching	   an	   agent	   can	   elicit	   a	   significantly	  stronger	   ERD	   in	   comparison	   to	   videos	   showing	   the	   same	   scene	   from	   a	   fixed	   distance.	  Furthermore,	   the	   artificiality	   of	   other	   ways	   of	   simulating	   the	   dynamic	   distance	   reduction	  (such	  as	  zoom	  or	  dolly)	  might	  be	  reflected	   in	  differences	   in	   the	   time	  course	  of	   the	  rebound	  phase.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  time-­‐course	  of	  mu-­‐rhythm	  ERD/ERS/rebound	  is	  modulated	  by	  the	  resemblance	  between	  the	  effect	  of	  camera	  movements	  and	  ordinary	  human	  vision.	  Familiarity	  with	  the	  visual	  experience	  provided	  by	  the	  video	  predicts	  mu	  ERD/ERS/rebound	  time-­‐course.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  several	  questions	  remain	  open.	  	  1)	  The	  results	  indeed	  cannot	  sufficiently	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  stronger	  activation	  of	  the	  mirror	  mechanism	  supports	  the	  spectator’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  fictional	  world.	  Though	  the	  rating	  task	  showed	  that	  video-­‐clips	  produced	  by	  the	  steadicam	  were	  subjectively	  judged	  by	  participants	  as	  more	  giving	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  in	  place	  of	  a	  person	  approaching	  the	  scene	  (that	   is	   quasi	   embodying	   the	   camera),	   involvement	   ratings	   in	   general	   did	   not	   differ	   among	  zoom,	  dolly	  and	  steadicam	  condition.	  Admittedly,	  subjective	  involvement	  in	  a	  scene	  is	  hard	  to	  assess.	  In	  fact,	  a	  conscious	  rating	  of	  of	  the	  involving	  nature	  of	  videos	  seen	  dozens	  of	  times	  in	  the	  last	  hour	  might	  not	  be	  the	  optimal	  method	  to	  do	  so.	  Clearly,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  rating	  task	  might	  be	  influenced	  by	  these	  circumstances	  and	  future	  research	  should	  try	  to	  find	  better	  ways	  to	  measure	  this	  factor.	  2)	   Moreover,	   participants’	   persistent	   judgment	   of	   feeling	   more	   in	   the	   place	   of	   a	   person	  approaching	   the	  scene	  when	  the	  rated	  video	  was	  produced	  by	  means	  of	  a	  steadicam,	  raises	  another	  question,	  formulated	  in	  the	  following.	  As	  already	  reported	   in	  Chapter	   II.2	  of	   this	   thesis,	  motor	  cortex	  activations	  attributed	   to	   the	  mirror	   mechanism	   have	   not	   only	   been	   found	   during	   the	   observation	   of	   actions,	   but	   also	  during	  the	  observation	  of	  traces	  of	  actions	  such	  as	  writing,	  brush	  painting	  etc.	  (see	  Sbriscia-­‐Fioretti	   et	   al.,	   (2013);	   Heimann	   et	   al.	   (2013);	   Umiltà	   et	   al.	   (2012);	   Longcamp	   et	   al.	   (2006,	  2008)).	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This	  proposes	  two	  possible	  causes	  for	  the	  stronger	  ERD	  we	  found	  for	  video-­‐clips	  produced	  by	  a	   steadicam.	   Firstly	   it	  might	   be,	   that	   the	   usual	   activation	   of	   the	  motor	   cortex	  during	   action	  observation	  resembling	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  motorcortex	  during	  our	  own	  grasping	  movement	  of	   the	   right	   hand	   is	   simply	   enhanced	   by	   a	   more	   “realistic”	   representation,	   that	   is	   a	  representation	  that	  by	  including	  more	  depth	  cues	  etc.	  closer	  resembles	  the	  vision	  we	  are	  used	  to	   from	   real	   life.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	  we	  might	   also	   hypothesize	   that	   the	   camera	  movement	  itself,	  as	  a	  trace	  of	  a	  walking	  movement,	  could	  elicit	  an	  additional	  motor	  cortex	  activation	  not	  similar	  to	  motor	  cortex	  activations	  during	  our	  own	  grasping	  actions	  with	  the	  right	  hand,	  but	  rather	   resembling	   such	   activations	   during	   actions	   involving	   muscles	   involved	   in	   walking.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  descriptions	  from	  film	  theory	  talking	  about	  an	  “embodiment”	  of	  the	  camera	  in	  the	  specific	  sense	  of	  the	  camera	  taking	  over	  the	  place	  of	  an	  actual	  person	  in	  the	  fictional	  world,	  “through	  whose	  eyes”	  the	  scene	  is	  seen	  and	  lived	  (see	  for	  example	  Nielson,	  p.	  242	   and	   following).	   Future	   studies	   need	   to	   clarify	   this	   issue	   by	   investigating	   if	   camera	  movements	  produced	  by	  a	  steadicam	  filming	  an	  empty	  room	  (without	  performing	  actor)	  can	  equally	   elicit	   motor	   cortex	   activations	   of	   the	   reported	   nature.	   It	   might	   also	   be	   possible	   to	  further	  distinguish	  the	  activations	  found	  by	  individually	  separating	  the	  intrinsic	  mu-­‐rhythms	  for	  foot	  and	  hand	  areas,	  then	  comparing	  the	  results	  of	  respective	  analysis	  (see	  Pfurtscheller,	  Neuper,	   Andrew,	  &	   Edlinger,	   1997).	   Importantly,	   if	   such	   studies	  would	   show	   the	   predicted	  activations	   this	   would	   mean	   the	   discovery	   of	   a	   third	   kind	   of	   cases	   involving	   the	   mirror	  mechanism.	   Not	   only	   the	   perception	   of	   an	   action	   performed	   by	   another	   agent,	   or	   the	  perception	  of	  a	  trace	  of	  an	  action,	  in	  the	  past	  performed	  by	  an	  agent,	  but	  even	  the	  perception	  of	  perceptual	  movements	  of	  another	  agent	  could	  then	  be	  declared	  to	  involve	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  motor	  cortex.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  these	  issues	  in	  Chapter	  IV	  of	  this	  thesis,	  when	  combining	  the	  results	  of	  both	  presented	  studies.	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III.2	  A	  Cut	   in	   the	  Mirror?!	   –	   A	   high	   density	   EEG	   study	   investigating	   the	   neural	   correlates	   of	  different	  montage	  techniques	  in	  film	  	  This	  chapter	  and	  the	  study	  presented	  in	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  second	  type	  of	  movement	  defining	  motion	   pictures,	   according	   to	   Vivian	   Sobchack:	   “the	   movement	   between	   projected	   images	  called	   editing”	   (Sobchack,	   1982).	   Specifically,	   our	   experiment	   investigated	   spectators’	   brain	  activity	   during	   the	   observation	   of	   short	  movie	   clips	   produced	   via	   the	   editing	   of	   two	   shots	  showing	  a	  continuous	  scene	  but	  being	   filmed	   from	  different	  angles.	  Half	  of	   these	  clips	  were	  edited	  according	  to	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  continuity	  editing,	  while	  the	  edits	  in	  the	   other	   half	   violated	   this	   system	   by	   not	   complying	   to	   the	   180°	   rule,	   one	   of	   the	   most	  important	  guidelines	  of	  continuity	  editing.	  	  Again,	  before	  reporting	  about	  experimental	  setup	  and	  results,	  the	  following	  section	  will	  clarify	  the	   precise	   idea	   behind	   the	   investigation	   by	   framing	   how	   editing	   can	   be	   and	   has	   been	  considered	   as	   a	   fundamental	   means	   of	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   fictional	   world	   via	   activating	   and	  extending	  the	  spectator’s	  body.	  	  III.2.1	  Introduction:	  editing,	  continuity	  editing	  and	  its	  grounding	  in	  embodied	  perception	  	  As	   Bordwell	   &	   Thompson	   argue	   in	   their	   introduction	   to	   film	   art,	   film	   editing	   is	   the	  “coordination	   of	   one	   shot	   with	   the	   next”	   (Bordwell	   &	   Thompson,	   2004).	   The	   term	   “shot”	  refers	  to	  a	  single,	  continuous	  piece	  of	  recording	  produced	  with	  a	  moving-­‐picture	  camera.	  An	  ordinary	  Hollywood	  film	  typically	  is	  made	  of	  around	  one	  thousand	  shots,	  action	  movies	  might	  even	  contain	  more	  than	  two	  thousand	  shots.	  Taking	  the	  average	  length	  of	  a	  Hollywood	  movie	  to	   be	   approximately	   ninety	  minutes,	   this	  makes	   an	   average	   shot	   length	   of	   2.7-­‐5.4	   seconds	  (Bordwell	  &	  Thompson,	  2004).	  According	  to	  Hochberg	  &	  Brooks,	  here	  lies	  one	  of	  the	  features	  most	   obviously	  distinguishing	   film	   from	  experiences	   in	   the	   real.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   it	   is	   also	  here	  that	  we	  find	  one	  of	  the	  most	  crucial	  capacities	  of	  film:	  to	  be	  able	  to	  represent	  scenes	  and	  events	  in	  a	  piecemeal	  fashion,	  that	  is	  juxtaposing	  scenes	  not	  spatially	  or	  temporally	  connected	  thus	   acting	   highly	   associative	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   avoiding	   any	   redundant	   sequences	  (Hochberg	   &	   Brooks,	   1978).	   As	   it	   will	   be	   further	   illustrated,	   the	   success	   of	   these	   repre-­‐sentations	   is	   not	   taken	   to	   be	   granted	   of	   course	   but	   rather	   highly	   depending	   on	   skill	   and	  experience	  in	  handling	  film’s	  raw	  material.	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Usually,	  it	  is	  the	  director	  guided	  by	  his	  narrative	  intentions	  who	  decides	  at	  what	  point	  in	  time	  a	  running	  shot	  has	  to	  be	  “cut”	  to	  best	  fulfill	  its	  purpose	  and	  which	  other	  shot	  should	  be	  edited	  to	   make	   the	   story	   proceed.	   In	   former	   times	   this	   indeed	   entailed	   cutting	   the	   celluloid	   film	  between	   two	   frames	   and	   glueing	   the	   end	   of	   the	   current	   shot	   to	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   next	  selected	  shot.	  But	  even	  when	  using	  modern	  digital	   techniques,	   the	  result	  of	  the	  editing	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  movie	  is	  still	  the	  same:	  the	  old	  shot	  suddenly	  ends	  and	  the	  new	  one	  begins.	   It	  seems	  a	  curious	   fact,	   that	   this	  “sensorially	  brutal	  act	  of	  replacing	  the	  entire	  visual	  scene”,	   as	   Tim	   Smith	   in	   his	   elaborate	   thesis	   about	   continuity	   editing	   puts	   it	   (Smith,	   2005,	  p.22),	  does	  not	  create	  conscious	  experiences	  significantly	  imbuing	  the	  spectator’s	  experience	  of	  the	  movie	  as	  a	  whole.	  Indeed,	  empirical	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  viewers	  in	  fact	  find	  it	  hard	  to	   recall	   specific	   details	   of	   the	   editing	   after	   a	  movie	   presentation.	   Instead,	   they	   apparently	  recall	  the	  film’s	  events	  as	  one	  continuous	  sequence	  (Messaris,	  1994).	  	  It	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  suggested,	  that	  this	  “invisibility	  of	  cuts”	  (see	  Reisz	  &	  Millar,	  1953)	  must	  be	   attributed	   to	   the	   prominent	   use	   of	   continuity	   editing.	   It	   is	   commonly	   agreed	   upon	   that	  continuity	  editing,	  synonymous	  with	  the	  Hollywood	  Style	  of	  filmmaking	  emerging	  during	  the	  earliest	   days	   of	   cinema	   and	   conventionalized	   in	   the	   grand	   years	   of	   film	   between	   1930	   and	  1940,	   is	  the	  most	  dominant	  style	  of	  editing	  today	  (Smith,	  2005,	  p.22).	  The	  basic	  principle	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  editing	  lies	  in	  the	  compliance	  to	  a	  set	  of	  rules,	  or,	  as	  Smith	  pronounces,	  “abstract	  heuristics”	  or	  “rules	  of	  thumb”,	  describing	  how	  a	  scene	  should	  be	  staged,	  filmed	  and	  edited	  so	  that	   the	   viewer	   can	   comprehend	   the	   event	   flow	  with	  minimum	   effort”	   (Smith,	   2005,	   p.22).	  Regarding	  montage,	  this	  “minimal	  effort”	  has	  been	  declared	  to	  correspond	  with	  the	  avoidance	  of	   any	   major	   discontinuities	   regarding	   space,	   time	   and	   causation	   between	   the	   two	   edited	  shots	   (thus	   the	   name	   continuity	   editing,	   see	   also	   Magliano	   &	   Zacks,	   2011).	   The	   further	  explanations	  will	  illustrate	  this.	  The	   continuity	   style	   of	   filmmaking	   is	   based	   on	   a	   system	   of	   guidelines	   regarding	   camera	  placement	   and	   editing	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   180°	   System.	   According	   to	   the	   180°	  System,	   the	   initial	   shot	   of	   a	   scene	   (establishing	   shot)	   crucially	   orientates	   the	   spectator	   by	  drawing	  an	   imaginary	   line,	  called	  the	  “axis-­‐of-­‐action”,	  which	  divides	  the	  action	  space	   in	  two	  halves:	  the	  one	  the	  camera	  is	  located	  in	  (as	  being	  placed	  within	  a	  circle	  orthogonally	  focusing	  on	  the	  (180°)	  division	  line,	  with	  the	  action	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  centre)	  and	  the	  one	  being	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  that	  line	  (see	  Figure	  9,	  next	  page).	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  As	   a	   first	   rule	   deriving	   from	   this	   “staging”	   (commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   180°	   rule),	   the	  position	  of	  the	  camera	  can	  be	  varied	  between	  two	  shots	  only	  as	  long	  as	  this	  line	  is	  not	  crossed.	  Interesting	   is	   the	   explanation	   given	   for	   this	   rule:	   Despite	   the	   actual	   displacement,	   so	   the	  statement	  goes,	   the	  experience	  of	   this	  kind	  of	  “continuity	  edits”	  does	  not	  cause	  a	  disturbing	  violation,	  precisely,	  as	  it	  stays	  “close	  to	  what	  we	  know	  from	  real	  world	  perception”	  (Magliano	  &	   Zacks,	   2011,	   p.2).	   Indeed,	   bodily	   movements	   in	   combination	   with	   blinks	   and	   saccades	  causing	  short	  interruptions	  of	  the	  processing	  of	  currently	  given	  visual	  information,	  can	  lead	  to	  experiences	   possibly	   comparable	   with	   what	   happens	   to	   us	   during	   a	   cut	   (see	   also	   Murch,	  2001).	  A	  breaking	  of	   the	  180°	   rule,	  on	   the	  other	  hand	  –	   in	   its	   result	   called	   “reverse	   shot”	  –	  supposedly	   crucially	   violates	   our	   perceptual	   habits	   acquired	   in	   a	   spatially,	   temporally	   and	  causally	   stable	   world.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   that	   fact	   that,	   if	   a	   spectator	   would	   like	   to	   change	   his	  perspective	  on	  a	  scene	  for	  180°	  in	  real	  life,	  he	  would	  have	  to	  get	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  setup.	  Such	  a	  bodily	  displacement	   is	  possible	  of	  course,	  but	   in	   the	  real	  world	  depending	  on	  bodily	  movements	  (such	  as	  walking	  or	  running)	  that	  need	  time.	  Furthermore,	  on	  the	  way	  to	  the	  new	  standpoint,	   the	   spectator	   would	   most	   probably	   not	   close	   his	   eyes,	   so	   that	   the	   bodily	  movement	   would	   be	   reflected	   in	   continuous	   perception.	   Even	   if	   taking	   into	   account	   short	  interruptions	  elicited	  by	  blinks	  or	  fast	  eye-­‐movement,	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely,	  that	  our	  perception	  in	  real	  life	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  experience	  even	  close	  to	  a	  reverse	  shot	  in	  film.	  To	  be	  precise,	  such	   edits	   (that	   is	   reverse	   shots)	   violate	   spatial	   continuity	   as,	   without	   a	   trace	   of	   bodily	  displacement	   of	   the	   camera,	   suddenly	   left	   becomes	   right	   and	   vice	   versa.	   They	   also	   violate	  action	   continuity	   (related	   to	   causation)	   as	   due	   to	   the	   spatial	   violation	  described	  before	   the	  motion	  flow	  across	  shots	  is	  disturbed	  and	  we	  cannot	  be	  sure	  if	  the	  shot	  before,	  with	  regard	  to	  
Figure	   9:	   An	   Illustration	   of	   camera	   displace-­‐ments	  between	  shots	  complying	   to	  or	  violating	  the	   180°	   rule.	   Taken	   from	   Wikipedia:	   180-­‐degree	  rule.	  (2014,	  December	  31).	  In	  Wikipedia,	  
The	  Free	  Encyclopedia.	  Retrieved	  15:40,	  January	  15,	  2015	  from	  http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=180-­‐degree_rule&oldid=640401700.	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its	   content,	   links	   directly	   to	   the	   shot	   after.	   Lastly,	   they	   possibly	   also	   violate	   temporal	  continuity	   as	   the	   spatial	   jump	   needed	   to	   explain	   the	   new	   perspective	   in	   our	   bodily	   habits,	  possibly	   links	   to	  a	  bodily	  movement	  needing	   time.	   It	   thus	   represents	  a	   jump	   in	   time.	  While	  continuity	   edits	  might	  not	   even	  be	  noticed,	   so	   the	   theory	  of	   continuity	   editing	   states,	   these	  kinds	  of	  cuts	  are	  not	  easily	  overseen,	  unless	  embedded	   in	  other	  editing	  techniques	  (such	  as	  cross-­‐cutting	   etc.,	   see	   for	   example	   Bordwell,	   1985).	   Indeed,	   it	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   by	   a	  number	  of	  studies	  that	  the	  different	  editing	  techniques	  are	  correlated	  to	  different	  experiences	  and	   cognitive	  behaviors	   in	   a	  number	  of	   different	   tasks.	  Already	   in	  1990,	   it	  was	   shown	   that	  participants	  that	  are	  asked	  to	  press	  a	  button	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  see	  a	  cut	  respond	  significantly	  faster	   to	   discontinuity	   edits	   than	   continuity	   edits	   (D’Ydewalle	   &	   Vanderbeeken,	   1990;	  Schröder,	  1990).	   In	  2009,	  Zacks	  et	   al.	   even	   reported,	   that	   continuity	  edits,	  much	  more	   then	  discontinuity	  edits,	  were	  sometimes	  missed	  by	  spectators	  performing	  the	  same	  task.	  Both	  of	  these	   studies	   supported	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   continuity	   rules	   produce	   “invisible	   cuts”.	  Furthermore	   however,	   it	   was	   also	   shown	   that	   200-­‐400	   ms	   after	   discontinuity	   cuts,	  participants	  showed	  significantly	  more	  saccadic	  eye-­‐movements,	  possibly	  indicating	  the	  need	  to	   extract	   visual	   information	   (d’Ydewalle,	   Desmet,	   &	   Van	   Rensbergen,	   1998;	   Hochberg	   &	  Brooks,	   1978;	   May,	   Dean,	   &	   Barnard,	   2003).	   This	   period	   was	   shown	   to	   be	   preceded	   by	   a	  period	   of	   about	   150ms	   in	   which	   no	   new	   visual	   information	   is	   processed	   to	   the	   level	   of	  awareness,	  possibly	  indicating	  cognitive	  overload	  (Geiger	  &	  Reeves,	  1993).	  As	  related	  to	  this,	  because	  of	  indicating	  an	  attentional	  drain	  caused	  by	  discontinuity	  edits,	  has	  been	  interpreted	  the	   finding	   that	   participants	   that	   needed	   to	   perform	   a	   secondary	   task	   whilst	   watching	   a	  movie,	   showed	   prolonged	   response	   times	   to	   the	   secondary	   task	   after	   discontinuity	   edits	  (Geiger	  &	  Reeves,	  1993;	  Lang,	  Geiger,	  Struckwerda,	  &	  Sumner,	  1993).	  Also,	  participants	   in	  a	  memory	   task	   about	   watched	   movies	   showed	   better	   and	   faster	   recognition	   memory	   for	  information	   originally	   presented	   after	   a	   discontinuity	   edit	   (Lang,	   1991;	   Frith	   &	   Robson,	  1975).	  However,	   interestingly,	   recalls	   of	   entire	   film	   sequences	   have	   shown	   to	   suffer	   rather	  than	  profit	  from	  frequent	  discontinuity	  edits	  (Frith	  &	  Robson,	  1975;	  Kraft,	  1987).	  	  Taken	  together	  these	  findings	  clearly	  indicate	  that	  continuity	  edits	  and	  discontinuity	  edits	  are	  not	   only	   experienced	   differently,	   but	   they	   correlate	   with	   different	   further	   processing	   with	  crucial	   impact	   on	   most	   important	   cognitive	   functions,	   such	   as	   attention	   and	   memory.	  	  Regarding	  the	  effect	  of	  montage	  on	  film	  experience,	  the	  reported	  results	  furthermore	  suggest	  that	   discontinuity	   edits	   might	   have	   the	   power	   to	   interrupt	   the	   filmic	   illusion	   by	   explicitly	  marking	   a	   violation	   of	   visual	   habits	   as	   they	   are	   known	   from	   real	  world	   perception.	   At	   the	  same	   time	   it	   seems	   possible	   that	   continuity	   edits	   can	   counterbalance	   this	   effect,	   while	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creating	  an	  experience	  similar	  enough	  to	  vision	   in	  normal	   life	   to	  activate	  our	  body	  in	  a	  way	  also	  overcomes	  certain	  violations.	  As	  Smith	  puts	  it:	  “Film	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  deviant	  form	  of	  visual	  experience.	  Its	  level	  of	  deviancy	  is	  controlled	  by	  continuity	  editing”	  (Smith,	  2005,	  p.18)	  	  	  III.2.2.	  Experimental	  idea	  and	  hypothesis	  	  It	  is	  the	  suggestion	  of	  this	  thesis,	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  movies	  can	  involve	  us	  they	  way	  they	  do	  by	  using	  images	  close	  to	  our	  experience	  to	  activate	  our	  normal	  skills	  of	  embodied	  perception,	  can	  be	  tested	  by	  neuroscientific	  experiments	  deriving	  their	  three	  hypotheses	  from	  the	  framework	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  II	  of	  this	  thesis	  (see	  especially	  Chapter	  II.4).	  These	  hypotheses	  also	  relate	  to	   the	   application	   of	   montages	   creating	   experiences	   more	   or	   less	   closely	   resembling	  perception	  in	  real	  life.	  Specifically,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  suggest,	  that,	  firstly,	  comparing	  the	  onset	  of	  visual	  stimuli	  per	  se	  with	  continuity	  edits	  and	  discontinuity	  edits	  (violating	  the	  180°	  rule),	  early	  brain	  activity	  signifying	  stimulus	  detection	  should	  significantly	  differ	  between	  the	  first	  stimulus	   type	   and	   the	   latter	   two.	  While	   the	   onset	   of	   a	   visual	   stimulus	   should	   be	   precisely	  correlated	  with	  the	  detection	  of	  a	  clearly	  and	  unambiguously	  new	  stimulus,	  cuts	  should	  rather	  be	  registered	  as	  violations	  of	  the	  action	  continuously	  perceived	  across	  the	  cut.	  Furthermore,	  secondly,	   there	   should	   be	   differences	   detectable	   regarding	   the	   further	   processing	   between	  continuity	  edits	  (fulfilling	  basic	  habits	  of	  visual	  perception	  in	  real	  life)	  and	  discontinuity	  edits	  (violating	  these	  habits),	  reflecting	  their	  difference	  in	  resembling	  real	  world	  perception	  as	  well	  as	   regarding	   spectators’	   experiences.	   Lastly,	   especially	   montages	   creating	   moving	   images	  supposedly	  closely	  resembling	  vision	  in	  real	  life,	  can	  be	  predicted	  to	  stronger	  activate	  action	  perception	  links	  (in	  real	  life	  proposed	  to	  serve	  action	  understanding,	  action	  preparation	  and	  the	  feeling	  of	  presence	  of	  the	  surrounding	  world).	  	  These	  hypotheses	  were	  approached	  via	  two	  different	  analyses	  of	  EEG	  data	  and	  one	  behavioral	  task	   comparing	   three	   different	   stimuli	   involving	   a	   visual	   change:	   the	   plain	   onset	   of	   a	   new	  visual	  stimulus,	  a	  continuity	  edit	  and	  a	  discontinuity	  edit.	  Firstly,	  we	  performed	  an	  Event	  Related	  Potential	   (ERP)	   analysis	   looking	   for	   components	   in	  the	   event	   related	   time-­‐course	   of	   the	   brain	   activity,	   in	   their	   modulation	   possibly	   reflecting	  differences	  between	  conditions	  in	  early	  and	  later	  stimulus	  processing	  phases.	  ERP	  analysis	  is	  a	  well	  established	  method	  in	  cognitive	  research,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  catalogue	  of	  temporally	  and	  spatially	  described	  components	  reliably	  associated	  with	  specific	  cognitive	  functions.	   Continuity	   editing	   has	   been	   specifically	   hypothesised	   to	   depend	   on	   the	   substan-­‐
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tiation	  of	  spectators’	  habitual	  expectation	  regarding	  spatial,	  temporal	  and	  causal	  constancy	  of	  the	  world	  or	  the	  perceived	  action	  (see	  Chapter	  III.2.1).	  In	  fact,	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  in	  EEG	  research	  has	   looked	   at	   violations	   of	   expectations,	   especially	   distinguishing	   semantic	   and	   syntactic	  violations	   in	   language	   (sentence)	   and	   music	   perception	   (see	   Hahne	   and	   Friederici	   1999;	  Friederici,	  Pfeifer,	  &	  Hahne,	  1993;	  Friederici	  2002,	  Grodzinsky	  and	  Santi,	  2008;	  Steinhauer	  &	  Drury,	  2012;	  Koelsch,	  2011).	  Most	  recently,	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  field	  have	  been	  picked	  up	  and	  further	   explored	   by	   research	   looking	   at	   action	   perception.	   Most	   interestingly,	   Maffongelli,	  Bartoli,	  Sammler,	  Koelsch,	  […],	  &	  D’Ausilio	  (submitted)	  found	  similar	  components	  indicating	  semantic	  and	  syntactic	  violations	  also	  for	  the	  visual	  perception	  of	  action	  sequences	  (including	  either	   unexpected	   content	   or	   a	   scrambling	   of	   temporal	   order).	   Precisely,	   Maffongelli	   et	   al.	  (submitted)	   found	   that	   semantic	   violations	   in	   action	   observation	   (regarding	   sequences	   of	  static	   images	  of	   an	  ongoing	  action	   including	  an	  unexpected	  element,	   such	  as	  brushing	  your	  hair	  with	  a	  toothbrush)	  elicited	  a	  frontally	  distributed	  EEG	  negative	  deflection	  around	  400	  ms	  after	  stimulus-­‐onset.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  structural	  violations	  in	  action	  observation	  (sequences	  of	  static	  images	  of	  an	  ongoing	  action	  scrambled	  in	  their	  logical	  order)	  elicited	  first	  an	  early	  left	  anterior	  deflection,	  indicating	  the	  detection	  of	  the	  structural	  violation,	  followed	  by	  a	  late	  left	  anterior	  positivity,	  reflecting	  further	  cognitive	  processing.	  Due	  to	  the	  specific	  edits	  looked	  at	  in	  our	  experiment,	  not	  changing	  the	  content	  of	  the	  action	  seen	  but	  rather	  the	  perspective	  on	  it,	  we	   expected	   to	   find	   ERP	   components	   specifically	   marking	   a	   cut	   in	   general	   (that	   is,	  independently	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  camera	  displacement	  in	  simple	  comparison	  to	  a	  plain	  visual	  onset)	  as	  a	  structural	  violation	  in	  the	  above	  declared	  sense.	  Furthermore,	  we	  supposed	  that	  the	   two	   different	   cut	   conditions	   would	   differ	   among	   each	   other,	   if	   not	   already	   in	   the	   first	  component	   of	   the	   complex	   described	   by	   Maffongelli	   et	   al.,	   then	   at	   least	   in	   the	   second	  component,	   indicating	   further	   cognitive	   processing.	   More	   specifically,	   we	   expected	   to	   find	  differences	  illuminating	  spectators’	  different	  experiences	  of	  and	  responses	  to	  continuity	  edits	  and	   non-­‐continuity	   edits	   as	   described	   in	   Chapter	   III.2.1.	   While	   continuity	   edits	   tend	   to	   be	  rather	  overseen,	  non-­‐continuity	  edits	  are	  easily	  remarked	  and	  seem	  to	  restrict	  our	  attention	  to	  other	  cognitive	  tasks	  simultaneously	  performed.	  Second,	   we	   performed	   a	   time-­‐frequency	   analysis	   focusing	   on	   the	   mu-­‐rhythm	   in	   central	  (motor)	   areas	   (with	   its	   alpha	   and	   beta	   components)	   as	   a	   common	   marker	   for	   the	   mirror	  mechanism	   in	   humans	   (see	   Chapter	   III.1.2.1).	   Reflections	   on	   film	   experience	   based	   on	   4EA	  approaches	   to	   cognition,	   as	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   II.3,	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	  spectator’s	  strong	   involvement	   in	   the	   fictional	  environment	  created	  by	   film	  might	  be	  due	  to	  the	  activations	  of	  visual	  habits	  and	  experiences	  from	  the	  real	  world	  elicited	  by	  moving	  images,	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and	  especially	  by	  those	  closely	  resembling	  what	  is	  known	  to	  us	  from	  perception	  in	  real	  life.	  It	  was	   furthermore	   proposed	   that	   this	   process	  might	   crucially	   be	   based	   on	   action	   perception	  links	  that	  previous	  research	  suggested	  may	  activate	  the	  body,	  even	  if	  something	  is	  not	  (yet)	  in	  our	  reach	  or	  if	  it	  is	  completely	  unavailable	  to	  be	  bodily	  explored.	  A	  mechanism	  that	  has	  been	  repeatedly	   claimed	   to	   enable	   such	   an	   action-­‐perception	   or	   emotion-­‐perception	   link	   is	   the	  mirror	  mechanism	  as	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  II.2	  of	  this	  thesis.	  In	  the	  study	  “Moving	  mirrors	  –	  A	  high	  density	  EEG	  study	  exploring	  the	  effect	  of	  different	  camera	  movements	  on	  motor	  cortex	  activation	  during	   action	  observation”	   (see	  Heimann	  et	   al.	   (2014)	   as	  well	   as	  Chapter	   III.1	   of	  this	  thesis)	  we	  found	  that	   indeed,	   the	  mirror	  mechanism	  was	  more	  strongly	  activated	  when	  spectators	   watch	   a	   video	   clip	   produced	   by	   use	   of	   a	   steadicam,	   the	   result	   of	   which	   best	  resembles	  vision	  during	  the	  spectators’	  own	  movement.	  We	  hypothesized	  that	  we	  would	  see	  a	  similar	  effect	  also	   in	   this	   study.	  To	  be	  precise,	  we	  expected	  a	   stronger	  and	  possibly	   shorter	  lasting	  ERD	  of	  the	  mu-­‐rhythm	  during	  action	  observation	  after	  continuity	  edits,	  which	  in	  film	  theory	   are	   described	   as	   substantiating	   habits	   from	   real	   world	   perception,	   than	   after	  discontinuity	  edits,	  described	  to	  crucially	  violate	  our	  usual	  habits	  of	  perceiving	  derived	  from	  real	  world	  interactions.	  	  The	   following	   paragraphs	  will	   describe	   the	   details	   of	   setup,	   and	   the	   analysis	   results	   of	   the	  respective	  experiment.	  	  III.2.3	  Participants,	  materials	  and	  methods	  	  The	  participants	   in	   the	   experiment	   consisted	  of	  20	  healthy	  volunteers	   (10	  male,	   10	   female,	  mean	   age	   24.8	   (SD	   2,31),	   all	   right	   handed	   as	   assessed	   by	   (an	   Italian	   adaption	   of)	   the	  Edinburgh	   Handedness	   Inventory	   (Oldfield	   1971)).	   Participants	   were	   recruited	   by	   public	  announcement	   and	   were	   paid	   25	   euros	   as	   reimbursement.	   Before	   the	   experiment,	   they	  received	  written	   and	   oral	   experimental	   instructions.	   After	   the	   experiment	   each	   participant	  was	  debriefed.	  Written	  informed	  consent	  was	  obtained	  from	  all	  participants	  before	  entering	  the	  study.	  The	  study	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  local	  Ethical	  Committee.	  	  	  Stimuli	   consisted	  of	  video	  clips	  of	  5	   seconds	   length	  each.	  Each	  video	  was	  a	  montage	  of	   two	  single	  clips.	   In	  the	   first	  clip	  of	  2	  seconds	   length,	   two	  agents	  (one	  male,	  one	   female)	  stand	   in	  front	  of	  a	  table,	  at	  the	  center	  of	  which	  a	  small	  object	  (either	  a	  salt	  shaker	  or	  an	  espresso	  cup)	  is	   placed.	   The	   actors	   first	   look	   at	   each	   other	   before	   one	   of	   them	   (either	   the	   man	   or	   the	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one.	  In	  the	  second	  clip	  of	  3	  seconds	  length,	  the	  actor	  leading	  the	  gaze	  in	  clip	  one	  then	  grasps	  the	  object,	  picks	  it	  up	  and	  places	  it	  right	  in	  front	  of	  the	  other	  actor.	  The	  variable	  specifically	  manipulated	  for	  the	  experiment	  is	  the	  angle	  with	  which	  the	  camera	  is	  displaced	  from	  the	  first	  to	  the	  second	  shot	  edited	  together.	  In	  50	  %	  of	  the	  clips	  this	  angle	  is	  90°,	  in	  the	  other	  50	  %	  this	  angle	  is	  180°	  (in	  both	  cases	  the	  jump	  is	  once	  realized	  clockwise,	  and	  once	  counterclockwise).	  This	  made	  up	   for	  a	   total	  of	  8	  clips	  (always	  showing	  the	  same	  scene,	  but	  using	  two	  different	  objects	  (a	  cup	  and	  a	  salt	  shaker),	  two	  displacement	  angles	  (90°	  and	  180°),	  and	  two	  directions	  of	   displacement:	   once	   counterclockwise,	   once	   clockwise).	   Video	   clips	   were	   recorded	   and	  edited	  in	  a	  professional	  film	  studio,	  enabling	  us	  to	  film	  the	  same	  scene	  under	  highly	  controlled	  conditions.	  Figure	  10	  below	  shows	  3	  still	  frames	  demonstrating	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  camera	  displacement.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  10:	  Illustrating	  the	  differences	  between	  applied	  edits,	  once	  involving	  a	  90°	  camera	  displacement,	  once	  a	  180°	  camera	  displacement	  across	  the	  edit.	  	  The	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  two	  different	  parts	  comprising:	  1)	  a	  60	  minutes	  EEG	  recording	  session	  (including	  breaks);	  2)	  a	  10	  minutes	  rating	  task.	  With	  preparation	  and	  debriefing	  the	  whole	  procedure	  took	  about	  1.5	  hours	  per	  participant.	  The	  EEG	  was	  recorded	  during	  three	  blocks	  of	  about	  15	  minutes	  length	  each.	  After	  each	  block	  participants	  were	  given	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  short	  break.	  Two	  blocks	  consisted	  of	  53,	  and	  one	  of	  54	   trials,	   leading	   to	   a	   total	   of	   80	   trials	   per	   condition	   (continuity	   edit:	   90°	   displacement	   /	  reverse	  shot:	  180°	  displacement).	  Participants	  were	  seated	  in	  an	  isolated	  EEG	  lab	  in	  front	  of	  a	  computer	  screen	  placed	  on	  a	  table	  at	  a	  distance	  of	  50	  cm.	  Participants	  were	  then	  instructed	  about	  the	  experimental	  procedure:	  Each	  trial	  began	  with	  a	  fixation	  cross	  (of	  random	  duration	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between	   500-­‐1000	   ms),	   followed	   by	   one	   of	   the	   video	   stimuli	   (of	   5	   sec.	   length	   each	   (see	  before),	  presented	  in	  random	  order).	  In	  50%	  of	  the	  trials,	  after	  stimulus	  presentation,	  first	  a	  light	  green	  screen	   (2	   seconds),	   then	  a	  grey	   screen	   (intertribal	   interval	   ITI,	  3	   seconds)	  were	  displayed	  (guaranteeing	  the	  return	  of	  brain	  activity	   to	  baseline).	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  blink	  only	  during	  the	  grey	  screen	  period,	  to	  minimize	  eye	  movement	  artifacts	  in	  the	  periods	  of	  interest.	  In	  the	  other	  50%	  of	  the	  trials,	  after	  stimulus	  presentation	  and	  before	  the	  grey	  screen,	  participants	  were	  presented	  a	  question	  on	  screen	  referring	   to	  either	   the	  object	  or	  to	  one	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  video	  displayed	  before	  (for	  example:	  “Was	  the	  object	  that	  was	  handed	  over	  an	  espresso	  cup?”	  or	  “Was	  it	  the	  male	  actor	  who	  handed	  over	  the	  object?”).	  The	  answer	  had	  to	  be	   given	   by	   clicking	   the	   mouse	   on	   the	   left	   button	   with	   the	   right	   index	   finger	   or	   the	   right	  button	  with	  the	  right	  medium	  finger.	  This	  allowed	  participants	  to	  answer	  with	  “Yes”	  or	  “No”	  As	   we	   did	   not	   compare	   reaction	   times	   answer-­‐button	   matches	   were	   not	   balanced	   among	  participants,	   but	   left	   button	   always	   indicated	   a	   “Yes”,	   right	   button	   a	   “No”.	   The	  mouse	  was	  positioned	  on	  the	  table	   in	  front	  of	  participants	  at	  a	  distance	  of	  15	  cm	  from	  their	  right	  hand.	  During	  video	  observation,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  keep	  the	  right	  hand	  at	  a	  fixed	  position	  indicated	  by	  a	  physical	  marker.	  When	  the	  question	  slide	  appeared,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  move	  their	  hand	  from	  start	  position	  to	  the	  mouse	  and	  give	  their	  answer,	  and	  then	  move	  back	  the	  hand	   to	   start	   position.	   If	   participants	   gave	   a	  wrong	   answer	  or	  did	  not	   answer	  within	  5	  seconds,	   they	  were	  told	   the	  trial	  was	   incorrect	  or	   the	  answer	  was	  given	  too	  slowly,	  and	  the	  trial	  was	  repeated.	  This	  action	  execution	  condition	  served	  both	  as	  control	  for	  attention	  and	  to	  record	  participants’	  ERD	  during	  action	  execution.	  See	  Figure	  11.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  11:	  Experimental	  paradigm	  during	  the	  EEG	  recording.	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The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  a	  rating	  task.	  Participants,	  still	  sitting	  in	  front	  of	  the	  screen	  as	  during	  the	  EEG	  recording	  session,	  were	  again	  shown	  the	  video	  clips	  and	  for	  each	  of	  the	  clips	  they	  were	  asked	  five	  different	  questions	  (in	  5	  separate	  blocks	  (one	  for	  each	  question)	  always	  conducted	  in	  the	  same	  order).	  The	  questions	  were:	  	  1)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  involved	  in	  the	  scene?	  	  2)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  like	  the	  actor	  (the	  one	  handing	  over	  the	  object)?	  	  3)	  How	  easy	  to	  watch	  did	  you	  find	  this	  video?	  4)	  How	  natural	  did	  you	  find	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  scene	  in	  this	  video?	  	  5)	  Which	  of	  the	  two	  videos	  was	  longer	  (regarding	  its	  duration)?	  	  The	   first	   two	   questions	   were	   designed	   to	   investigate	   participants’	   potential	   feeling	   of	  involvement	  with	  the	  observed	  scene	  in	  terms	  of	  empathy	  with	  the	  actor.	  The	  third	  question	  was	   designed	   to	   explore	   how	   much	   at	   ease	   participants	   were	   with	   the	   different	   ways	   of	  editing.	   The	   fourth	   question	   was	   designed	   to	   measure	   participants’	   estimation	   of	   the	  ecological	  plausibility	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  editing	  used.	  The	  last	  question	  was	  designed	  to	  investigate	   if	   the	   different	   montage	   techniques	   have	   an	   influence	   of	   participants’	   time	  duration	  estimation.	  	  
	  EEG	  data	  was	  acquired	  by	  a	  128-­‐channel	  Sensor	  Net	  (Electrical	  Geodesic,	  Eugene,	  USA)	  and	  recorded	  within	  the	  standard	  EGI	  package	  Net	  Station	  4.3.1.	  EEG	  was	  sampled	  at	  500	  Hz,	  and	  band-­‐pass	  filtered	  online	  at	  0.1-­‐100	  Hz.	  The	  electrodes	  impedance	  was	  kept	  less	  than	  50	  kΩ	  (checked	  after	  each	  block).	  The	  raw	  EEG	  data	  was	  recorded	  with	  the	  vertex	  (Cz)	  as	  the	  online	  reference	  and	  re-­‐referenced	  off-­‐line	  to	  the	  common	  average	  (Muthukumaraswamy,	  Johnson,	  &	  McNair,	  2004).	  Stimuli	  were	  presented	  with	  E-­‐Prime	  2.0	  and	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  trial,	  and	  all	   event	  markers	  were	   sent	   to	  Net	   Station.	  Participants’	  motion	  was	  monitored	  by	   the	  experimenter	   and	   video-­‐recorded	   for	   off-­‐line	   analysis;	   if	   participants	   moved	   during	   the	  observation	   or	   rest	   conditions	   the	   trial	   was	   excluded	   from	   further	   analysis.	   All	   further	  processing	  was	  done	  using	  the	  Matlab	  Toolbox	  FieldTrip	  (Oostenveld	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Statistical	  analysis,	  if	  not	  further	  specified,	  were	  done	  using	  the	  STATISTICA	  software	  of	  StatSoft.	  	  For	   ERP	   analysis,	   data	   were	   filtered	   off-­‐line	   with	   an	   additional	   low	   passfilter	   of	   45	   Hz	  (resulting	   in	   0.1-­‐45	   Hz	   data)	   and	   segmented	   into	   specific	   time	   epochs	   for	   baseline	   and	  montage	  conditions,	  each	  of	  one	  second	   length.	  For	   the	  montage	  conditions	  we	  selected	  the	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first	  second	  after	  the	  editing	  point	  in	  the	  videos	  –	  in	  50%	  representing	  a	  montage	  complying	  to,	  and	  in	  50%	  violating	  the	  180°	  rule	  (further	  refered	  to	  as	  continuity	  edit	  (referring	  to	  90°	  camera	  displacement)	  and	  reverse	  shot	  (referring	  to	  180°	  camera	  displacement)).	  As	  baseline	  we	   took	   the	   first	   second	  after	   video	  onset.	  We	  decided	   for	   this	   baseline	   as	   it	   allowed	  us	   to	  distinguish	   ERPs	   caused	   by	   the	   onset	   of	   a	   new	   visual	   stimulus	   in	   general,	   from	   those	  specifically	  caused	  by	  the	  camera	  displacement	  across	  the	  edit.	  That	  means,	  that	  baseline	  and	  montage	  conditions	  were	  similar	  as	  both	  involve	  a	  visual	  change	  (in	  case	  of	  the	  baseline	  from	  black	  screen	  to	  the	  scene,	  in	  case	  of	  the	  montage	  conditions,	  that	  is	  the	  edit,	  from	  one	  shot	  to	  the	   other).	   The	   difference	   though	   is	   that	   the	   two	   shots	   following	   each	   other	   in	   our	  within-­‐scene-­‐montages	   bear	   a	   contextual	   relationship,	   as	   they	   show	   the	   same	   ongoing	   scene,	   only	  filmed	  from	  different	  angles.	  	  Artifacts	  for	  all	  conditions	  were	  removed	  through	  visually	  inspected	  Independent	  Component	  Analysis	   as	   implemented	   in	   FieldTrip,	   considering	   temporal,	   topographic	   and	   spectral	  distribution	  of	  the	  component.	  Subsequent	  additional	  visual	  inspection	  of	  each	  segment	  led	  to	  the	   exclusion	   of	   all	   trials	  with	   still	   remaining	   artifacts.	   A	  minimum	  number	   of	   50	   trials	   for	  each	   condition	   was	   kept	   (fulfilled	   by	   all	   but	   two	   participants,	   who	   were	   consequently	  excluded	  from	  further	  analysis,	  resulting	  in	  18	  data	  sets	  finally	  analyzed).	  	  ERPs	   were	   computed	   by	   averaging	   over	   trials	   and	   participants	   using	   time-­‐locked-­‐analysis	  over	  the	  segmented	  epochs	  as	  implemented	  in	  FieldTrip.	  As	  a	  first	  comparison	  of	  baseline	  and	  montage	  conditions	  in	  FieldTrip	  (cluster	  based	  permutation	  test	  using	  dependent	  samples	  t-­‐test	   statistics,	   Monte	   Carlo	   method,	   based	   on	   500	   randomizations)	   did	   show	   significant	  differences	   for	   almost	   all	   electrodes,	   thus	   not	   allowing	   a	   sensible	   cluster	   identification,	  Regions	   of	   Interest	   (ROIs)	   were	   selected	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   findings	   of	   prior	   studies	  investigating	  ERPs	  due	  to	  content/structure	  violations.	  Previous	  studies	  looking	  at	  sentences	  (Kutas	   and	  Hillyard,	   1980;	   Kutas	   and	   Federmeier,	   2000;	   Lau	   et	   al.,	   2008),	  musical	   phrases	  (Steinbeis	   and	   Koelsch,	   2008;	   Koelsch,	   2011)	   and	   goal-­‐directed	   actions	   (Maffongelli	   et	   al.,	  submitted)	   dissociated	   ERPs	   indicating	   content	   violations	   from	   ERPs	   indicating	   structure	  violations.	   While	   content	   violations	   were	   found	   to	   correlate	   with	   a	   negative	   component	  around	  400	  ms	   after	   stimulus	   onset	   (N400),	   structure	   violations	  were	   reported	   to	   elicit	   an	  earlier	   and	   specifically	   anterior	   negativity	   (ELAN).	   Furthermore,	   when	   task	   relevant,	   these	  early	  anterior	  left	  negativities	  were	  reported	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  late	  positivity,	  in	  the	  action	  domain,	  being	  equally	  located	  in	  left	  anterior	  regions	  (see	  Maffongelli	  et	  al.,	  submitted).	  	  In	  these	  studies,	  usually	  four	  ROIs	  were	  defined:	  anterior	  left,	  anterior	  right,	  posterior	  left	  and	  posterior	  right.	  We	  adopted	  these	  ROIs	  and	  additionally	  defined	  two	  further	  central	  ROIs	  to	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allow	  a	   comparison	  with	   results	  of	   the	  ERD	  analysis	  when	  considering	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  Montage	  conditions.	  The	  resulting	  six	  ROIs	  are	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  12-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  12:	  Selection	  of	  electrodes	  for	  the	  six	  ROI	  chosen.	  	  Time-­‐windows	   of	   interest	   were	   detected	   based	   on	  where	   (on	   scalp	   surface)	   ERPs	   reached	  their	  maximum	  values.	  (See	  also	  Figure	  13,	  next	  page)	  Time-­‐window	   1	   is	   140-­‐190	  ms	   after	   stimulus	   onset	   –	   centered	   around	   an	   early	   negativity	  (N1)	  in	  anterior	  and	  central	  regions	  and	  an	  early	  positivity	  (P1)	  in	  posterior	  regions.	  Time-­‐window	  2	   is	  180-­‐220	  ms	  after	  stimulus	  onset	   -­‐	   centered	  around	  an	  early	  positivity	   in	  anterior	  and	  central	  regions	  (P2)	  and	  an	  early	  negativity	  in	  posterior	  regions	  (N2)	  	  Time-­‐window	  3	  is	  	  250-­‐380	  ms	  after	  stimulus	  onset	  –	  centered	  around	  a	  strong	  negativity	  in	  anterior	  and	  central	  regions	  (N3)	  and	  a	  strong	  positivity	  in	  posterior	  regions	  (P3)	  Time-­‐window	  4	  is	  400-­‐650	  ms	  after	  stimulus	  onset	  –	  centered	  around	  a	  late	  positivity	  (P4-­‐6)	  in	  all	  regions.	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Figure	   13:	   ERP	   course	   over	   the	   six	   selected	   ROI.	   Frames	   mark	   the	   4	   time-­‐windows	   chosen	   due	   to	   maximum	   values	   of	  observable	  components	  and	  previous	  literature.	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Data	  was	  extracted	  averaging	  potential	  over	  defined	  ROIs	  and	   time	  windows.	  Outliers	  were	  replaced	  with	  the	  corresponding	  average	  values	  of	  all	  participants	  (the	  criterium	  being	  ±	  2.5	  standard	  deviations	  from	  mean,	  resulting	   in	  the	  replacement	  of	   less	  than	  1	  %	  of	  all	  data).	  A	  final	  Kolmogorow-­‐Smirnov	  test	  showed	  no	  significant	  results	   for	  all	  data,	   thus	   justifying	  the	  use	  of	  parametric	  statistics.	  Regarding	  statistical	  analysis,	   in	  a	  first	  analysis,	  conducted	  to	  assess	  differences	  caused	  by	  a	  complete	  change	  of	  visual	   input	   in	   comparison	   to	  within-­‐scene	  edits,	  we	  compared	  average	  potentials	   of	   baseline	   with	   average	   potential	   after	   within-­‐scene-­‐cuts	   (without	   separating	  continuity	  edit	  and	  reverse	  shot	  conditions).	  For	  each	  window	  a	  2x2x3	  ANOVA	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	  ROIs)	  was	  conducted.	  In	   a	   second	   step.	   we	   then	   compared	   continuity	   edit	   and	   reverse	   shot	   conditions	   using	   the	  same	  ROIs,	  time	  windows	  and	  statistical	  methods.	  	  For	   all	  ANOVAs,	  Duncan	  post-­‐hoc	   tests	  were	  used	   to	   further	   explore	   significant	   factors	   and	  interactions.	   Reported	   results	   in	   these	   tests	  were	   automatically	   adjusted	   for	  multiple	   com-­‐parisons	  by	  the	  software	  used.	  	  For	   ERD	   analysis	   data	   were	   filtered	   offline	   with	   a	   bandpassfilter	   of	   1-­‐30	   Hz	   and	   were	  	  segmented	   into	  specific	   time	  epochs.	  From	  observation	  trials	   (videos	  edited	  according	   to	  or	  violating	   the	  180°	  rule),	   the	   three	  seconds	  after	   the	  editing	  point	  of	   the	  video	  clips	  plus	   the	  two	  seconds	  of	  green	  screen	  were	  analyzed.	  As	  baseline	  (time	  without	  any	  ERD	  expectation),	  1000	  ms	  of	  grey	  screen	  ending	  250	  ms	  before	   the	   start	  of	   the	  new	   trial	   (appearance	  of	   the	  fixation	   cross)	   were	   selected	   from	   the	   observation	   trials.	   From	   action	   execution	   trials,	  segments	   of	   1000	   ms	   were	   selected,	   starting	   500	   ms	   before	   the	   motor	   response	   (button	  press)	   and	   ending	   500	   ms	   after	   it.	   Artifacts	   were	   removed	   through	   visually	   inspected	  Independent	   Component	   Analysis	   as	   implemented	   in	   FieldTrip,	   considering	   temporal,	  topographic	   and	   spectral	   distribution	   of	   the	   component.	   Subsequent	   additional	   visual	  inspection	   of	   each	   segment	   led	   to	   the	   exclusion	  of	   all	   trials	  with	   still	   remaining	   artifacts.	   A	  minimum	   number	   of	   50	   trials	   for	   each	   condition	   were	   kept	   (fulfilled	   by	   all	   but	   three	  participants,	  who	  were	  consequently	  excluded	  from	  further	  analysis,	  resulting	  in	  17	  datasets	  finally	  analysed).	  Frequency	  bands	  of	  interest	  were	  the	  different	  components	  of	  the	  rolandic	  mu-­‐rhythm,	  consisting	  of	  an	  alpha	  and	  a	  beta	  band	  (see	  for	  example	  Avanzini	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  time–frequency	  analysis	  was	  performed	  for	  each	  participant	  on	  1.5	  second	  long	  segments	  for	  all	   conditions	   (baseline,	   continuity	   edit	   (90°),	   reverse	   shot	   (180°),	   action	   execution),	   using	  Hanning	  tapers	  in	  1	  Hz	  intervals	  with	  a	  sliding	  time	  window	  of	  0.5	  seconds,	  in	  the	  frequency	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range	   from	  7	   to	  30	  Hz.	  Frequency-­‐power	  coefficients	  were	  calculated	  by	   taking	   the	  average	  across	  trials	  for	  each	  of	  the	  128	  channels.	  Electrode-­‐clusters	  of	  interest	  were	  chosen	  for	  each	  of	   the	   two	   frequency	   bands	   of	   interest	   by	   means	   of	   a	   first	   exploratory	   statistical	   analysis	  comparing	   baseline	   and	   action	   execution	   condition	   in	   a	   cluster-­‐based	   permutation	   test	   as	  implemented	   in	   FieldTrip	   (using	   dependent	   samples	   t-­‐test	   statistics,	   Monte	   Carlo	   method,	  based	   on	   500	   randomizations).	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   results	   showing	   the	   electrodes	   with	  significant	   differences	   (see	   topoplots	   below),	   for	   alpha	   as	   well	   as	   for	   beta	   bands	   two	  symmetrical	  central	  clusters	  (one	  in	  the	  left,	  the	  other	  in	  the	  right	  hemisphere)	  were	  chosen.	  As	   previous	   research	   described	   the	   source	   of	   the	   beta	   component	   of	   the	   mu-­‐rhythm	  sometimes	  lying	  more	  frontal	  (see	  also	  Stancak,	  A.,	  &	  Pfurtscheller,	  G.,	  1996),	  for	  beta	  bands	  we	   additionally	   selected	   one	   frontal	   cluster	   that	   also	   showed	   a	   strong	   difference	   between	  conditions.	  See	  Figure	  14	  below.	  	  
	  
Figure	   14:	  Electrode	  cluster	  chosen	   for	   the	   two	  band	  ranges	  of	   interest	  on	   the	  base	  of	  dependent	  samples	   t-­‐test	  statistics	  using	  Monte	  Carlo	  Method	  as	  implemented	  in	  FieldTrip	  package.	  	  Using	   these	   clusters,	   specific	   alpha-­‐	   and	   beta-­‐frequency	   bands	   were	   selected	   for	   each	  participant	   following	   the	  procedure	  described	   in	  previous	  studies	   (Oberman	  et	  al.,	  2007a,b;	  Babiloni,	   Del	   Percio,	   Rossini,	   Marzano,	   […],	   &	   Eusebi,	   2009).	   The	   individual	   peak	   (F)	   of	  attenuated	  frequency	  was	  determined	  by	  calculating	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	  frequency	  power	  in	  action	  execution	  trials	  and	  during	  baseline	  in	  the	  following	  sub-­‐frequency	  bands:	  8–9,	  9–10,	  
*p=0.001996*p=0.003992
Plotted results of cluster based permutation analysis comparing baseline and action execution condition 
(average of 100 ms before and after button press). Chosen electrode clusters for further analysis 
marked by white dashed line.
1) alpha (8-14 Hz) 2) lower/middle beta (15-24 Hz)
left central cluster: E 30, 31, 36, 37, 41, 42, 53, 54
right central cluster: E 79, 80, 86, 87, 93, 103, 104, 105
left central cluster: E 30, 36, 37, 41, 42, 47, 52, 53
right central cluster: E 87, 93, 98, 103, 104, 105, 110, 111
frontal cluster: E 4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21,  
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10–11,	  11–12,	  12–13,	  13–14	  Hz	   for	   alpha,	  15-­‐16,	  16-­‐17,	  17-­‐18,	  18-­‐19,	  19-­‐20,	  20-­‐21,	  21-­‐22,	  22-­‐23,	  23-­‐24	  for	  beta.	  Each	  value	  was	  then	  transformed	  into	  a	  log-­‐ratio	  and	  the	  frequency	  that	  corresponded	   to	   the	   log-­‐ratio	   with	   the	   most	   negative	   value	   was	   taken	   as	   F.	   A	   3	   Hz	   range	  frequency	  band	  was	  chosen	  for	  each	  participant	  (F	  -­‐	  1;	  F	  +	  1)	  and	  frequency	  type	  (alpha	  and	  beta).	   For	   the	   following	   statistical	   analyses,	   the	   frequency	   power	   in	   this	   3	   Hz	   range	   was	  extracted	  in	  all	  conditions	  (number	  of	  participants	  selected	  per	  range:	  Alpha:	  7-­‐9	  Hz:	  5;	  8-­‐10	  Hz:	  4;	  9-­‐11	  Hz:	  1;	  10-­‐12	  Hz:	  3;	  11-­‐13	  Hz:	  2;	  12-­‐14	  Hz:	  2;	  Beta:	  	  16-­‐18	  Hz:	  1;	  17-­‐19	  Hz:	  4;	  18-­‐20	  Hz:	  7;	  20-­‐22	  Hz:	  4;	  21-­‐23Hz:	  1).	  ROIs	  and	  specific	  frequency	  bands	  of	  each	  participant	  were	  then	   used	   to	   extract	   the	   final	   data	   from	   all	   four	   conditions	   and	   chosen	   time	  windows	   (see	  below).	   Before	   statistical	   analysis	   all	   data	   was	   corrected	   for	   normality	   by	   using	   a	   log	  transformation	   resulting	   in	   non-­‐significant	   Kolmogorov-­‐Smirnov	   tests	   for	   all	   conditions,	  justifying	  the	  use	  of	  parametric	  statistics.	  	  For	   statistical	   analysis,	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   central	   alpha	  ERD	   in	   sensory-­‐motor	   areas	  during	  different	  observation	  and	  action	  execution	  trials,	  we	  compared	  the	  extracted	  frequency	  power	  for	  the	  different	  conditions	  using	  several	  ANOVAs.	  
1) In	   order	   to	   generally	   assess	   central	   alpha	   and	   beta	   ERD	   in	   sensory-­‐motor	   areas,	   for	  every	   band	   range	   considered	   (alpha,	   beta)	   we	   compared	   the	   frequency	   power	  extracted	  from	  baseline	  (average	  of	  1000	  ms	  ending	  250	  ms	  before	  new	  fixation	  cross)	  with	   its	   value	   during	   observation	   conditions	   (average	   of	   1000	  ms:	   selected	  was	   the	  second	   second	   after	   the	   cut	   (4th	   second	   of	   video	   observation)	   in	   continuity	   edit	   and	  reverse	   shot	   condition,	   in	   which	   full	   ERD	   can	   be	   expected)	   and	   action	   execution	  condition	   (average	   of	   1000	   ms:	   500	   ms	   before	   and	   500	   ms	   after	   button	   press).	  Specifically	   we	   used	   a	   repeated	  measures	   4x2	   ANOVA	  with	   four	   levels	   of	   Condition	  (baseline,	   two	  observation	  conditions	  –	  continuity	  edit	  and	  reverse	  shot	  –	  and	  action	  execution	  condition)	  and	  two	  levels	  of	  Hemisphere	  (left	  and	  right).	  For	  the	  beta	  bands	  an	   additional	   ANOVA	   for	   the	   frontal	   cluster	   was	   performed	   (comparing	   the	   four	  conditions	  only)	  
2) To	   assess	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   observation	   conditions	   (continuity	   edit	   and	  reverse	  shot)	  another	  set	  of	  ANOVAs	  was	  performed,	  also	  taking	  into	  account	  possible	  differences	   in	   the	   time-­‐course	   of	   the	   activation.	   As	   it	   was	   shown	   that	   also	   the	   ERS	  following	   ERD	   of	   the	   rolandic	   mu-­‐rhythm	   shows	   a	   specific	   pattern	   that	   can	   be	  modulated	  by	  contextual	  conditions	  (Muthukumaraswamy	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Pfurtscheller	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2013,	  Heimann	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  we	  separately	  extracted	  the	  data	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of	  the	  5	  seconds	  after	  the	  cut	  (including	  2	  seconds	  of	  green	  screen	  after	  video	  offset),	  resulting	   in	   two	   2x2x5	   (2	   Conditions	   x	   2	  Hemispheres	   x	   5	   Time	  Windows)	  ANOVAs	  (one	   for	   central	   alpha,	   one	   for	   central	  beta)	  with	   two	   levels	  of	  Condition	   (continuity	  edit	  and	  reverse	  shot),	  two	  levels	  of	  Hemisphere	  (left	  and	  right)	  and	  five	  levels	  of	  Time	  (each	  of	  the	  five	  seconds	  following	  the	  stimulus	  onset)	  as	  well	  as	  one	  2x5	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  5	  Time	  Windows)	  ANOVA	  for	  the	  frontal	  beta	  cluster.	  	  
3) Since	   the	   central	   alpha	   frequency	   band	   (8–14	  Hz)	   overlaps	  with	   the	   posterior	   alpha	  band,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  recordings	  in	  central	  areas	  might	  be	  affected	  by	  this	  posterior	  activity.	  In	  order	  to	  check	  for	  such	  an	  influence,	  for	  the	  alpha-­‐range	  selected	  for	  each	  participant	   we	   extracted	   the	   respective	   power	   values	   from	   8	   electrodes	   per	  hemisphere	  in	  occipital	  areas	  (electrodes	  65,	  66,	  68,	  69,	  70,	  71	  73,	  74	  in	  left	  occipital	  lobe	  &	  electrodes	  76,	  82,	  83,	  84,	  88,	  89,	  90,	  94	  in	  right	  occipital	   lobe)	  using	  the	  same	  frequency	   bands	   as	   previously	   described.	   We	   then	   repeated	   the	   described	   ANOVAs	  described	  also	  for	  these	  data.	  	  For	   all	  ANOVAs,	  Duncan	  post-­‐hoc	   tests	  were	  used	   to	   further	   explore	   significant	   factors	   and	  interactions.	  Reported	  results	  are	  automatically	  adjusted	  for	  multiple	  comparisons.	  Error	  bars	  in	  all	  the	  graphs	  represent	  standard	  errors.	  	  	  Results	   of	   the	   rating	   task	   partly	   showed	   a	   violation	   of	   normality	   not	   correctable	   through	  transformation.	  In	  consequence	  non-­‐parametric	  statistics	  (Wilcoxon	  Signed	  Ranks)	  were	  used	  for	  statistical	  analysis,	  resulting	  in	  5	  related	  sample	  test	  (one	  for	  each	  of	  the	  questions).	  	  
	  All	  Means	  and	  Standard	  Errors	  are	  noted	  in	  the	  table	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  results	  section.	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III.2.4	  Results	  	  III.2.4.1	  Results	  EEG:	  ERP	  	  	  
Comparison	  Baseline	  –	  Montage	  	  We	   first	   compared	   baseline	   and	   montage	   conditions	   (continuity	   edit	   and	   reverse	   shot	  conditions	  taken	  together)	  in	  the	  four	  selected	  time	  windows.	  For	   the	   first	   timewindow	  (140-­‐190	  ms)	  a	  2x2x3	  ANOVA	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	  ROIs)	  showed	  significant	  interactions	  of	  Condition	  x	  Hemisphere	  (F(1,17)=5.47,	  p<0.05)	  and	  Conditions	  x	  ROI	  (F(2,34)=4.41,	  p<0.05)	  Post-­‐hoc	  tests	  regarding	  the	  Condition	  x	  Hemisphere	  interaction	  and	   the	  Condition	  x	  ROI	   interaction	   showed	   that	   the	   effects	  were	  driven	  by	   left	  hemispheric	   (p<0.05)	   and	   anterior	   regions	   (p<0.01).	   This	   shows	   a	   significant	   difference	  between	   baseline	   and	   montage	   conditions	   pronounced	   in	   anterior	   and	   left	   hemispheric	  regions,	  because	  in	  the	  grand	  average	  ERP	  a	  negative	  component	  (N1)	  was	  found,	  which	  was	  more	  strongly	  pronounced	   for	  montage	  conditions.	  See	  potential	   course	   in	  anterior	  and	   left	  regions	  Figure	  13,	  page	  79,	  and	  for	  a	  representative	  example	  Figure	  15.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	   15:	   ERP	   time-­‐course	   in	   left	   anterior	  ROI.	  Marked	   in	   red	   the	  N1	   component	  pronounced	   for	  montage	   conditions	   in	  anterior	   and	   left	   hemispheric	   regions.	   Condition	   x	   Hemisphere	   interaction:	   F(1,17)=5.47,	   p<0.05	   and	   Conditions	   x	   ROI	  interaction:	  F(2,34)=4.41,	  p<0.05.	  In	  anterior	  regions	  the	  significance	  level	  is	  p<0.01;	  in	  left	  hemispheric	  regions	  p<0.05.	  	  For	  the	  second	  time	  window	  (180-­‐220	  ms),	  a	  2x2x3	  ANOVA	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	   ROIs)	   showed	   significant	   main	   effects	   of	   Condition	   (F(1,17)=10.47,	   p<0.01),	   ROI	  (F2,34)=13.02,	   p<0.001)	   and	   a	   significant	   interactions	   for	   Condition	   x	   ROI	   (F(2,34)=9.72,	  p<0.001).	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Post-­‐hoc	   tests	  showed	  that,	   regarding	   the	  Condition	  effect,	  average	  potential	  was	  higher	   for	  baseline	   (p<0.01).	  Regarding	   the	  effect	   for	  ROI,	  we	   found	   that	   average	  potential	   in	  anterior	  regions	   and	   central	   regions	   was	   significantly	   smaller	   than	   in	   posterior	   regions	   (p<0.001).	  Finally,	   Post-­‐hoc	   tests	   regarding	   the	   Condition	   x	   ROI	   interaction	   showed	   that	   in	   anterior	  regions,	  average	  potential	  of	  baseline	  was	  significantly	  higher	  than	  that	  of	  montage	  conditions	  (p<0.01),	   while	   in	   posterior	   regions	   this	   relation	   was	   reversed	   (p<0.01).	   This	   shows:	   a)	   a	  significant	  difference	  between	  baseline	  and	  montage	  conditions	  in	  anterior	  regions,	  which	  in	  the	  Grand	  Average	  ERP	  shows	  up	  as	  an	  early	  positivity	   (in	   the	   following	  referred	   to	  as	  P2),	  more	   strongly	   pronounced	   for	   baseline;	   b)	   a	   significant	   difference	   between	   baseline	   and	  montage	   conditions	   in	   posterior	   regions,	  which	   in	   the	   Grand	   Average	   ERP	   shows	   up	   as	   an	  early	  negativity	  (in	  the	  following	  referred	  to	  as	  N2)	  that	  is	  also	  more	  strongly	  pronounced	  for	  baseline.	  See	  Figure	  16	  below.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  16:	  ERP	  time-­‐course	  in	  anterior	  and	  posterior	  ROIs.	  Marked	  in	  red	  the	  P2	  and	  N2	  components	  that	  are	  pronounced	  for	   baseline.	   Condition	   x	  ROI	   interaction:	   F(2,34)=9.72,	   p<0.001;	   differences	  between	   conditions	   in	   anterior	   and	  posterior	  regions	  p<0.01.	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For	  the	  third	  time	  window	  (250-­‐380	  ms),	  a	  2x2x3	  ANOVA	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	  ROIs)	  showed	  significant	  main	  effects	  for	  ROI	  (F2,	  34)=45.09,	  p<0.001)	  only.	  	  Post-­‐hoc	  tests	  showed	  that	  that	  average	  potential	  in	  anterior	  and	  in	  central	  regions	  was	  lower	  than	  in	  posterior	  regions	  (all	  p<0.001).	  No	  difference	  between	  conditions	  was	  found.	  	  For	  the	  fourth	  time	  window	  (400-­‐650	  ms),	  a	  2x2x3	  ANOVA	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	  ROIs)	   showed	   significant	   main	   effects	   for	   Hemisphere	   (F(1,17)=23.5,	   p<0.001),	   ROI	  (F2,34)=12.29,	   p<0.001)	   and	   significant	   interactions	   for	   Condition	   x	   Hemisphere	  (F(1,17)=4.57,	  p<0.05)	  and	  Condition	  x	  ROI	  (F(2,34)=4.19,	  p<0.05).	  	  Post-­‐hoc	  tests	  showed	  that,	  regarding	  the	  Hemisphere	  effect,	  average	  potential	  was	  lower	  in	  the	  left	  hemisphere	  (p<0.001).	  Regarding	  the	  effect	  for	  ROIs	  we	  found	  that	  average	  potential	  in	  anterior	  regions	  was	  lower	  than	  in	  central	  and	  posterior	  regions	  and	  average	  potential	  in	  central	  regions	  was	  lower	  than	  in	  posterior	  regions	  (for	  the	  difference	  between	  anterior	  and	  posterior	   regions:	   p<0.001;	   between	   anterior	   and	   central	   regions:	   p<0.01;	   between	   central	  and	  posterior	  regions:	  p<0.05).	  Post-­‐hoc	  tests	  on	  the	  Condition	  x	  Hemisphere	  interaction	  only	  supported	   the	   findings	  of	  hemispheric	  differences	   in	  both	   conditions	   (for	  baseline	  p<0.001;	  for	  montage	   conditions,	   p<0.05).	   Post-­‐hoc	   tests	   on	   the	   Condition	   x	   ROI	   interaction	   showed	  that	  in	  posterior	  regions,	  average	  potential	  in	  baseline	  was	  higher	  than	  average	  potential	  after	  montage	   (p<0.05).	   This	   shows	   a	   significant	   difference	   between	   baseline	   and	   montage	  conditions	  in	  posterior	  regions,	  showing	  a	  late	  positivity	  (in	  the	  following	  referred	  to	  as	  P4-­‐6)	  more	  strongly	  pronounced	  for	  baseline.	  See	  Figure	  17	  below.	  	  
	  
Figure	  17:	  ERP	  time-­‐course	  in	  posterior	  ROIs.	  Marked	  in	  red	  the	  P4-­‐6	  component	  pronounced	  for	  baseline.	  Condition	  x	  ROI	  interaction:	  F(2,34)=4.19,	  p<0.05;	  differences	  in	  posterior	  regions	  p<0.05.	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Comparison	  Continuity	  Editing	  	  –	  Reverse	  shot	  	  The	   analyses	   described	   above	   were	   repeated	   in	   a	   second	   step,	   now	   comparing	   ERPs	   after	  montage	  that	  involved	  either	  continuity	  edit	  or	  reverse	  shot.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  window	  (140-­‐190	  ms),	  a	  2x2x3	  ANOVA	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	  ROIs)	   showed	   a	   significant	   main	   effect	   only	   for	   ROI	   (F(2,34)=3.64,	   p<0.05).	   Post-­‐hoc	   tests	  showed	  that	  average	  potentials	  in	  anterior	  regions	  were	  significantly	  lower	  than	  in	  posterior	  regions	  (p<0.05).	  No	  effect	  or	  interaction	  involving	  Condition	  was	  found.	  	  For	   the	   second	   time	   window	   (180-­‐220	   ms),	   equally,	   a	   2x2x3	   ANOVA	   (2	   Conditions	   x	   2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	  ROIs)	  showed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  only	  for	  ROI	  (F(2,34)=36.04,	  p<0.001.	  Post-­‐hoc	   tests	   showed	   that	   average	   potentials	   in	   anterior	   and	   central	   regions	   were	  significantly	   lower	  than	  in	  posterior	  regions	  (all	  p<0.001).	  No	  effect	  or	   interaction	  involving	  Condition	  was	  found.	  	  For	  the	  third	  time	  window	  (250-­‐380	  ms)	  a	  2x2x3	  ANOVA	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	  ROIs)	   showed	   significant	   main	   effects	   for	   ROI	   (F(2,34)=54,79,	   p<0.001)	   and	   significant	  interactions	  for	  Hemisphere	  x	  ROI	  (F(2,34)=5.12,	  p<0.05).	  Post-­‐hoc	  tests	  showed	  that	  average	  potential	   in	   anterior	   and	   central	   regions	  was	   lower	   than	   in	  posterior	   regions	   (all	   p<0.001).	  Furthermore,	   for	   posterior	   regions,	   average	   potential	   was	   lower	   in	   the	   left	   hemisphere	  (p<0.001).	  No	  effect	  or	  interaction	  involving	  Condition	  was	  found.	  	  For	  the	  fourth	  time	  window	  (400-­‐650	  ms),	  a	  2x2x3	  ANOVA	  (2	  Conditions	  x	  2	  Hemispheres	  x	  3	  ROIs)	   showed	   significant	   main	   effects	   for	   Hemisphere	   (F(1,17)=6.25,	   p	   <0.05),	   ROI	  (F(2,34)=10.12,	   p<0.001),	   and	   a	   significant	   interaction	   of	   Condition	   x	   Hemisphere	   x	   ROI	  (F(2,34)=3.91,	  p<0.05).	  Post-­‐hoc	  tests	  showed	  that	  average	  potential	   in	  left	  hemisphere	  was	  significantly	   lower	   than	   in	   right	   hemisphere	   (p<0.05).	   Furthermore,	   average	   potential	   in	  anterior	  regions	  was	  lower	  than	  in	  central	  and	  posterior	  regions	  (p<0.001).	  Most	  importantly	  for	   this	   comparison,	   continuity	   edit	   condition	   significantly	   differed	   from	   reverse	   shot	  condition	  in	  left	  anterior	  (p<0.01)	  as	  well	  as	  right	  central	  (p<0.05)	  ROIs.	  This	  supports:	  a)	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	   the	   two	   conditions	   in	   a	   late	   left	   anterior	  positivity	   (P4-­‐6	   ant	  left),	   which	   is	   more	   pronounced	   for	   the	   continuity	   edit	   condition;	   b)	   a	   late	   right	   central	  positivity	   (P4-­‐6	   cen	   right),	   which	   is	   more	   pronounced	   for	   the	   reverse	   shot	   condition.	   See	  
Figure	  18,	  next	  page.	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Figure	  18:	  ERP	  time-­‐course	   in	  anterior	   left	  and	  central	  right	  ROIs.	  Marked	  in	  red	  the	  P4-­‐6,	  which	   in	  anterior	   left	  region	  is	  more	  pronounced	   for	  continuity	  edit	  condition,	  and	   in	  central	   right	  region	   is	  more	  pronounced	   for	  reverse	  shot	  condition.	  Condition	   x	   Hemisphere	   x	   ROI	   	   interaction:	   F(2,34)=3.91,	   p<0.05.	   Differences	   between	   conditions	   in	   anterior	   left	   region	  	  p<0.01,	  in	  central	  right	  region	  p<0.05.	  	  	  III.2.4.2	  Results	  EEG:	  ERD	  	  	  
Analysis	  ERD	  in	  observation	  and	  action	  execution	  condition	  
	  In	  order	   to	  generally	  assess	  mu-­‐rhythm	  ERD	   in	   sensory-­‐motor	  areas,	  we	  compared	   the	   fre-­‐quency	  power	  for	  selected	  alpha	  and	  beta	  frequency	  ranges	  during	  baseline,	  with	  observation	  conditions	  (continuity	  edit	  and	  reverse	  shot	  condition)	  and	  the	  action	  execution	  condition.	  	  Descriptives	  for	  alpha	  power	  in	  central	  regions	  showed	  that,	  compared	  to	  baseline,	  ERD	  was	  present	  in	  both	  observation	  conditions	  as	  well	  as	  during	  action	  execution	  (button	  press),	  with	  a	   maximum	   in	   the	   latter	   condition.	   A	   4x2	   ANOVA	   (Condition	   x	   Hemisphere)	   showed	   a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Condition	  (F(3,48)=20.67,	  p<0.001).	  	  Post-­‐hoc	  comparisons	  showed	  that	   frequency	   power	   for	   baseline	   was	   significantly	   higher	   than	   for	   all	   other	   conditions	  (p<0.001).	   Furthermore,	   frequency	  power	   for	  both	  observation	   conditions	  was	   significantly	  higher	   than	   for	   action	   execution	   (for	   continuity	   edit	   versus	   action	   execution	   p<0.01,	   for	  reverse	  shot	  versus	  action	  execution	  p<0.05).	  See	  Figure	  19,	  next	  page.	  Descriptives	   for	  beta	  power	   in	  central	  and	   frontal	  areas	  showed	   that	   compared	   to	  baseline,	  ERD	  was	   present	   in	   both	   observation	   conditions	   as	  well	   as	   during	   action	   execution.	   A	   4x3	  ANOVA	   (Condition	   x	   Region)	   accordingly	   showed	   a	   significant	   main	   effect	   for	   Condition	  (F(3,48)=25.63,	  p<0.001),	   for	  Region	  (F(2,32)=16.66,	  p	  <0.001)	  and	  a	  significant	  Interaction	  Condition	  x	  Region	  (F(6,96)=3.6,	  p<0.01)	  Post-­‐hoc	  comparisons	  revealed	  that	  the	  significant	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differences	   for	   conditions	   again	   ocurred	   between	   baseline	   and	   all	   other	   conditions	   (all	  p<0.001),	  for	  Regions	  between	  the	  two	  central	  clusters	  and	  the	  frontal	  cluster	  (all	  p<0.001).	  Post-­‐hocs	   for	   the	   Condition	   x	   Region	   Interaction	   showed	   that	   for	   left	   and	   right	   central	  electrodes	  as	  well	  as	  for	  frontal	  electrodes	  baseline	  beta	  power	  was	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  respective	  values	  for	  the	  observation	  conditions	  and	  for	  action	  execution	  (p<0.001).	  For	  right	   central	   electrodes	   we	   also	   found	   a	   significant	   difference	   between	   beta	   power	   in	  observation	  conditions	  and	  action	  execution	  (p<0.01,	  for	  central	  left	  electrodes	  this	  difference	  is	  not	  significant	  (p=0.55)).	  See	  Figure	  19	  below.	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ERD-­‐time-­‐course	  comparison	  of	  continuity	  edit	  and	  reverse	  shot	  conditions	  	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  precise	  time-­‐course	  of	  ERD/ERS	  in	  sensory-­‐motor	  areas	  during	  the	  two	  different	  observation	  conditions	  we	  compared	   the	   log	  values	  of	   the	   frequency	  power	  of	   the	  chosen	  frequency	  ranges	  during	  the	  different	  observation	  conditions	  divided	  by	  baseline.	  	  For	  central	  alpha	  power	  values	  the	  2x2x5	  ANOVA	  (2	  levels	  of	  Condition	  (continuity	  edit	  and	  reverse	  shot	  montage),	   two	   levels	  of	  Hemisphere	  (left	  versus	  right),	  and	  5	   levels	  of	  Time	  (5	  seconds	  from	  cut	  on))	  showed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Time	  (F(4,64)=26.10,	  p<0.001)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  significant	  interaction	  Condition	  x	  Hemisphere	  (F(1,16)=6.22,	  p<0.05).	  	  Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	   for	   the	   time-­‐course,	   significant	   differences	   occurred	  between	  all	   time	  windows	  during	  video	  observation	  (desynchronization	  phase)	  and	  all	   time	  windows	  after	  video	  observation	  (resynchronization	  phase)	  (p<0.01).	  Results	  regarding	  time-­‐course	  differences	  are	  illustrated	  together	  with	  beta	  band	  results	  in	  Figure	  21,	  see	  next	  page.	  	  Post-­‐hocs	   further	   investigating	   the	   significant	   Condition	   x	   Hemisphere	   Interaction	   showed	  that	  the	  significant	  differences	  occurred	  between	  left	  and	  right	  hemisphere	  for	  continuity	  edit	  conditions	  (with	  the	  left	  hemisphere	  being	  stronger	  desynchronized	  than	  the	  right,	  p<0.001)	  and	   between	   continuity	   edit	   and	   reverse	   shot	   conditions	   in	   the	   right	   hemisphere	   (with	  continuity	  edits	  being	  less	  desynchronized	  than	  reverse	  shots,	  p	  <0.01).	  See	  Figure	  20	  below.	  
	  
Figure	   20:	  Central	  alpha	  power	  results	  regarding	  Condition	  x	  Hemisphere	   interaction:	  F(1,16)=6.22,	  p<0.05.	   Indicated	  are	  significant	   differences	   between	   alpha	   power	   for	   continuity	   edit	   condition	   in	   left	   and	   continuity	   edit	   condition	   in	   right	  hemisphere	  p<0.001,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  continuity	  edit	  condition	  and	  reverse	  shot	  condition	  in	  right	  hemisphere	  p<0.01.	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For	  central	  beta	  power	  values	   the	  2x2x5	  ANOVA	  (2	   levels	  of	  Condition	   (continuity	  edit	  and	  reverse	   shot	   condition),	   2	   levels	   of	   Hemisphere	   (left	   versus	   right),	   and	   5	   levels	   of	   Time	   (5	  seconds	  from	  cut	  on))	  showed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Time	  only	  (F(4,64)=23.53,	  p<0.001).	  Post-­‐hocs	   showed	   that	   for	   the	   time-­‐course	   the	   significant	   differences	   occurred	   between	   all	  time	   windows	   during	   video	   observation	   (desynchronization	   phase)	   and	   all	   time	   windows	  after	  video	  observation	  (resynchronization	  phase)	  (p<0.001).	  See	  Figure	  21	  below.	  For	   frontal	   beta	   power	   values,	   the	   2x5	   ANOVA	   (2	   levels	   of	   Condition	   (continuity	   edit	   and	  reverse	   shot	   condition)	  and	  5	   levels	  of	  Time	   (5	   seconds	   from	  cut	  on))	   showed	  a	   significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Time	  only	  (F(4,64)=17.36,	  p<0.001)	  	  Post-­‐hocs	   showed	   that	   for	   the	   time	   course	   the	   significant	   differences	   occurred	   between	   all	  time	   windows	   during	   video	   observation	   (desynchronization	   phase)	   and	   all	   time	   windows	  after	  video	  observation	  (resynchronization	  phase)	  (all	  p<0.001).	  See	  Figure	  21	  below.	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Control	  in	  occipital	  regions	  
	  To	  control	  for	  similar	  effects	  in	  occipital	  regions	  we	  repeated	  the	  analysis	  just	  described	  in	  1)	  and	  2)	  in	  occipital	  electrodes.	  The	  4x2	  ANOVA	  with	  4	  factors	  of	  Condition	  (baseline,	  continuity	  edit,	   reverse	  shot	  and	  action	  execution)	  and	  2	   factors	  of	  Hemisphere	   in	   the	  occipital	   region	  showed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  Condition	  only	  (F(3,48)=21.44,	  p<0.001).	  	  Post-­‐hoc	   comparisons	   showed	   that	   frequency	   power	   for	   baseline	   was	   significantly	   higher	  than	  for	  all	  other	  conditions	  (p<0.001).	  There	  was	  no	  difference	  between	  frequency	  power	  for	  observation	  conditions	  and	  action	  execution.	  	  See	  Figure	  22	  below.	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Figure	  23:	  Results	  of	  a	  control	  analysis	  assessing	  time-­‐course	  of	  occipital	  alpha	  power	  ERD.	  Condition	  effect:	  F(4,64)=23.93,	  p<0.001.	  Significant	  differences	  occur	  between	  desynchronization	  and	  resynchronization	  periods:	  p<0.05.	  	  III.2.4.3	  Results	  Rating	  Task	  	  Only	   the	   results	   of	   question	   4	   of	   the	   rating	   task	   revealed	   significant	   differences	   between	  observation	  conditions.	  For	  the	  question	  "How	  natural	  did	  you	  find	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  scene	  in	  this	  video?”	  participants	  rated	  videos	  with	  a	  continuity	  edit	  as	  more	  natural	  in	  their	  representation	   of	   the	   scene	   than	   videos	   including	   a	   reverse	   shot	   (N=17,	   T=	   25,	   Z=	   2,22,	  p<0.05).	  See	  Figure	  24	  below.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	   24:	  Results	   of	   the	   rating	   task,	   question:	   “How	  natural	   did	   you	   find	   the	   representation	  of	   the	   scene	   in	   this	   video?”,	  showing	  that	  movie	  clips	  containing	  a	  continuity	  edit	  were	  judged	  as	  more	  naturally	  representing	  the	  scene	  than	  movie	  clips	  containing	  a	  reverse	  shot	  edit.	  Results	  of	  Wilcoxon	  Signed	  Ranks:	  N=17,	  T=	  25,	  Z=	  2,22,	  p<0.05.	  	  The	  following	  tablet	  provides	  means	  and	  standarderrors	  for	  all	  significant	  results	  reported.	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MEANS AND STANDART ERRORS RESULTS      
ERP RESULTS Mean STE    
TIME WINDOW 1 (140-190ms)   
Comparison Baseline-Montage Conditions   
Significant potential differences for Condition x Hemisphere Interaction   Left hemisphere, Baseline 0.037 0.047 Left hemisphere, Montage Conditions -0.164 0.067 
Significant potential differences for Condition x ROI Interaction   Anterior Regions, Baseline -0.006 0.081 Anterior Regions, Montage Conditions -0.212 0.092 
   
Comparison Continuity Edit – Reverse shot Conditions   
Significant potential differenced for ROI effect   Anterior Regions -0.227 0.106 Posterior Regions 0.174 0.076       
TIME WINDOW 2 (180-220 ms)   
Comparison Baseline-Montage Conditions   
Significant potential differences for Condition effect   Baseline -0.006 0.042 Montage Conditions -0.123 0.042 
Significant potential differences for ROI effect   Anterior Regions -0.666 0.241 Central Regions -0.504 0.126 Posterior Regions 0.977 0.238 
Significant potential differences for Condition x ROI Interaction   Anerior Regions, Baseline -0.245 0.296 Anterior Regions, Montage Conditions -1.087 0.241 Posterior Regions, Baseline 0.61 0.325 Posterior Regions, Montage Conditions 1.34 0.198    
Comparison Continuity Edit-Reverse Shot Conditions   
Significant potential differences for ROI effect   Anterior Regions -1.086 0.209 Central Regions -0.625 0.12 Posterior Regions -1.344 0.199       
TIME WINDOW 3 (250-380ms)   
Comparison Baseline-Montage Conditions   
Significant potential differences for ROI effect   Anterior Regions -1.205 0.202 Central Regions -0.72 0.132 Posterior Regions 1.675 0.227    
Comparison Continuity Edit-Reverse Shot Conditions   
Significant potential differences for ROI effect   Anterior regions -1.324 0.216 Central regions -0.784 0.142 Posterior regions 1.719 0.178 
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Significant potention diffrences for Hemisphere x ROI Interaction   Posterior left regions 1.451 0.159 Posterior right regions 1.985 0.277 
   
   
TIME WINDOW 4 (400-650ms)   
Comparison Baseline-Montage Conditions   
Significant potential differences for Hemisphere effect   Left hemisphere -0.212 0.092 Right hemisphere 0.54 0.086 
Significant potential differences for ROI effect   Anterior regions -0.678 0.165 Central regions 0.233 0.191 Posterior regions 0.938 0.221 
Significant potential differences for Condition x Hemisphere Interaction   Left hemisphere, Baseline -0.343 0.132 Left hemisphere, Montage Conditions -0.081 0.113 Right hemisphere, Baseline 0.714 0.14 Right hemisphere, Montage Conditions 0.367 0.077 
Significant potential differences for Condition x ROI Interaction   Posterior Regions, Baseline 1.299 0.319 Posterior Regions, Montage Conditions 0.578 0.184 
   
Comparison Continuity Edit – Reverse shot Conditions   
Significant potential differences for Hemisphere effect   Left hemisphere -0.097 0.12 Right hemisphere 0.408 0.099 
Significant potential differences for ROI effect   Anterior regions -0.427 0.139 Central regions 0.554 0.169 Posterior regions 0.38 0.188 
Significant potential differences for Condition x Hemisphere x ROI Interaction   Anterior left, Continuity Edit -0.571 0.171 Anterior lef, Reverse Shot -1.104 0.291 Central right, Continuity Edit 0.514 0.252 Central rigtht, Reverse Shot 0.892 0.25 
   
   
ERD RESULTS Mean STE 
   
First analysis central alpha   
Significant lot(power) differences for Condition effect   Baseline 0.262 0.21 Continuity Edit -0.176 0.214 Reverse Shot -0.206 0.22 Action Execution -0.446 0.17 
   
First analysis central and frontal beta   
Significant lot(power) differences for Condition effect   Baseline -0.776 0.124 Continuity Edit -1.159 0.109 Reverse Shot -1.16 0.114 Action Execution -1.236 0.095 
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Significant log(power) differences for Region effect   Central left -1.248 0.123 Central right -1.218 0.127 Frontal -0.782 0.1 
Significant log(power) differences for Condition x Region interaction   Baseline left central -0.983 0.142 Continuity Edit left central -1.309 0.132 Reverse Shot left central -1.307 0.134 Action Execution left central -1.392 0.11 Baseline right central -0.95 0.144 Continuity Edit right central -1.256 0.131 Reverse Shot right central -1.264 0.133 Action Execution right central -1.392 0.11 Baseline frontal -0.394 0.14 Continuity Edit frontal -0.912 0.098 Reverse Shot left frontal -0.908 0.105 Action Execution left frontal -0.913 0.094 
   
First analysis occipital alpha   
Significant log(power) differences for Condition effect   Baseline 0.501 0.224 Continuity Edit -0.104 0.186 Reverse Shot -0.118 0.185 Action Execution 0.017 0.194 
   
Time course analysis, comp. Continuity edit and reverse shot – central alpha   
Significant log(power) differences for Time effect   1st second -0.445 0.09 2nd second -0.449 0.11 3rd second -0.427 0.08 4th second -0.22 0.07 5th second -0.086 0.07 
Significant lot(power) differences for Condition x Hemisphere interaction   Continuity Edit, left hemisphere -0.3 0.082 Continuity Edit, right hemisphere -0.273 0.079 Reverse Shot, left hemisphere -0.298 0.08 Reverse Shot, right hemisphere -0.291 0.078 
   
Time course analysis, comp. Continuity edit and reverse shot – central beta   
Significant log(power) differences for Time effect   1st second -0.323 0.074 2nd second -0.317 0.075 3rd second -0.251 0.064 4th second -0.053 0.065 5th second -0.042 0.058 
   
Time course analysis, comp. Continuity edit and reverse shot – frontal beta   
Significant log(power) differences for Time effect   1st second -0.502 0.093 2nd second -0.516 0.096 3rd second -0.47 0.097 4th second -0.362 0.099 5th second -0.301 0.102 
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Time course analysis, comp. Continuity edit und reverse shot – occipital alpha   
Significant lot(power) differences for Time effect   1st second -0.565 0.11 2nd second -0.612 0.12 3rd second -0.586 0.102 4th second -0.333 0.102 5th second -0.152 0.146 
   
Rating Task Results   
Question	  „How	  natural	  did	  you	  find	  the	  representation	  oft	  he	  scene?“   Continuity Edit 34.912 5.313 Reverse Shot 30.257 5.221 
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III.2.5	  Summary	  and	  Discussion	  of	  Results	  	  
ERP	  results	  	  
	  For	  the	  first	  time	  window	  (140-­‐190	  ms)	  we	  found	  significantly	  lower	  potentials	  for	  montage	  conditions	   than	   for	   baseline	   in	   anterior	   and	   left	   hemispheric	   regions.	   Together	   with	   the	  descriptive	   information	   of	   the	   Grand	   Average	   ERP	   this	   shows	   an	   amplitude	   increase	   of	   an	  early	   anterior	   negativity	   (N1)	   for	   montage	   conditions,	   especially	   pronounced	   in	   the	   left	  hemisphere.	   Early	   anterior	   negativities	   have	   previously	   been	   described	   as	   appearing	   in	  response	  to	  structural	  irregularities	  in	  language	  as	  well	  as	  in	  music	  and	  action	  observation.	  In	  the	  language	  domain	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  correlated	  with	  the	  initial	  syntactic	  processing	  of	  local	  dependencies.	  They	  often	  show	  a	  left	  hemispheric	  bias	  and,	  if	  task	  relevant,	  were	  described	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  late	  posterior	  positivity	  (Hahne	  and	  Friederici	  1999;	  Friederici	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Friederici	   2002,	   Grodzinsky	   and	   Santi,	   2008;	   Steinhauer	   &	   Drury,	   2012).	   In	   studies	   in	   the	  domain	   of	   music	   in	   contrast,	   a	   right	   hemispheric	   bias	   for	   the	   early	   negativity	   has	   been	  observed,	  while	  the	  following	  late	  positivity	  was	  again	  localized	  in	  posterior	  regions	  (Koelsch,	  2011).	  Most	   importantly,	   in	   recent	   studies	   investigating	   content	   and	   structure	   violations	   in	  action	   observation,	   it	   was	   reported	   that	   structure	   violations	   correlate	   with	   a	   pronounced	  early	  negativity	  and	  a	   late	  positivity	  both	  localized	  in	  anterior	   left	  regions	  (Maffongelli	  et	  al.	  (submitted)).	  	  Our	  results	  of	  the	  first	  time	  window	  thus	  suggest	  that	  both	  the	  visual	  onset	  of	  a	  video	  as	  well	  as	   the	  visually	  different	  stimulus	  after	  a	  cut	  elicit	  an	  ERP	  associated	  with	   the	  detection	  of	  a	  syntactic	   violation.	   The	   significant	   difference	   between	   baseline	   and	   montage	   condition,	  however,	   indicates	   that	   the	   violation	   caused	  by	   the	  within-­‐scene	   cuts	   is	   perceived	   as	   being	  much	  stronger.	  Interestingly,	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  Montage	  conditions	  (continuity	   edit	   versus	   reverse	   shot)	   were	   found	   in	   this	   time	   window,	   indicating	   that	   the	  quantitatively/qualitatively	   different	   visual	   interruption	   caused	   by	   these	   two	   conditions	  (continuity	  edit	  versus	  reverse	  shot)	  is	  not	  traced	  by	  this	  component.	  	  	  For	   the	   second	   time	   window	   (180-­‐220	   ms)	   we	   found	   significantly	   higher	   potential	   for	  baseline	   than	   for	   montage	   conditions	   in	   anterior	   regions,	   as	   well	   as	   significantly	   lower	  potential	  for	  baseline	  than	  for	  montage	  conditions	  in	  posterior	  regions.	  	  Together	  with	  the	  descriptive	  information	  of	  the	  Grand	  Average	  ERP	  this	  shows	  an	  amplitude	  increase	   of	   an	   early	   anterior	   positivity	   (P2)	   as	   well	   as	   early	   posterior	   negativity	   (N2)	   for	  baseline.	   Previous	   research	   has	   correlated	   raising	   amplitude	   sizes	   of	   P2	   with	   decreasing	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stimulus	   ambiguity.	   Specifically,	   Kommeier	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   reported	   that	   when	   participants	  watch	  ambiguous	  stimuli	   (as	   the	  Necker	   lattice)	  as	  well	  as	  slightly	  disambiguated	  stimuli	  of	  the	  same	  kind,	  an	  early	  centrofrontal	  positivity	  around	  200	  ms	  after	  stimulus	  onset	  and	  a	  late	  centroparietal	   positivity	   around	   400	   ms	   after	   stimulus	   onset	   can	   be	   observed,	   with	   the	  amplitudes	  of	  both	  increasing	  with	  decreasing	  ambiguity.	  The	  change	  in	  vision	  produced	  by	  a	  stimulus	  onset	   is	  a	  clear	  event	  of	  rather	  non-­‐ambiguous	  nature.	  The	  change	  caused	  by	  a	  cut	  involving	   the	   montage	   of	   two	   shots	   filmed	   from	   a	   different	   camera	   position,	   in	   contrast,	  causes	   what	   can	   be	   described	   as	   an	   ambiguous	   event.	   Precisely,	   the	   same	   scene	   is	   still	  observed	  though	  the	  camera	  has	  been	  displaced,	  that	  is,	  the	  visual	  continuity	  is	  broken.	  It	   is	  possible	  that	  these	  kinds	  of	  stimuli	  elicit	  a	  response	  precisely	  signaling	  an	  ambiguity	  as	  some	  visual	  features	  are	  still	  kept,	  while	  others	  have	  changed.	  	  Interpretations	   of	   the	   differences	   found	   in	   posterior	   regions	   are	   reminiscent	   of	   a	   study	   by	  Proverbio	   &	   Riva	   (2009).	   In	   this	   study,	   which	   explores	   ERP	   responses	   to	   static	   visual	  representations	   (photos)	   of	   actions,	   the	   authors	   found	   a	   pronounced	   posterior	   negativity,	  around	   250	  ms	   after	   stimulus	   onset,	   elicited	   by	   all	   stimuli	   representing	   comprehensible	   in	  comparison	   to	   incomprehensible	   actions.	  The	  differences	   in	  our	  data	  might	   thus	   stem	   from	  the	  fact	  that	  montages	  in	  general	  cause	  a	  slight	  disturbance	  in	  action	  comprehension,	  traced	  by	  the	  modulation	  of	  the	  reported	  component.	  	  Again,	   interestingly,	   also	   in	   the	   second	   time	  window,	  no	  difference	  between	   continuity	   edit	  and	   reverse	   shot	   condition	  was	   found,	   indicating	   that	  within	   early	   processing	   there	   are	   no	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  conditions.	  	  For	  the	  third	  time	  window	  (250-­‐380	  ms)	  no	  differences	  were	  found	  either	  between	  baseline	  and	   montage	   conditions	   or	   between	   continuity	   edit	   and	   reverse	   shot	   montage	   conditions.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  Grand	  Average	  ERP	   for	   this	   time	  window	  showed	  a	  negativity	   in	  anterior	  regions	  and	  a	  positivity	  in	  posterior	  regions.	  Fronto-­‐central	  negativities	  around	  300	  ms	  after	  stimulus	  onset	  have	  been	  reported	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  detection	  of	  faces	  (Barrett,	  Rugg,	  &	  Perrett,	  1988;	  Debruille,	  Pineda,	  &	  Renault,	  1996;	  Debruille,	  Brodeur,	  &	  Porras	  2012).	  Faces	  are	  indeed	  present	  in	  all	  of	  our	  stimuli	  conditions.	  Positivities	  (in	  temporal/parietal	  regions)	  around	  300	  ms	   after	   stimulus	   onset	   have	   been	   associated	  with	  working	  memory	   activities,	  indicating	   a	   perceived	   change	   of	   the	   environment	   (Donchin	  &	   Coles,	   1988;	   Patel	   &	   Azzam,	  2005;	  Polich,	  2007).	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  did	  not	  find	  significant	  differences	  between	  conditions	  here	  is	  likely	  to	  indicate	  that	  face	  detection	  and	  working	  memory	  access	  do	  not	  differ	  among	  our	  conditions.	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  For	   the	   fourth	   time	   window	   (400-­‐650	   ms)	   we	   found	   a	   significantly	   higher	   potential	   for	  baseline	   than	   for	   montage	   conditions	   in	   posterior	   regions.	   Together	   with	   the	   descriptive	  information	  of	   the	  Grand	  Average	  ERP	   this	   shows	  an	  amplitude	   increase	  of	   a	   late	  posterior	  positivity	   (P4-­‐6)	   for	   baseline.	   As	   reported	   above,	   late	   posterior	   positivities	   have	   been	  described	   in	   language	   research	   to	   correlate	  with	   structure	   violations.	   However,	   it	  was	   also	  reported	   that	   strong	   content	   violations	   do	   correlate	   with	   a	   pronounced	   posterior	   P4-­‐6	  (Meerendonk	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  It	  can	  therefore	  be	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  strong	  visual	  change	  from	  black	  screen	  to	  video	  onset	  elicits	  the	  registration	  of	  a	  semantic	  rather	  than	  syntactic	  violation	  leading	  to	  a	  contextual	  update	  indicated	  by	  a	  pronounced	  posterior	  P4-­‐6.	  Another	  possibility	  might	  be	   that	   the	  observed	  P4-­‐6	   is	   the	  one	  reported	   to	  appear	  after	  non-­‐ambiguous	  stimuli	  (see	  results	  for	  the	  second	  time	  window),	  though	  in	  the	  studies	  of	  Kommeier	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  this	  component	  was	  found	  in	  central-­‐parietal	  regions	  rather	  than	  in	  posterior	  regions.	  	  	  Comparing	  continuity	  edit	  and	  reverse	  shot	  conditions	  within	  this	  time	  window	  we	  found	  two	  significant	  differences:	  We	  measured	  significantly	  higher	  potential	  (P4-­‐6)	  for	  continuity	  edit	  condition	   than	   for	  reverse	  shot	  condition	   in	  anterior	   left	   regions.	  As	  reported	  above,	   recent	  studies	  exploring	  content	  and	  structure	  violation	  in	  action	  observation	  observed	  a	  late	  P4-­‐6	  in	  left	   anterior	   regions	   following	   syntactic	   violations	   (indicated	   by	   early	   left	   anterior	  negativities),	  associated	  with	  postperceptual	  processes	  possibly	  serving	  an	  adjustment	  to	  the	  detected	   violation,	   most	   likely	   helping	   to	   overcome	   the	   change	   without	   reaching	   visual	  awareness.	   Indeed,	   in	   our	   data	   both	  montage	   conditions	   show	   an	   early	   anterior	   negativity,	  though	  this	  component	  is	  not	  different	  in	  amplitude	  when	  comparing	  continuity	  editing	  and	  reverse	   shot.	   Interestingly	   then	   however,	   the	   later	   P4-­‐6	   component	   indicating	   updating/	  reanalysis	  is	  stronger	  for	  the	  continuity	  editing	  condition,	  possibly	  indicating	  a	  suppression	  of	  the	  adjusting	  response	  for	  reverse	  shots.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  in	  central	  right	  regions	  we	  found	  a	   significantly	  higher	  potential	   (P4-­‐6)	   for	   the	   reverse	  shot	  condition	  when	  compared	   to	   the	  continuity	   editing	   condition.	   Interestingly,	   previous	   ERP	   studies	   investigating	   the	   neural	  correlates	  of	  change	  blindness	  found	  a	  pronounced	  late	  positivity	  (300-­‐700	  ms)	  over	  central	  parietal	   lobes	   only	   when	   a	   change	   was	   detected	   (Niedeggen,	   Wichmann,	   &	   Stoerig,	   2001;	  Koivisto	  &	  Revonsuo,	  2003).	  Koivisto	  &	  Revonsuo	  suggested	  that	  these	  changes	  are	  likely	  not	  to	   be	   associated	   to	   phenomenal	   visual	   awareness,	   but	   to	   postperceptual	   processes	   such	   as	  conscious	   evaluation	   of	   change	   and	   decision	  making.	  With	   reference	   to	   Block	   (2001)	   they	  write	  “this	  later	  positivity	  may	  be	  related	  to	  access	  consciousness	  or	  reflexive	  consciousness	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(a	  special	  kind	  of	  access).	   It	  does	  not	  correlate	   to	   the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  seeing	  but	   to	  perceiver’s	   other	   beliefs	   about	   the	   experience	  with	   the	   seen	   event.”	   (Koivisto	   &	   Revunsuo,	  2003,	  p.428)	  	  	  Interestingly,	  taken	  together	  these	  findings	  can	  further	  illuminate,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  be	  informed	  by	  a	  prior	  fMRI	  study	  on	  the	  topic,	  done	  by	  Magliano	  and	  Zacks	  in	  2011.	  Using	  film	  sequences	   taken	   out	   of	   a	   real	   movie	   Magliano	   and	   Zacks	   distinguished	   BOLD	   responses	  regarding	   three	   different	   types	   of	   stimuli:	   a)	   Film	   sequences	   including	   montages	   that,	  according	  to	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  Magliano	  and	  Zacks,	  supposedly	  do	  not	  violate	  time	  and	  space	   or	   action	   continuity	   as	   the	   edited	   shots	   show	   the	   same	   ongoing	   scene	   filmed	   from	  different	   camera	   positions	   but	   not	   violating	   the	   180°	   rule	   (continuity	   edits);	   b)	   Film	  sequences	  including	  montages	  that	  supposedly	  violate	  time	  and	  space	  continuity	  as	  the	  edited	  shots	   show	  the	  same	  scene	  but	   the	  difference	   in	  position	  of	   the	   filming	  camera	  violates	   the	  180°	   rule	   (reverse	   shots);	   c)	   Film	   sequences	   including	  montages	   that	   clearly	   violate	   space,	  time	   and	   action	   continuity	   by	   editing	   shots	   showing	   completely	   different	   scenes.	   BOLD	  responses	  registered	  during	  the	  watching	  of	  continuity	  edits	  revealed	  a	  transient	  increase	  in	  networks	  associated	  with	  early	  visual	  processing	  (inferotemporal	  cortex,	  posterior	  superior	  temporal	  sulcus	  and	  precentral	  sulcus)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  precuneus	  right	  after	  the	  cut,	  which	  the	   authors	   interpreted	   as	   stimulus-­‐driven	   processing	   serving	   the	   remapping	   of	   visual	  features	   across	   the	   editing	   boundaries.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   for	   montages	   violating	   spatial	  and/or	  temporal	  discontinuities	  by	  crossing	  the	  180°	  axis,	  fMRI	  data	  revealed	  a	  contemporary	  transient	   bilateral	   increase	   of	   activation	   in	   the	   parahippocampal	   cortex,	   interpreted	   by	   the	  authors	  as	  a	  stimulus-­‐driven	  response	  to	  the	  reverse	  shot.	  Moreover,	  for	  the	  same	  condition,	  they	   also	   observed	   transient	   decreases	   of	   activation	   in	   early	   visual	   cortices	   that	   they	  suggested	   reflects	   attention-­‐driven	   down	   regulation	   of	   activity	   in	   regions	   involved	   in	   the	  adjustive	   processing	   of	   the	   changed	   dimensions,	   thus	   being	   responsible	   for	   the	   perceptual	  salience	  of	   the	  cut.	  Lastly,	   for	  clear	  scene	  breaks	   they	   found	  a	  reduction	  of	  activation	   in	   the	  lateral	  parietal	   cortex,	   a	   region	   formerly	  associated	  with	   the	   representation	  of	   action	  goals,	  possibly	   serving	   a	   complete	   contextual	   update	   due	   to	   the	   salient	   difference	   of	   the	   new	  stimulus	  (Maglioni	  &	  Zacks,	  2011).42	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Notably,	  Magliano	  and	  Zack’s	  interpretations	  are	  driven	  by	  Event	  Segmentation	  Theory	  (EST).	  EST	  models	  how	  the	  brain	  manages	  to	  dissect	  the	  continuous	  flow	  of	  perceptual	   input	   into	  hierarchically	  organized	  parts	  and	  sub-­‐parts.	   Important	   in	  this	  context	  are	  prior	  findings	  demonstrating	  that	  in	  general	  the	  brain’s	  responses	  to	  discontinuities	  depends	  on	  the	  degree	  of	   spectators’	   attention	   towards	   to	   the	   violations	   they	   represent	   (see	   Grill-­‐Spector	   &	   Malach,	   2001,	   for	   stimulus	   driven	  discontinuities	  and	  Maunsell	  &	  Treue,	  2006	  for	  attention	  driven	  discontinuities).	  While	  changes	  of	  a	  stimulus	  in	  general	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  increase	  activity	  in	  regions	  associated	  with	  the	  processing	  of	  the	  changed	  dimensions,	  hence	  likely	  helping	  the	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fMRI	  as	  a	   technique	  allows	  excellent	  spatial	   resolution	  but	  cannot	  provide	  precise	   temporal	  information,	   as	   is	   accessible	   via	   EEG	   recordings.	   Furthermore,	   previous	   EEG	   research	   has	  accumulated	   substantial	   knowledge	   associating	   certain	   components	   with	   certain	   cognitive	  functions,	  that	  might	  be	  of	  crucial	  help	  in	  further	  investigating	  the	  issues	  at	  hand.	  	  To	  be	  precise,	  our	  findings	  could	  not	  only	  support	  but	  also	  refine	  Maglioni	  &	  Zacks	  hypothesis	  that	   moving	   images	   are	   processed	   by	   the	   brain	   using	   networks	   for	   action	   observation	  processing,	  crucially	  depending	  on	  real	  world	  experience.	  Indeed,	  our	  findings	  indicated	  that	  these	  networks	  seem	  to	  be	  sensitive	   to	  violations	  of	   constancy	  expectations,	   represented	   in	  the	  ERP	  by	  components	  previously	  associated	  with	  syntactic	  violations	  during	  the	  perception	  of	   action	   sequences.	   Furthermore,	   regarding	   the	   temporal	   dimension	   of	   the	   processes	  involved,	   our	   study	   revealed	   that	   earliest	   stimulus	   detection	   processes,	   at	   least	   as	   far	   as	  reflected	   by	   the	   modulation	   of	   the	   ERP	   components	   observed,	   do	   not	   differ	   significantly	  between	   continuity	   edits	   and	   reverse	   shots.	   In	   contrast	   to	   that,	   the	   modulation	   of	   later	  components,	   as	  observed	   in	  our	   study,	  does	   show	  differences	  between	  montage	  conditions,	  thus	  supporting	  Magliano	  &	  Zacks	  hypothesis	   that	   late	  postperceptual	  processing	  makes	  up	  for	  the	  different	  experiences	  connected	  with	  continuity	  edits	  and	  reverse	  shots.	  To	  be	  precise,	  our	   findings	   indicate,	   just	   as	   suggested	   by	   Magliano	   and	   Zacks,	   that	   continuity	   edits	   elicit	  postperceptual	   processes	   probably	   helping	   to	   adjust	   to	   the	  new	  visual	   inputs,	   preventing	   a	  distortion	  of	  the	  visual	  flow.	  Futhermore,	  our	  findings	  additionally	  showed	  that	  reverse	  shots	  seem	   to	   activate	   access	   to	   reflexive	   consciousness,	   possibly	   directing	   awareness	   from	   the	  content	  of	   the	   image	  to	   its	  representation,	   thus	  the	  conscious	  perception	  of	   the	  cut.	  We	  will	  come	  back	  to	  these	  findings	  in	  the	  integrative	  discussion	  of	  ERP	  and	  ERD	  results	  below.	  
	  
ERD	  results	  	  ERD	  results	  in	  general	  show	  the	  expected	  desynchronization	  of	  the	  mu-­‐rhythm	  during	  action	  observation	   and	   execution	   in	   both	   alpha	   and	  beta	  bands.	  More	   specifically,	  when	   analysing	  band	   power	   of	   both	   bands	   in	   selected	   electrodes	   during	   the	   second	   second	   of	   action	  observation	   as	   well	   as	   in	   the	   second	   surrounding	   participants’	   button	   press,	   a	   significant	  desynchronization	   during	   action	   observation	   as	   well	   as,	   more	   pronounced,	   during	   action	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  perceiver	  to	  bridge	  the	  discontinuity,	  stronger	  stimuli	  changes	  across	  cuts	  have	  been	  reported	  to	  produce	  attention	  driven	  decrease	  of	  activation	  of	  the	  same	  regions,	  hence	  possibly	  not	  leading	  to	  an	  assimilation	  of	  the	  change	  but	  instead	  to	  a	  further	  enhanced	  salience	  of	  stimulus	  differences	  and,	  consequently,	  to	  the	  perception	  of	  an	  event	  break.	  Magliano	  and	  Zacks	  (2011)	  hypothesize	   that	   precisely	   these	   principles	   underlie	   the	   180°	   rule,	   with	   continuity	   edits	   depending	   on	   spatial	   remapping	  processes,	  which	  for	  reverse	  shots	  as	  well	  as	  for	  real	  scene	  breaks	  are	  suppressed.	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execution	  was	  found.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  in	  occipital	  alpha	  no	  difference	  between	  observation	  and	   execution	   conditions	   was	   found,	   supporting	   the	   notion	   that	   alpha	   ERD	   in	   occipital	  cortices	  is	  discriminable	  from	  alpha	  ERD	  in	  motor	  areas,	  with	  alpha	  ERD	  in	  occipital	  cortices	  showing	  only	  effects	  likely	  due	  to	  attention.	  	  Further	   investigation	   of	   the	   whole	   time	   course	   of	   mu-­‐rhythm	   desynchronization	   and	  resynchronization	   for	   observation	   conditions	   (that	   is,	   three	   seconds	   of	   movie	   observation	  following	  the	  point	  of	  montage	  and	  two	  seconds	  of	  the	  subsequent	  ITI),	  in	  beta	  bands	  did	  not	  show	   any	   further	   difference	   between	   conditions	   (continuity	   edit	   versus	   reverse	   shot	  montage).	   In	   contrast,	   in	   alpha	   bands	   a	   significant	   Condition*Hemisphere	   interaction	   was	  detected.	   To	   be	   precise,	   post-­‐hoc	   tests	   revealed	   that	   for	   continuity	   edits	   the	   significant	  difference	  was	  between	  hemispheres,	  with	   the	   left	   hemisphere	   showing	   stronger	  ERD	   than	  the	   right	   hemisphere.	   In	   contrast,	   for	   reverse	   shots,	   ERD	   was	   equal	   in	   both	   hemispheres,	  leading	   to	   a	   significant	   difference	   between	   continuity	   edit	   condition	   and	   reverse	   shot	  condition	  in	  the	  right	  hemisphere.	  Previous	   studies	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   mu-­‐rhythm	   shows	   ERD	   during	   voluntary	   action	  execution	  as	  well	  as	  action	  observation	   (Derambure	  et.	  al.,	  1993;	  Stancak	  and	  Pfurtscheller,	  1996;	  Toro	  et	  al.,	  1994;	  Pfurtscheller	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  Moreover,	  it	  has	  been	  reported	  that	  in	  alpha	  bands,	   mu-­‐rhythm	   suppression	   during	   the	   observation	   of	   hand	   actions	   is	   larger	   in	   the	  hemisphere	  contralateral	  to	  the	  moving	  hand	  (Perry	  &	  Bentin,	  2009;	  for	  respective	  findings	  in	  fMRI	   see	   also	   Shmuelof	  &	   Zohary,	   2005).	  When	   interpreting	   our	   findings	  we	  would	   like	   to	  reiterate	  that	  a	  camera	  displacement	  of	  180°	  (reverse	  shot)	  causes	  a	  mirroring	  of	  the	  original	  spatial	  relations	  of	  the	  viewer	  to	  the	  scene:	  what	  has	  been	  presented	  as	  left	  before,	  becomes	  right	  after	  the	  cut.	  We	  suggest	  that	  this	  might	  cause	  a	  short	  orientation-­‐deficit,	  disturbing	  the	  clear	   identification	   of	   the	   observed	   hand	   actually	   executing	   the	   action.	   In	   consequence,	   for	  reverse	   shots	   no	   clear	   contralateral	   lateralization	   of	   the	   ERD	  might	   occur,	   but	   rather	   both	  hemispheres	  should	  show	  equally	  strong	  ERD	  –	  as	   indeed	  was	   found	   in	   the	  present	  experi-­‐ment.	  Again,	   analyses	  of	   alpha	  power	   in	  occipital	   regions	  do	  not	   reveal	   comparable	   results,	  supporting	  the	  notion	  that	  alpha	  ERD	  in	  occipital	  cortices	  is	  discriminable	  from	  alpha	  ERD	  in	  motor	  areas.	  	  We	  would	   furthermore	   like	   to	   point	   out	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   these	   diverging	   activations	  have	  an	  influence	  on	  further	  processing	  of	  the	  stimulus	  as	   indicated	  by	  our	  ERP	  results	  and	  previous	   studies	   of	   Magliano	   &	   Zacks	   (2011).	   Indeed,	   the	   location	   of	   the	   late	   P4-­‐6	   in	   the	  reverse	   shot	   condition,	   lying	   in	   central	   right	   electrodes,	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   differences	  found	   in	   our	   analysis	   of	   the	   ERD	   of	   the	   central	  mu-­‐rhythm,	   precisely	   happening	   in	   central	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right	  regions.	  Future	  research	  needs	  to	  adress	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  different	  processing	  of	  stimuli	  might	  be	  due	  to	  deviating	  processes	  in	  motor	  rather	  than	  visual	  regions.	  	  Also,	   it	   has	   to	   be	   clearly	   stated	   at	   this	   point	   that	   these	   results	   do	   not	   match	   our	   original	  hypothesis	  predicting	  a	  stronger	  ERD	  for	  stimuli	  that	  better	  resemble	  vision	  as	  known	  from	  real	  world	  experience	  (that	  is,	  continuity	  edits).	  This	  might	  be	  due	  to	  several	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   discontinuity	   edits,	   when	   compared	   to	   continuity	   edits,	   elicit	   an	  increase	  of	  attention	   in	  general,	   influencing	  also	  the	  action	  perception	   links	   investigated	  via	  analysis	  of	  the	  mu-­‐rhythm.	  Such	  attentional	  drain	  could	  make	  up	  for	  the	  differences	  expected,	  that	   is	   enhancing	   the	   activation	   of	   the	   motor	   cortex	   during	   action	   observation,	   originally	  assumed	   to	   be	   attenuated	   due	   to	   the	   artificiality	   of	   the	   representation.	   Indeed,	   previous	  studies	   reported	   that	   the	  mirror	  mechanism	  can	  be	  enhanced	  by	  attentional	  processes	   (see	  Bach,	   Peatfield	   &	   Tipper,	   2007	   for	   behavioral	   results	   and	   Chong,	   Williams,	   Cunnington,	   &	  Mattingley,	  (2008)	  for	  an	  fMRI	  study).	  Furthermore	  Reeves,	  Thorson,	  Rothschild,	  McDonald,	  Hirsch,	  &	  Goldstein,	  (1985)	  by	  comparing	  potential	  of	  occipital	  alpha	  as	  registered	  during	  EEG	  recording,	   reported	   that	   attention	   was	   directed	   toward	   the	   source	   of	   a	   perceived	   discon-­‐tinuities.	   These	   findings	   can	   also	   be	   supported	   by	   studies	   showing	   enhanced	   accuracy	   and	  faster	  response	  times	  in	  recognition	  memory	  tasks	  for	  information	  originally	  presented	  after	  a	  discontinuity	   (Carroll	  &	  Bever,	  1976).	   Indeed,	   considering	   this	  alternative,	   the	  heightened	  activation	  of	  the	  motor	  cortex	  during	  the	  watching	  of	  videos	  produced	  by	  the	  steadicam	  could	  also	   be	   attributed	   to	   this	   raise	   of	   attention	   due	   to	   the	   additional	   movement	   in	   the	   scene.	  However,	  such	  an	  attentional	  drain	  should	  be	  traceable	  by	  occipital	  alpha	  showing	  the	  same	  differences	  as	  central	  alpha.	  Remarkably,	   this	  control	  analysis	  did	  not	  show	  such	  a	  result	   in	  either	  of	  the	  two	  studies	  conducted.	  In	   consequence	   I	   would	   like	   to	   propose	   another	   explanation	   for	   the	   surprising	   lack	   of	  additional	   activation	   of	   the	   motor	   cortex	   after	   continuity	   edits.	   In	   comparison	   to	   camera	  movements	  enabling	  moving	   images	   to	  closely	  resemble	  vision	   in	   the	  real	  world,	  continuity	  edits	   might	   only	   serve	   to	   produce	   moving	   images	   not	   crucially	   violating	   habits	   from	   real	  world	   perception.	   Indeed,	   one	  may	   doubt	   that	   the	   explanation	   that	   our	   own	   bodily	  move-­‐ments	  in	  the	  world	  could	  lead	  to	  visual	  impressions	  that	  closely	  resemble	  cuts	  in	  the	  movies,	  even	   when	   talking	   about	   continuity	   edits.	   Of	   course	   blinks	   and	   saccades	   might	   elicit	  interruptions	  of	  vision	  reminiscent	  to	  cuts.	  However,	  it	  feels	  as	  if	  this	  insight	  takes	  much	  more	  time	  and	  reflexion	  on	  when	  and	  how	  we	  move,	  blink	  and	  saccade	  and	  how	  this	  could	  lead	  to	  similar	  experiences	  as	  a	  cut,	  than	  considering	  about	  how	  a	  steadicam	  produces	  a	  movement	  close	  to	  our	  own.	  Indeed,	  wouldn’t	  be	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  steadicam	  for	  montage	  be	  the	  use	  of	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a	   steadily	   moving	   camera	   whose	   lens	   sometimes	   gets	   shut	   by	   a	   lid,	   just	   as	   we	   sometimes	  blink?	  Most	  likely	  however,	  the	  effect	  of	  such	  an	  artificial	  blink,	  does	  not	  correspond	  to	  most	  edits,	  not	  even	  those	  complying	  to	  the	  180°	  rule!	  Rather	   than	   actually	   “simulating”	   vision	   in	   the	   real	   world,	   we	   might	   therefore	   consider	  continuity	  edits	  as	  being	  merely	  “less	  violating”	   it.	  This	  would	  be	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that	   the	   first	   component	   (N1),	   indicating	   the	   detection	   of	   structural	   violation	   is	   indeed	  modulated	  in	  the	  same	  way	  by	  both	  edits	  AND	  followed	  for	  continuity	  edits	  by	  a	  component	  suggested	   to	   serve	   overcoming	   of	   this	   violation.	   In	   consequence,	   only	   camera	   movements	  would	   have	   the	   possibility	   to	   help	   creating	  moving	   images	   closely	   resembling	   vision	   in	   the	  real.	  This	  might	  also	  mean,	  that	  only	  camera	  movements	  would	  be	  able	  to	  crucially	  enhance	  the	  mirror	  mechanism,	  possibly	   fundamentally	  underlying	   the	   spectator’s	   immersion	   in	   the	  movie.	  Clearly,	  future	  research	  has	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  further	  illuminate	  this	  issue.43	  	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  thought	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Integrative	  discussion	  of	  ERD,	  ERP	  and	  behavioural	  data	  	  
	  With	   our	   study	   we	   aimed	   to	   illuminate	   how	   different	   kind	   of	   editing	   techniques	   affect	  spectators’	  film	  experience.	  Reflections	  on	  film	  influenced	  by	  4EA	  approaches	  to	  cognition	  led	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  film’s	  obvious	  power	  to	  completely	  involve	  the	  spectator	  in	  a	  fictional	  world	   might	   be	   due	   to	   an	   activation	   of	   all	   habits	   and	   experiences	   of	   an	   embodied	   visual	  activity	   (see	   also	   Chapter	   II.3	   and	   II.4	   of	   this	   thesis).	   Furthermore,	   such	   activation	   might	  depend	  on	  moving	  images	  closely	  resembling	  visual	  perception	  in	  real	  life.	  A	  prominent	  line	  in	  cognitive	   film	   theory	   (see	   Chapter	   II.3	   of	   this	   theses)	   has	   repeatedly	   described	   continuity	  editing	   as	   being	   a	   system	   creating	   such	   kind	   of	   smooth	   images.	   Also	   based	   on	   the	   findings	  reported	  in	  our	  study	  about	  camera	  movements	  (see	  Chapter	  III.1),	  we	  hypothesized	  that	  1)	  edits	   in	  general	   should	  be	  detected,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  plain	  onsets	  of	  new	  visual	   stimuli,	   as	  violations	   of	   continuously	   perceived	   action	   sequences.	   Precisely,	   for	   the	   special	   case	  investigated,	  that	  comprised	  edits	  produced	  via	  filming	  the	  same	  scene	  from	  different	  angles,	  we	   predicted	   the	   detection	   of	   structural	   violations	   regarding	   the	   actions	   perceived;	   2)	  continuity	   edits	   and	   discontinuity	   edits	   should	   differ	   at	   least	   in	   later	   stages	   of	   (post-­‐perceptual)	   processing	  with	   the	   precise	   differences	   reflecting	   the	   degree	   of	   deviation	   from	  real	  world	  perception	   as	  well	   as	   spectators’	   different	   awareness	   of	   the	   edits;	   and	   finally	   3)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  One	  idea	  to	  further	  test	  the	  immersive	  effect	  of	  camera	  movements	  might	  be	  to	  use	  a	  “priming”	  of	  the	  spectator:	  If	  camera	  movements	  can	  really	  help	  spectator’s	  immersion	  into	  the	  movie,	  an	  establishing	  shot	  produced	  via	  the	  use	  of	  the	  steadicam	  might	  be	  able	  to	  attenuate	  the	  differences	  between	  continuity	  edits	  and	  reverse	  shot	  as	  observed	  in	  our	  study.	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continuity	  edits	  should	  enhance	  motor	  cortex	  activations	  during	  action	  observation,	  as	  such	  action	   perception	   links	  were	   suggested	   to	   play	   a	  major	   role	   in	   feeling	   the	   presence	   of	   and	  reacting	  to	  a	  world	  on	  distance.	  	  	  Indeed,	  our	  findings	  firstly	  showed	  that	   in	  contrast	  to	  plain	  onsets	  of	  a	  new	  visual	  stimulus,	  within-­‐scene	   cuts	   correlated	   with	   modulations	   of	   early	   components	   previously	   associated	  with	   structural	   violation,	   ambiguous	   character	   and	  hard	   comprehensibility.	  Remarkably,	   no	  difference	  between	  continuity	  edits	  and	  reverse	  shots	  was	  found	  for	  these	  components.	  These	  results	   in	   fact	   support	   the	   notion	   that	   within-­‐scene	   cuts	   in	   general	   are	   detected	   in	   their	  violation	   of	   certain	   expectations	   regarding	   spatial/temporal/causal	   constancy,	   which	   are	  derived	  from	  real	  life.	  More	  concretely,	  they	  suggest	  that	  the	  visual	  changes	  evoked	  by	  a	  cut	  are	  categorized	  as	  structural/syntactic	  violations	  of	  the	  action	  perceived.	  	  Next,	  our	  results	  showed	  a	  late	  anterior	  left	  positivity	  more	  pronounced	  for	  continuity	  edits	  than	  for	  reverse	  shots.	  In	  previous	  research	  such	  a	  component	  has	  been	  found	  to	  occur	  after	  an	   early	   left	   anterior	   negativity,	   which	   was	   associated	   with	   the	   detection	   of	   a	   structural	  violation	   in	  visually	  presented	  action	   sequences	   if	   this	   violation	  was	   task	   relevant.	  The	   late	  anterior	  left	  positivity	  was	  therefore	  interpreted	  as	  possibly	  representing	  updating	  processes	  that	  serve	  the	  reanalysis	  of	   the	  scene	  (see	  Maffongelli	  et	  al.,	  submitted).	  The	  absence	  of	  this	  component	   for	   reverse	   shots	   in	   our	   study	   supports	   Zacks	   and	  Magliano’s	   hypothesis	   of	   the	  importance	   of	   such	   later	   remapping	   processes	   for	   spectators’	   experiences	   of	   the	   differente	  edits	  and	  their	  interpretation,	  which	  is	  that	  such	  processes	  might	  be	  suppressed	  for	  montages	  violating	  continuity	  editing	  rules.	  Furthermore,	  we	  found	  a	  late	  central	  right	  positivity	  (P4-­‐6)	  more	   pronounced	   for	   reverse	   shot	   montages,	   possibly	   indicating	   the	   access	   of	   reflexive	  consciousness,	   leading	   to	   the	  awareness	  of	   the	  perceptual	  process	   rather	   than	   its	   content	  –	  thus	  a	  rupture	  of	  spectators’	  immersion	  in	  the	  movie.	  	  Regarding	  ERD	  data,	  for	  continuity	  edits	  we	  found	  a	  stronger	  ERD	  of	  the	  mu-­‐rhythm	  in	  the	  left	  hemisphere,	  likely	  to	  reflect	  a	  selective	  response	  to	  the	  (right)	  hand	  moving	  in	  the	  observed	  video.	  On	   the	  contrary,	   for	  reverse	  shot	  condition,	   left	  and	  right	  hemispheres	  showed	  equal	  ERD.	  We	  suggested	  that	  this	  might	  be	  due	  to	  a	  short	  orientation-­‐deficit	   following	  the	  strong	  spatial	   violation	   caused	   by	   the	   reverse	   shot,	   that	   render	   left	   to	   right	   and	   right	   to	   left.	   In	  consequence,	   for	   reverse	   shots	  no	   clear	   contralateral	   lateralization	  of	   the	  ERD	  might	  occur,	  but	  rather	  both	  hemispheres	  should	  show	  equally	  strong	  ERD	  –	  as	  indeed	  it	  was	  found	  in	  the	  present	   experiment.	   We	   also	   suggested	   that	   there	   might	   be	   a	   link	   between	   this	   lack	   of	  lateralization	  and	  the	  different	  postperceptual	  processing	  of	  reverse	  shots	  described	  before.	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Remarkably,	  contrary	  to	  our	  initial	  hypotheses,	  ERD	  responses	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  their	  general	  strength	  between	  the	  two	  montage	  conditions.	  We	  proposed	  that	  this	  possibly	  indicates	  that	  continuity	  edits	  play	  less	  of	  an	  activating	  and	  more	  of	  a	  sustaining	  role	  with	  regard	  to	  action	  perception	   links	  possibly	   involved	   in	  spectators’	   film	  experiences.	  This	  can	  be	  corroborated	  by	  reflections	  about	  how	  similar	  edited	  moving	  images	  can	  in	  fact	  get	  to	  human	  vision.	  Indeed,	  it	   is	   relatively	   intuitive	   to	   assume	   that	   a	   camera	   carried	   by	   a	   human	   (thus	   a	   steadicam),	  records	   images	   closely	   resembling	   such	  a	  humans	  vision.	  However,	   though	  we	  might	   try	   to	  think	   about	   cuts	   as	   blinks	   or	   suppression	   of	   vision	   during	   saccades,	   these	   physiological	  phenomena	   are	   not	   enough	   to	   explain	   the	   jump	   in	   time	   and	   space	   elicited	   by	   edits	   –	   even	  when	  these	  are	  produced	  with	  compliance	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  continuity	  editing.	  	  Indeed,	   the	   consequent	   interpretation	   that	   continuity	   edits	   should	   be	   considered	   as	   “less	  violating”	   rather	   than	   “simulating”	   vision	   in	   the	   real	   world	   can	   also	   be	   supported	   by	   the	  results	   of	   our	   rating	   task	   which	   indicated	   that	   participants	   experience	   continuity	   edits	   as	  producing	  a	  more	  natural	  representation	  of	  the	  observed	  scene	  than	  that	  achieved	  by	  reverse	  shots,	   but	   that	   did	   not	   support	   any	   differences	   between	   the	   different	   representations	  regarding	  a	  feeling	  of	  involvement	  in	  the	  scene	  etc.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  critique	  against	  using	  a	  rating	  task	  of	  the	  kind	  performed	  in	  our	  experiment	  as	  a	  method	  to	  access	  the	  involvement	  in	  the	   scene,	   as	   uttered	   in	   Chapter	   III.1.3.4,	   still	   holds,	   and	   asks	   for	   future	   research	   finding	   a	  better	  approach	  to	  this	  question.	  	  Taken	  together	  these	  findings	  indicate	  that	  indeed	  film	  seems	  to	  be	  perceived	  in	  activation	  of	  habits	  and	  experiences	  of	  an	  embodied	  vision,	  developed	   in	   interaction	  with	  the	  real	  world.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  our	  data,	  which	  shows	  that	  visual	  ruptures	  such	  as	  those	  caused	  by	  edits	  are	  not	  perceived	  as	  plain	  onsets	  of	  a	  new	  visual	  stimulus,	  but	  rather	  as	  structural	  violations	  of	  a	  continuously	  perceived	  action.	  Moreover,	   images	  closely	  matching	   the	  circumstances	  of	  vision	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  including	  edits	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  continuity	  editing,	  seem	  to	  be	  processed	   via	   the	   activation	   of	   adjustment	   processes	   in	   later	   visual	   processing.	   Such	  processes	  possibly	  allow	  an	  undisturbed	  involvement	  in	  the	  movie,	  that	  is,	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  fictional	  world	  just	  as	  an	  active	  embodied	  activity	  exploring	  it.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  images	  vehemently	   violating	   the	   circumstances	   of	   vision	   as	   known	   from	   the	   real	   world,	   as	   for	  example	   reverse	   shots	   not	   complying	   to	   the	   180°	   rule	   of	   continuity	   editing,	   seem	   to	   elicit	  brain	   responses	   associated	   with	   the	   access	   of	   reflexive	   consciousness.	   In	   consequence	  spectators	  might	   be	   aware	   of	   the	   violation,	   and	  with	   that	   of	   the	  movie	   as	   a	   representation	  with	   its	   own	   narrative	   means.	   Such	   processes	   simultaneously	   might	   cause	   a	   rupture	   of	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spectators’	   movie	   experience,	   that	   is,	   the	   undisturbed	   experience	   of	   the	   content	   and	   plot,	  rather	  than	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  film	  as	  a	  medium.	  Exactly	  this	  experience	  is	  what	  is	  reported	  by	   cognitive	   film	   theory	   as	   the	   typical	   effect	   of	   reverse	   shots,	   if	   not	   embedded	   in	  circumstances	  helping	  to	  “hide”	  the	  cut44.	  Further	  research	  should	  explore	  if	  this	  difference	  in	  processing	  might	  be	   linked	   to	   the	   lack	  of	   hemispheric	   lateralization	  of	   the	  mu-­‐rhythm	  ERD	  observed	  in	  our	  study.	  	  Not	   supported	   was	   our	   hypothesis	   that	   continuity	   edits,	   though	   judged	   by	   participating	  spectators,	   as	   producing	   images	   more	   natural	   in	   character	   than	   reverse	   shot,	   do	   enhance	  motor	  cortex	  activations	  during	  action	  observation,	  as	  was	  observed	  for	  camera	  movements	  producing	  experiences	  close	  to	  human	  vision	  in	  real	   life	  (see	  Chapter	  III.1	  of	   this	  thesis).	  As	  explicated	  before,	  we	  do	  not	   take	  this	  as	  evidence	  against	  our	  hypothesis	   in	  general.	  Rather	  we	   suggest	   that	   this	   might	   indicate	   that	   continuity	   edits	   play	   less	   of	   an	   activating	   than	  sustaining	   role	   regarding	   action	   perception	   links	   that	   are	   possibly	   involved	   in	   enabling	  spectators’	   bodily	   involvement	   in	   the	   movie.	   We	   consider	   this	   a	   very	   interesting	   finding,	  characterizing	  the	  different	  narrative	  devices	  of	  film	  that	  we	  looked	  at	  so	  far.	  	  	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  these	  interpretations	  in	  the	  following	  summary	  and	  conclusive	  discussion	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Another	  rule	  of	  continuity	  editing	  for	  example	  proposes	  to	  always	  let	  reverse	  shots,	  if	  needed,	  coincide	  with	  moments	  in	  a	  shot	  that	  include	  a	  lot	  of	  fast	  and	  large	  movements	  possibly	  eliciting	  saccades	  or	  even	  blinks	  in	  the	  perceiver,	  which	  are	  able	  to	  hide	  the	  cut.	  See	  for	  example	  Smith	  (2005)	  or	  Murch	  (2001).	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IV.	  Summary	  and	  Conclusion	  	  This	   thesis	   is	   an	   illustration	   of	   how	  4EA	   approaches	   to	   cognition	   can	   be	   used	   by	   empirical	  cognitive	  neuroscience	   to	  develop	  new	  experimental	  hypotheses	  and	  setups	  delivering	  new	  insights	  regarding	  key	  questions	  about	  the	  human	  mind	  and	  in	  particular	  about	  human	  film	  perception.	  The	  main	  objective	  of	  the	  research	  presented	  here	  was	  to	  illuminate	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  underlying	   film	  perception,	   that	   is,	   the	  special	  relation	  between	  edited	   live	  action	  moving	  images	  and	  the	  spectator.	  As	  underlined	  in	  Chapter	  I,	  films	  and	  movies	  are	  ever	  more	  present	  in	  today’s	  life.	  Indeed,	  most	  recent	  surveys	  reported	  that	  for	  about	  1/5	  of	  our	  lifetime	  we	  encounter	  the	  world	  exclusively	  through	  movies.	  Nevertheless,	  our	  knowledge	  about	  the	  cognitive	   processes	   supporting	   this	   encounter	   is	   still	   rather	   limited.	   This	   is	   a	   curious	   fact,	  given	   the	   almost	   bipolar	   nature	   of	   film.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   objectively	   seen,	   the	   world	   as	  represented	  in	  film,	  due	  to	  the	  use	  of	  camera	  and	  montage,	  looks	  very	  different	  from	  the	  way	  we	  perceive	   it	   in	   real	   life	   interactions.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   film	   is	   also	  widely	   known	   for	   its	  strong	  illusive	  power,	  sometimes	  even	  described	  as	  eliciting	  a	  bodily	  surrender,	  drawing	  the	  spectator	   in	   the	   fictional	   world	   without	   any	   trace	   of	   constant	   perceptual	   violations.	   This	  makes	  film	  perception	  one	  of	  the	  mysteries	  of	  human	  cognition,	  and	  suggests	  that	  filmmakers	  could	  be	  conceived	  as	  implicit	  specialists	  of	  perception,	  thus	  making	  their	  products	  –	  movies	  –	  worth	  being	  studied	  also	  by	  Cognitive	  Neuroscience.	  Remarkably,	  hypotheses	  and	  designs	  guiding	  empirical	  investigations	  crucially	  depend	  on	  the	  theoretical	   framework	   from	  which	   they	   originated.	   Traditional	   cognitivist	   views	   on	   human	  cognition	   as	   outlined	   in	   Chapter	   II.1	   conceptualize	   cognition	   as	   relying	   on	   symbolic	  transformations	  designed	  to	  combine	  and	  fill	  in	  the	  holes	  of	  passively	  registered	  data	  from	  the	  environment,	  to	  create	  detailed	  inner	  representations	  of	  the	  world	  and	  of	  our	  possibilities	  of	  acting	   within	   it.	   Though	   so	   far	   this	   framework	   has	   led	   to	   enormous	   progress	   in	   research	  exploring	   the	   human	  mind	   and	   brain,	   it	   often	   neglects	   certain	   aspects	   –	   that	   is	   the	   human	  body	   and	   its	   interactions	   with	   the	   world	   and	   other	   animate	   beings	   –	   that	   should	   be	  considered	   as	   equally	   important	   for	   cognition	   as	   the	   architecture	   of	   the	   human	   brain.	  Following	  this	   insight,	  embedded,	  embodied,	  enactive,	  extended	  and	  affective	  approaches	  to	  the	   mind	   describe	   cognition	   as	   a	   dynamical	   interaction	   between	   an	   animate	   body	   and	   an	  enlived	  world,	  relying	  on	  experience	  and	  skillful	  behavior	  rather	  than	  on	  innate	  and	  learned	  knowledge	  describable	  in	  terms	  of	  rules	  and	  conventions.	  In	  the	  last	  decades	  such	  approaches	  have	  been	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  use	  also	  when	  trying	  to	  understand	  human	  perception	  of	  arts	  and	  media.	   Chapter	   II.2	   outlined	   this	   development	  with	   a	   special	   focus	   on	   new	  hypotheses	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generated	  within	   theories	  on	   the	  perception	  of	   visual	   images.	   Interestingly,	   it	  was	   a	  neuro-­‐scientific	   finding	   that	   recently	   boosted	   positions	   emphasizing	   the	   role	   of	   the	   body	   in	   art	  perception:	   the	   discovery	   of	   mirror	   neurons.	   Precisely,	   Freedberg	   and	   Gallese	   (2007)	   pro-­‐posed	   that	   at	   a	   basic	   level	   beholders	   experience	   their	   relationship	  with	   visual	   art	   as	   being	  bodily	  affected	  both	  by	  the	  represented	  content	  and	  by	  its	  representation.	  They	  proposed	  that	  certain	  aesthetic	  experiences	  at	  a	  basic	   level	  rely	  on	  inner	  embodied	  simulation	  of	  what	  the	  image	   represents	   or	   of	   the	   hand	   gestures	   that	   created	   it	   (as,	   for	   example,	   the	   trace	   of	   the	  artist’s	   creative	   act	   captured	   in	   expressive	   brushstrokes).	   They	   furthermore	   suggested	   that	  such	  resonance-­‐phenomena	  might	  crucially	  rely	  on	  direct	  action-­‐perception	   links,	   like	  those	  provided	   by	   the	   mirror	   mechanism.	   These	   links	   can	   be	   automatically	   activated	   not	   only	  during	  real	  world	  observation	  but	  also	  during	  the	  perception	  of	  images	  portraying	  the	  world.	  Precisely,	   such	   activation	   consists	   of	   the	   articulated	   coming	   into	   play	   of	   motor	   or	   sensory	  regions	  of	  the	  brain,	  despite	  the	  lack	  of	  actual	  movements	  or	  sensations	  –	  an	  event	  possibly	  serving	   direct	   understanding	   of	   the	   represented	   via	   the	   support	   of	   simulation	   processes.	  Some	  scholars	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  such	  activations	  might	  be	  responsible	  for	  our	  feeling	  of	  the	   presence	   of	   things	   (even	   in	   depictions)	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   correlating	  with	   bodily	  engagements	  (explorative	  movements)	  not	  only	  exploring	  the	  depicted,	  but	  also	  the	  depiction	  itself.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  might	  lead	  to	  the	  development	  of	  new	  perceptual	  skills	  via	  the	  interaction	  with	   artworks	   (see	   for	   example	   Fingerhut,	   2014).	   Remarkably,	   research	   carried	   out	   during	  the	   last	   years	   has	   indeed	   started	   to	   empirically	   support	   Gallese	   &	   Freedberg’s	   claims	   by	  showing	   that	   also	   static	   images	   and	   traces	   of	   actions	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   activate	   and	  distinctly	  modulate	  the	  cortical	  motor	  system	  of	  observers’	  brains.	  	  Film	  experiences,	  as	  most	  of	  us	  would	  admit,	  even	  more	  than	  other	  visual	  media	  experiences,	  seem	  to	  involve	  strong	  bodily	  affection.	  This	  might	  be	  the	  reason	  why	  cognitive	  film	  science	  of	  the	   last	   decades,	   more	   willingly	   than	   other	   subjects	   within	   arts	   and	   media	   science,	   have	  quickly	   picked	   up	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   film	   perception	   might	   crucially	   rely	   on	   embodied	  mechanisms	  of	  human	  cognition	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  Remarkably	  the	  discussion	  within	  this	  field	  did	   not	   focus	   only	   on	   the	   role	   of	   action	  perception	   links.	   Rather,	   ecological	   film	   theory	  has	  argued	   that	   film	   derives	   its	   illusionary	   power	   from	   the	   complete	   recruitment	   of	   embodied	  perception,	  characterized	  by	  crucial	  experiences	  with	  perceptual	  stimuli	  that,	  judged	  from	  an	  objective	   stance,	   are	  anything	  but	  of	   a	   continuous	  and	   transparent	  nature.	   In	   line	  with	  4EA	  approaches	   as	  portrayed	   in	  Chapter	   II.1,	   scholars	   supporting	   this	   theory	   assume	   that	   these	  fundamental	   experiences	  derived	   from	  a	   continuous	  bodily	  exploration	  of	   the	  world	   can	  be	  used	   not	   to	   substitute	   information	   lacking	   in	   the	   movies	   or	   to	   transform	   “wrong”	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representation	  of	  film	  into	  something	  known,	  but	  rather	  to	  equally	  enter	  in	  interaction	  with	  a	  fictional	   world.	   Such	   an	   interaction,	   so	   it	   is	   further	   suggested,	   is	   substantiated	   by	   moving	  images	  closely	  simulating	  vision	  as	  known	  from	  us	  from	  real	  world	  perception.	  On	  the	  base	  of	  this	  grounding	  then,	  even	  violations	  of	  visual	  habits,	  such	  as	  weird	  perspectives	  or	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  jumps,	  do	  not	  stop	  the	  interactive	  relationship	  completely,	  but	  are	  only	  registered	  in	  their	   deviating	   nature.	   Interestingly,	   traditional	   narrative	   film	   devices	   such	   as	   camera	  movement	   and	   montage,	   according	   to	   the	   descriptions	   found	   (see	   Chapter	   II.3,	   III.1.1	   and	  III.2.1),	  can	  play	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  these	  processes.	  Via	  the	  creation	  of	  moving	  images	  that	  crucially	   substantiate	   experiences	   from	   real	  world	   perception	   by	   closely	   resembling	   vision	  known	  from	  this	  normal	  interaction	  with	  the	  world,	  some	  camera	  movements	  and	  montages	  are	  suggested	   to	   lay	   the	  very	  groundings	  of	   spectators’	   immersive	  experience.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  the	  same	  narrative	  devices	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  create	  experiences	  different	  from	  what	  is	  known	  to	  us	   in	  real	   life,	   thus	  generating	  surprise,	  shock	  or	  estrangement,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  maybe	  step	  by	  step	  extending	  our	  perceptual	  habits	  and	  skills.	  	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   these	   collected	   assumptions,	   several	   hypotheses	   guided	   the	   first	  neuroscientific	   experiments	   investigating	   the	   neural	   underpinnings	   of	   film	   perception,	  focusing	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  camera	  movement	  and	  montage	  on	  brain	  activity.	  	  These	  hypotheses	  comprise	  (see	  Chapter	  II.4):	  1) Detecting	  Violations	  of	  Visual	  Habits:	  New	  Stimulus	  or	  Violation	  of	  Action	  Moving	   images,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   recruitment	   of	   embodied	   vision	   as	   a	   perceptual	  activity	   exploring	   a	   constant	   and	   continuous	   world	   known	   from	   experience,	   are	  evaluated	   as	   the	   experiences	   of	   an	   animate	   being	   exploring	   its	   enlived	   environment	  rather	  than	  a	  row	  of	  snapshots	  of	  different	  quality	  in	  need	  of	  interpretation.	  Violations	  of	   visual	   habits	   caused	   by	   the	   special	   narrative	   devices	   of	   film,	   such	   as	   camera	  movements	  and	  montage,	  should	  thus	  be	  detected	  as	  violations	  of	  the	  observed	  actions	  rather	  than	  as	  plain	  visual	  ruptures	  or	  changes.	  2) Processing	  Violations	  of	  Visual	  Habits:	  Repair	  or	  Reflexion	  Nevertheless,	  the	  degree	  of	  similarity	  of	  the	  moving	  images	  with	  visual	  impressions	  as	  known	   to	   us	   from	   our	   normal	   interaction	   with	   the	   real	   world	   should	   significantly	  modulate	   the	   activations	   found.	   Specifically,	   different	  montage	   techniques,	   described	  to	  more	   or	   less	   violate	   constancy	   expectations	   derived	   from	   real	  world	   interactions,	  should	   be	   associable	   to	   differences	   in	   late	   stages	   of	   cognitive	   processing,	   possibly	  illuminating	   the	  diverging	  descriptions	   of	   these	   kind	  of	  montages	   in	   film	   theory	   and	  the	  spectators’	  experience.	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3) Familiar	  Vision	  and	  Action	  Perception	  Links	  Lastly,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  suggestions	  on	  a	  possible	  role	  of	  action-­‐perception	  links	  such	  as	   the	  mirror	  mechanism	   in	   visual	   art	   and	  media	  perception,	   it	   can	  be	  hypothesized	  that	  moving	   images	  more	   strongly	   resembling	   real	   world	   visual	   experiences	   elicit	   a	  stronger	   activation	   of	   the	   mirror	   mechanism,	   possibly	   underlying	   spectators’	  immersion	   in	   the	   movie	   by	   initiating	   bodily	   simulations	   or	   explorations	   with	   a	  (fictional)	  world	  –	  a	  world	  that	  exactly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  activations	  is	  felt	  as	  being	  in	  our	  grasp.	  	  Indeed,	   the	   experiments	   designed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   these	   hypotheses	   provided	   crucial	   new	  information	  about	  neural	  activities	  during	  movie	  watching	   that	  were	   interpreted	  within	   the	  given	  framework.	  Precisely,	  the	  first	  study,	  focusing	  on	  hypothesis	  3	  by	  investigating	  the	  effect	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  camera	  movements	  and	  uses	  on	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  motor	  cortex,	  revealed	  that	  the	  time-­‐course	   of	   mu-­‐rhythm	   ERD/ERS/rebound	   during	   the	   observation	   of	   actions	   represented	   in	  short	  movie	  clips	  correlated	  with	  the	  camera	  movements	  employed	  to	  create	  the	  movie.	  More	  precisely,	   the	  modulation	  observed	   seem	   to	  be	  dependent	  on	   the	   resemblance	  between	   the	  effect	  of	  camera	  movements	  and	  ordinary	  human	  vision.	  Visual	  experience	  during	  the	  movie	  judged	  as	  being	  closest	  to	  visual	  experience	  in	  real	  life,	  elicited	  the	  strongest	  ERD,	  indicating	  a	  higher	  activation	  of	  the	  mirror	  mechanism.	  Furthermore,	  the	  more	  artificial	  ways	  of	  moving	  or	  using	  the	  camera,	  such	  as	  dolly	  cam	  and	  zoom,	  correlated	  with	  an	  earlier	  rebound	  of	   the	  mu-­‐rhythm,	  indicating	  an	  earlier	  shut	  down	  of	  the	  mirror	  mechanism.	  We	  therefore	  proposed	  that	   the	   familiarity	   effect	   of	   the	   visual	   traces	   of	   camera	   movements	   in	   filmed	   stimuli	  modulates	   the	   activation	   of	   the	  mirror	  mechanism,	   particularly	   during	   observation	   of	   goal-­‐related	  hand	  actions.	  	  	  Unfortunately	  experimental	  setups	  and	  results	  did	  only	  partly	  supported	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	   activation	   of	   the	  mirror	  mechanism	   has	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	   spectator’s	   involvement	  with	   the	   scene,	   and	   therefore	   his	   immersion	   in	   the	   fictional	   world.	   Furthermore,	   findings	  raised	  the	  crucial	  question	  if	  the	  additional	  activations	  found	  are	  actually	  due	  to	  an	  enhanced	  activation	   of	   hand	   areas	   in	   the	  motor	   cortex	   due	   to	   the	   familiar	   vision,	   or	   to	   an	   additional	  activation	  of	  areas	  concerning	  muscles	  needed	  for	  walking,	  such	  as	  the	  feet	  areas.	  This	  latter	  possibility	   would	   indicate	   that	   the	   mirror	   mechanism	   can	   not	   only	   be	   activated	   by	   the	  perception	  of	  goal	  related	  actions	  of	  other	  agents,	  or	  the	  traces	  of	  those	  actions	  performed	  in	  the	  past,	   but	   also	  by	   the	  perception	  of	   the	  perceptual	  movements	   of	   another	   agent,	   by	   this	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crucially	  marking	   perception	   as	   a	   goal	   related	   activity.	   Clearly,	   future	   research	  needs	   to	   be	  employed	  to	  further	  illuminate	  these	  issues,	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  why	  we	  experience	  film	  the	  intense	  way	  we	  do.	  	  Despite	   these	   open	   questions,	   our	   study	   gave	   first	   support	   for	   Hypothesis	   3	   on	   our	   list,	  predicting	  action	  perception	  links	  to	  have	  a	  fundamental	  role	  in	  film	  perception	  by	  supporting	  spectators’	   immersion	   in	  a	   fictional	  world,	  by	  simulating	  visual	   conditions	  known	   from	  real	  life.	   Specifically,	   we	   found	   that	   the	   mirror	   mechanism	   is	   modulated	   by	   the	   spectator’s	  familiarity	  with	  the	  vision	  simulated	  by	  the	  effect	  of	  camera	  movements	  and	  uses.	  	  Next,	  the	  second	  study	  investigating	  the	  effect	  of	  different	  kind	  of	  montages	  on	  brain	  activity	  (ERP	  and	  ERD	  analysis,	  including	  tests	  of	  Hypotheses	  1,	  2	  and	  3)	  showed	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  plain	  onsets	  of	  a	  new	  visual	  stimulus,	  within-­‐scene	  cuts	  correlated	  with	  modulations	  of	  early	  components	  of	  brain	  electrical	  activity,	  which	  previously	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  structural	  violation,	   ambiguous	   character	   and	   hard	   comprehensibility.	   Remarkably,	   no	   difference	  between	  continuity	  edits	  and	  reverse	  shots	  was	  found	  for	  these	  components.	  These	  results	  in	  fact	   support	   the	   notion	   that	   within-­‐scene	   cuts	   in	   general	   are	   detected	   in	   their	   violation	   of	  certain	  expectations	  regarding	  spatial,	   temporal	  and	  causal	  constancy	  derived	   from	  real	   life	  (Hypothesis	  3).	  More	  concretely,	  the	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  visual	  changes	  evoked	  by	  a	  cut	  are	   first	   of	   all	   categorized	   as	   structural/syntactic	   violations	   of	   the	   action	   perceived,	  independently	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  violation.	  	  Next,	   our	   results	   showed	   a	   late	   anterior	   left	   positivity	   that	   was	   more	   pronounced	   for	  continuity	   edits	   than	   for	   reverse	   shots.	   In	   previous	   research,	   such	   a	   component	   has	   been	  found	  to	  occur	  after	  an	  early	  left	  anterior	  negativity,	  which	  was	  associated	  with	  the	  detection	  of	   a	   structural	   violation	   in	   visually	   presented	   action	   sequences,	   if	   the	   violation	   is	   task-­‐relevant.	  The	   late	  anterior	   left	  positivity	  was	   therefore	   interpreted	  as	  possibly	  representing	  updating	  processes	   that	  serve	  the	  reanalysis	  of	   the	  scene	  (see	  Maffongelli	  et	  al.,	   submitted).	  The	   absence	   of	   this	   component	   for	   reverse	   shots	   in	   our	   study	   supports	   a	   hypothesis	   first	  proposed	   by	   Zacks	   and	   Magliano	   who	   suggested	   that	   a	   suppression	   of	   postperceptual	  processing	   in	   visual	   regions	  might	   cause	   the	   perceptual	   salience	   of	   non-­‐continuity	   edits	   in	  regarding	  spectators’	  experiences.	  Furthermore,	  we	  found	  a	   late	  central	  right	  positivity	  (P4-­‐6),	   which	   was	   more	   pronounced	   for	   reverse	   shot	   montages,	   possibly	   indicating	   an	  enhancement	  of	  this	  salience-­‐effect	  due	  to	  the	  access	  of	  reflexive	  consciousness	  leading	  to	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  perceptual	  process	  rather	  than	  of	  its	  content	  (all	  Hypothesis	  2).	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Regarding	  ERD	  data,	  for	  continuity	  edits	  we	  found	  stronger	  ERD	  of	  the	  mu-­‐rhythm	  in	  the	  left	  hemisphere,	   likely	   due	   to	   a	   selective	   response	   to	   the	   (right)	   hand	  moving	   in	   the	   observed	  video.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   in	   reverse	   shot	   condition	   left	   and	   right	   hemispheres	   showed	   equal	  ERD.	  We	  suggested	  that	  this	  might	  be	  due	  to	  a	  short	  orientation-­‐deficit,	  following	  the	  strong	  spatial	   violation	   caused	   by	   the	   reverse	   shot,	   who,	   regarding	   the	   spectator’s	   experience	  abruptly	  turns	  left	  to	  right	  and	  vice	  versa.	  In	  consequence,	  for	  reverse	  shots	  no	  clear	  contra-­‐lateral	   lateralization	   of	   the	   ERD	   might	   occur,	   but	   rather	   both	   hemispheres	   should	   show	  equally	  strong	  ERD	  –	  as	  indeed	  was	  found	  in	  the	  present	  experiment.	  Future	  research	  has	  to	  qualify	   if	   this	  activation	  contributes	   to	   the	  differences	  between	  continuity	  edits	  and	  reverse	  shots	  in	  later	  stages	  of	  cognitive	  processing	  as	  reported	  above.	  	  Taken	  together	  this	  study	  provided	  strong	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  Hypotheses	  1	  and	  2	  of	  our	  list,	  predicting	   that	  violations	  of	  visual	  habits	  would	  be	  cognitively	  detected	  as	  violations	  of	  actions,	  and	  that	  later	  postperceptual	  processing	  underlies	  spectators’	  subjective	  experiences	  that	  differentiate	  between	  moving	   images	  similar	   to	  vision	   from	  the	  real	  world	  and	  moving	  images	  clearly	  deviating	  from	  what	  is	  known	  by	  bodily	  experience.	  	  As	  maybe	  one	  of	  our	  most	  interesting	  findings	  in	  this	  study	  we	  furthermore	  discovered	  that,	  contrary	   to	   our	   initial	   hypotheses	   (Hypothesis	   3),	   ERD	   responses	   did	   not	   differ	   in	   their	  general	   strength	   between	   the	   two	   montage	   conditions.	   This	   might	   indicate	   that	   camera	  movements	  and	  montage	  might	  have	  different	  influences	  on	  cognition	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  on	  film	  perception.	  While	  ecological	  camera	  movements,	  such	  as	  those	  elicited	  by	  use	  of	  the	  steadicam	  producing	  moving	  images	  very	  close	  to	  perception	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  might	  have	  the	  power	   to	   actually	   enhance	   or	   even	   initiate	   spectators’	   immersion	   in	   the	   movie,	   continuity	  edits,	  as	  the	  declared	  equivalent	  of	  an	  ecological	  edit,	  might	  have	  only	  a	  sustaining	  role	  in	  this	  process.	  Again,	  future	  research	  has	  to	  further	  explore	  this	  hypothesis.	  	  	  Lastly,	  it	  should	  be	  stressed	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  our	  studies	  are	  obviously	  relevant	  also	  outside	  the	  specific	  field	  of	  film	  theory.	  	  One	  of	  the	  fields	  that	  could	  profit	  most	  from	  our	  findings	  might	  indeed	  be	  empirical	  research	  about	   cognition	   itself.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   most	   experiments	   exploring	   cognition	   and	  perception	   crucially	   rely	   on	   films	   and	   movies,	   which	   are	   assumed	   to	   represent	   a	   way	   to	  present	  to	  participants	  the	  real	  world	  under	  highly	  controlled	  conditions.	  Our	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  representations	  themselves	  might	  have	  a	  crucial	  effect	  on	  the	  results	  as	  differences	  with	  visual	  perception	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  elicited	  by	  the	  representation	  chosen,	  proved	  able	  to	  not	  only	  elicit	  quantitative	  differences	  in	  the	  measurements	  (such	  as	  enhanced	  or	  attenuated	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activations),	  but	  even	  elicit	  different	  postperceptual	  processing	  of	  the	  stimuli.	  This	  argues	  for	  caution	  in	  interpretating	  results	  possibly	  affected	  by	  such	  confounding	  factors,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  application	  of	  more	  ecological	  studies	  in	  cognitive	  neuroscience.	  	  
	  Furthermore,	   given	   the	   fact	   that	  our	   findings	  essentially	   support	  an	  ecological	   view	  on	   film	  perception	   (by	   supporting	   Hypotheses	   1,	   2	   and	   3),	   they	   should	   stimulate	   more	   research	  following	  this	  line.	  This	  includes:	  	  a)	  Other	  Violations	  and	  Familiarities	  Needed	  are	  studies	  extending	  the	  investigations	  presented	  here	  to	  other	  uses	  of	  film’s	  special	  narrative	   devices.	   Obvious	   examples	   of	   such	   investigations	   lie	   in	   further	   explorations	  regarding	   the	   rules	   given	   by	   continuity	   editing.	   Such	   comparisons	   include	   continuity	   edits	  versus	   jump	   cuts,	   match	   action	   edits	   versus	   non	   match	   action	   edits	   etc.	   It	   should	   also	   be	  illuminating	   to	   investigate	   the	   influence	   of	   measures	   that	   continuity	   editing	   describes	   as	  helping	  to	  overcome	  certain	  violations,	  such	  as	  strong	  movement	  in	  the	  scene	  hiding	  cuts	  via	  eliciting	  saccades	  or	  special	  effects	  that	  attenuate	  the	  abruptness	  of	  a	  cut	  such	  as	  fade	  ins	  or	  fade	  outs.	  It	  could	  be	  equally	  interesting	  to	  investigate	  the	  possibilities	  of	  digital	  film	  such	  as	  slow	  and	  fast	  motion,	  matting,	  virtual	  backgrounds	  and	  so	  forth,	  all	  representing	  experiences	  not	  known	  to	  us	  from	  real	  life.	  	  b)	  Moving	  Image	  and	  Sound	  A	  very	  interesting	  topic	  consists	  in	  the	  interaction	  of	  moving	  image	  and	  sound.	  Questions	  to	  be	  asked	  here	  for	  example	  comprise	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  smoothing	  effect	  of	  continuous	  sounds	  overlaying	  discontinuity	  edits.	  It	  is	  thinkable	  that	  such	  combinations	  have	  a	  crucial	  effect	  on	  brain	  activity	  turning	  discontinuity	  into	  perceived	  continuity	  also	  regarding	  brain	  activity.	  	  c)	  New	  Perceptual	  Habits	  One	  should	  also	  seriously	  consider	  the	  claim,	  repeated	  throughout	  the	  whole	  thesis,	  that	  film	  perception,	  thought	  of	  an	  interaction	  between	  a	  spectator	  and	  a	  fictional	  world,	  should	  have	  the	  power	  to	  evoke	  the	  development	  of	  new	  perceptual	  habits.	  As	  also	  Sobchack	  stresses,	  film	  finally	  should	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  part	  of	  our	  extended	  mind	  incorporated	  into	  one’s	  being.	  Just	  as	  a	  far-­‐sighted	  person	  is	  not	  able	  to	  read	  a	  book	  without	  the	  help	  of	  glasses,	  films	  enable	  us	   a	   vision	  more	   and	  more	  deviating	   from	  what	  we	   are	   capable	   of	   doing	   as	   a	   result	   of	   our	  learning	  in	  real	   life.	  It	  seems	  highly	  interesting	  to	  try	  to	  trace	  the	  transient	  changes	  in	  brain	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responses,	   that	   should	   be	   involved	   in	   these	   extensions,	   possibly	   rendering	   effects	   initially	  perceived	   as	   strong	   violations	   into	   slight	   deviations	   and	   lastly	   even	   into	   known	  perceptual	  circumstances.	   Something	   like	   this	  might	  be	   realizable	  by	   comparing	   the	   film	  perception	  of	  experts	   (that	   is	   filmmakers,	   cameramen	   or	   editors)	  with	   that	   of	   amateurs.	   It	  might	   also	   be	  worth	   to	   try	  simulating	   the	  development	  of	  expertise	  by	  repeatedly	  presenting	   to	  amateurs	  new	  kind	  of	  moving	  images,	  comparing	  neural	  activations	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	   kind	   of	   training,	   while	   looking	   for	   the	   enduing	   changes.	   Lastly	   it	   should	   be	   highly	  interesting	  to	  trace	  perceptual	  habits	  most	  likely	  developed	  in	  the	  interaction	  with	  movies	  in	  their	  influence	  on	  life	  off	  the	  screen,	  such	  as	  in	  imagination,	  memory,	  dreams	  or	  even	  visual	  behavior	  of	  images	  and	  the	  world	  in	  general.	  	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  more	  to	  do	  on	  our	  way	  to	  understanding	  what	  it	  means	  to	  watch	  a	  movie.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  suggested	  and	  elaborated	  a	  new	  theoretical	  background	  for	  human	  film	  perception	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   which	   first	   empirical	   research	  was	   designed	   and	   conducted.	   Results	   of	   the	  reported	  experiments	  delivered	  strong	  evidence	  for	  the	  basic	  hypotheses	  made.	  This	  showed	  that	   the	   embedding	   of	   neuroscientific	   research	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   4EA	   approaches	   to	  cognition	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   establish	   an	   important	   and	   new	   framework	   for	   future	  interdisciplinary	  research	  on	  our	  relation	  to	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  media	  of	  today:	  Film.	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